UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

THE PERPETUAL COMPANY OF THE INDIES IN THE DAYS OF DUPLEIX;
ITS ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR THE HANDLING OF INDIAN COMMERCE, 1722-1754

WILBERT HAROLD DALGLIESH

A THESIS

IN HISTORY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILADELPHIA
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

- SKETCH MAP OF INDIA -

Preface

A careful examination of the map of present day India reveals the none too well known fact that scattered along the coasts of that great peninsula are several French possessions, Pondicherry, Karikal, Yanaon, and Mahé; and in the valley of the Ganges is Chandernagor. Scant heritage, is this, of the enterprise of Frenchmen of bygone days.

In the reign of Louis XII, 1498-1515, the first sea voyages from France to India were undertaken. Throughout the rest of the sixteenth century there were desultory and unorganized efforts to establish trade relations between these two countries. Then in 1604, Henry IV,wittingly or unwittingly following the example of the English and Dutch governments which had chartered India Companies, the former in 1600, the latter in 1602, gave his sanction to such enterprise by issuing the first charter to a French India Company. For fifteen years it was to enjoy the monopoly of French trade with the East. It was succeeded by other companies; with one of these is associated the name of Richelieu, with another that of Colbert. The latter was practically ruined by the wars of Louis XIV and the restrictions which that monarch placed on the importation of cotton and silks from India. John Law gave new life to the company by joining it and other trading companies in one great commercial organization, the *Compagnie perpétuelle des Indes.*

Much has been written about this Company and its outstanding governor, Dupleix. Until recently these accounts have been almost exclusively of two types, histories of its long military struggle with English rivals, and biographies of Dupleix. The administration and commercial activities of the Company have been generally overlooked, perhaps in part due to a lack of readily available material.

Interest in French Indian history has been greatly stimulated in the past twenty-five years by the formation of the *Société de l'Histoire de l'Inde Française,* which has published much material long reposing in the archives at Pondicherry. The *Revue Historique de l'Inde Française* established in 1916, several re-

cently published works such as Crepin's *Mahé de La Bourdonnais*, Martineau's *Origines de Mahé* and *Dupleix et l'Inde Française*, and the translation from the Tamoul of Ananda Ranga Pillai's famous *Journal* have served a similar purpose.

Only one general history of the Company has been written, Weber's *La Compagnie Française des Indes*, (1604-1875). This work has been the standard reference on the subject for nearly thirty years; yet one looks in it in vain for a satisfactory treatment of many topics such as the colonial end of the administrative machinery, finance in India, justice, relations with the French Government and Indian rulers, and the handling of commerce. In this monograph it has been my purpose to throw light upon these points. I have dealt with the Company's organization between 1722 and 1754 primarily in relation to its Indian activities. The administrative machinery has been sketched, and an effort made to show the close dependence of the Company on the Crown. The major portion of the treatise is devoted to the commercial pursuits of the Company—not simply to the purchase and sale of goods, but to the many problems associated directly or indirectly with Oriental trade, namely problems of finance and the effort to establish a satisfactory economic basis of operation, to secure trading posts, to develop peaceful, and when possible, friendly relations with native rulers and rival European companies, to organize an efficient and satisfied group of employees—in brief to show how and with what success the Company functioned.

This study centers around the thirty three years in which Dupleix was associated with the Company in India. It was a period in which the Company passed through many lean years to reach the apogee of its financial prosperity, to say nothing of its military renown. By starting with 1722, the year of Dupleix's arrival in India, one can pass by with briefest mention the decidedly involved period in the history of the Company when it was under the control of Law, but when it was a French financial institution rather than a commercial organization for the development of trade with the East. To carry the story beyond the departure of France's colonial hero from India in 1754 would serve no useful purpose, for there is no essential change in the organization of the

Company from that date until its charter privileges were suspended in 1769. Attention has been confined to the activities of the Company in so far as they relate to India, although its interests included Canada, Louisiana, Sengal, Guinea, the Isles of France and Bourbon, and China. The nature of the sources have made this limitation desirable; time and space have rendered it essential. No attempt has been made to give a detailed chronicle of either the Company's little known commercial history or its oft narrated military activities.

The source material for the period chosen is particularly abundant, including as it does the recently published *Archives de l'Inde,* Dupleix's voluminous correspondence, and the comprehensive *Journal* of his native dubash, Pillai, which serves as a check on the French sources. For no other period of the Company's history is there such a varied collection of contemporary documents.

The author has been materially assisted in his work by many. M. Alfred Martineau, to whose writings and editorial achievements all students of French Indian history owe a debt of gratitude, first turned my attention to the Company when, in the winter of 1924-25 he delivered a course of lectures on Dupleix at the *Collège de France.* During the course of my research work officials in many libraries and archives have shown themselves to be most obliging. M. Paul Roussier of the *Archives du Ministère des Colonies* and M. Marec of Lorient have rendered especial service in drawing to my attention valuable materials in their collections and facilitating my use of them. To M. Pierre Dupuy, Secretary of the Canadian Legation at Paris, I am indebted for the time and trouble he took in arranging for my admission to various archives. Professors W. E. Lingelbach and A. P. Watts of the University of Pennsylvania have taken a friendly and helpful interest in the work, aiding especially in its organization.

Two awards, an Ontario government scholorship for study in France, and a Harrison fellowship at the University of Pennsylvania afforded me the opportunity to do research work which otherwise would have been impossible. But valuable as this aid has been, the information acquired would probably never have assumed printed form had it not been for the faithful assistance of

my wife who in the course of four years has served in the multifold capacity of research assistant, secretary, literary and historical critic.

Contractions Used in Notes

Arch. Aff. Etr.—*Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères*
Arch. Col. —*Archives du Ministère des Colonies*
Arch. Lorient —*Archives du Ministère de la Marine,* in Arsenal at Lorient.
Arch. Marine —*Archives du Ministère de la Marine*
Arch. Nantes —*Archives Communales,* Nantes
Arch. Nat. —*Archives Nationales,* Paris
Arch. S. et O. —*Archives Départemental, Seine et Oise,* Versailles.
Bib. Arsenal —*Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal,* Paris
Bib. Nat. —*Bibliothèque Nationale, Département des Manuscrits,* Paris
C.S.C.C. —*Correspondance du Conseil supérieur de Pondichéry avec le Conseil de Chandernagor;* 3 volumes.
C.S.P.V. —*Procès Verbaux des délibérations du Conseil souverain de la Compagnie;* volume I.
Procès Verbaux des délibérations du Conseil supérieur de Pondichéry; volumes II, III.
P. Co. —*Correspondance du Conseil supérieur du Pondichéry et de la Compagnie;* 5 volumes.

Table of Weights and Measures

French monetary values
20 deniers equal 1 sol
20 sol equal 1 livre

Marc, 8 ounces of silver, varying from 46 to 51 livres in value; usually figured at 48 livres.

Indian weights and measures had no absolutely fixed values, but varied with both time and place.

16 annas equalled 1 roupie
1 roupie equalled about 2.4 livres
1 pagoda equalled about 8.5 livres or 3.5 roupies
1 piastre equalled from 5 to 7 livres
lac equalled 100,000, but was also used loosely for any large sum.

bard, approximately 480 pounds
candil, 540 to 560 pounds
cobe, measure from the shoulder to the finger tips
man, 24 pounds

CHAPTER I

The Paris Administration

One of the most important commercial organizations of eighteenth century France was the *Compagnie perpétuelle des Indes.* It had been established by a royal edict of May, 1719, by the simple expedient of consolidating the Company of the Occident, Colbert's East India Company, and the China Company. It is popularly known as Law's Company. Unlike many of the famous financier's projects, this one succeeded in weathering the debacle of 1720. For a half century thereafter it was to play an important part in the commercial history of the nation.

The administration of the Company can be considered conveniently under three heads as the organization had officers in Paris, Lorient, and India. The Parisian office undertook to determine general policy, to handle financial problems, and to supervise affairs in India and elsewhere. To perform these functions there were two groups of employees. The directors, syndics and royal commissioners comprised one, and the clerical force the other. Since the Company enjoyed monopoly privileges, and as the King was one of the principal stockholders it was natural that the directorate should be provided for by royal edict. As need for change arose additional edicts served to effect it. A study of the Parisian administration might easily resolve itself into little more than a consideration of these edicts,[1] the need for the changes they brought about, and the effect which they had. An appreciation of the administration can probably best be secured by studying the matter in some detail for a given epoch.

By 1748 a definitive form of organization had been decided upon. Prior to that time many changes had been made with a view to strengthening or relaxing the amount of royal control, but without vitally affecting the *modus operandi* in commercial activities. The form of government provided for in 1748 has several points in common with those of earlier date. Each was based on a royal decree. Each made provision for a general assembly of stockholders, with definite, but varying, prerequisites for attendance. Directors were regularly named by the King. Crown

control was further effected by provision for royal commissioners. Syndics, supposedly representing the interests of the stockholders, were also a regular feature.

With these common factors, why should it have been necessary to change the form of administration so frequently? In the early period this was partly due to the very rapid development of the Company when it was taking over matters not strictly relative to Indian commerce, but which nevertheless required an increase in the directorate. Later changes indicate that there was constant struggle between the King and the shareholders for control. Early in 1723 the King had gone to extremes in the establishment of the Council of the Indies which left the shareholders no voice in the management of their Company. In the course of a few months he was forced to give way to their protests, reorganize the Company, and provide syndics who were to be the direct representatives of the general assembly. Royal regret of this action is seen in a later effort to divorce the interests of the syndics and the shareholders by bringing the former under royal control through a system of indirect election. Moreover their effectiveness was always discounted by the presence of the royal commissioners.

The decree of 1748 established eight directors and six syndics as the Company's administrative officers. The directors held office for life, vacancies being filled by the King from three candidates proposed by the administrative assembly. One realizes the abuses existing under earlier administrations on reading that the directors were to abstain from Indian commerce. They were not to ship goods in the Company's vessels, purchase them at the sales, nor have an interest in Indian commercial companies established in other countries. Furthermore, a family was not to have more than one representative on the board. If this occurred through special dispensation, only one vote was allowed the family. The syndics were to be elected, one annually, for a six year term. The King, who seems to have long regretted his earlier liberality, did not allow the general assembly to name them directly. Instead, the administrative assembly was to propose four names; of these the general assembly chose two, and the King had the final selection of one of them as syndic. The work was divided among two

general and three particular departments. The first of the general departments, that of armaments and commerce, had four directors and two syndics. The second, dealing with purchases, finance, and bookkeeping had two directors and one syndic. This leaves three syndics who might be expected to be apportioned one to each of the other departments. But the decree makes no such provision. The directors and syndics comprised the administrative assembly which met daily. Here the correspondence was read, and employees assigned to their posts, and at times recalled. The original allocation of directors to departments was made by this body, which had also the power to shift them from one department to another. A plurality of voices ruled. At least once a week the commissioner of the King was invited to attend. The Comptroller General of the French government was to preside over monthly meetings. In both cases a résumé of the activities of the preceeding period was made. The Comptroller General in addition was to visé important commissions and instructions, especially when new officers were being appointed, and when there was correspondence with the Superior Council at Pondicherry, the seat of the Company's administration in India. There was provision for a general assembly open to holders of at least twenty-five shares of stock, meeting annually. Special meetings could be called by the syndics and directors with royal approval.

Let us now see how the Company actually operated under this form of administration.[2] It had its headquarters in a four story building comprising offices, storage room, and salesroom, which now constitutes a part of the National Library in Paris. In common with many present day French organizations, the arrangement of offices was very poor. The bureaux necessarily associated with each other were not physically adjacent; those to which the public had entrée were in some cases rather inaccessible, so that the employees were disturbed by having to give directions and serve as guides. On the ground floor were a cashier's office, the office of the *caisse d'escompte* (a sort of discount bank which while not integrally a part of the Company was managed by its officials, a sales office and salesroom where furs were disposed of, and a wrapping room. In this latter goods for shipment to Lorient and

thence to India were packed. On the second floor there were store-rooms, bookkeepers' offices, a bureau of supernumerary clerks who did much of the Company's writing, the purchasing bureau, and a special office which dealt with the stocks and bonds of the Company. The King's commissioner and one of the directors were also located on this floor. On the upper floor were the Indian Bureau, the Bureau of Armaments, a financial bureau, a committee room, offices for other members of the directorate, assembly halls, and lodgings for certain of the employees. Over one of the bureaux, in a sort of attic, were the archives.

The personnel has in large part been referred to in connection with the form of administration. The general assembly, which technically should have met annually, was apparently not convened between 1731 and 1745. The stockholders, who received dividends regularly due to the facility with which the Company secured funds from the government, accepted this state of affairs without noticeable protest. After 1745 the meetings were held regularly, the minister of finance presiding. The reading of a financial report, the discussion of the dividend, and the election of syndics were the chief items of business. That the stockholders did in a measure influence the affairs of the Company is evident from the correspondence of the Comptroller General with the Governor in India. Orry constantly ordered Dupleix to cut down expenses[3] in order to calm the stockholders, who were denouncing the lavish expenditures in the East. However it can safely be said that the general assembly was the least significant part of the Paris administration.

From 1723 on the interests of the stockholders were represented by syndics. The decree of 1748 stipulated that they should be elected indirectly. Gilly, in a contemporary account of the Company, divides them into two groups; one he styles *honoraire,* the other, *oneraire.* The first three were chosen from among men of noble rank to assist the administration by advice, especially in handling military affairs, and to bring matters relative to the Company's interest to royal attention. Their duties actually involved little more than attendance at and voting in the administrative assembly. The three working syndics took part in the daily activity

of the Company. They handled the correspondence, and helped conduct the general business. They received, instead of salaries, bonuses in the form of cotton goods, handkerchiefs, tea, coffee, etc.

The directors were eight in number. Of these, and of their predecessors in earlier administrations it might be noted that after their formal appointment by the issue of a decree of the Council of State, they took an oath before the Parlement of Paris to serve the Company well and faithfully. Even if they had served it faithfully they could not all have served it well. The capacity of several of them effectively prevented this.[4] Yet a considerable number were quite capable.[5] Some of them had seen service in India; two even served there while members of the Paris directorate. Godeheu went to India while a member of the Paris board, and Dupleix was named a supernumerary director while still at Pondicherry. A second supernumerary director, M. Roth, had also had some experience in the East. Two of the Indian Governors, Lenoir and Dumas, were named as directors on their return home. The advantage of action such as this was two-fold. It naturally tended to make the directorate more efficient and served as an encouragement to those who were serving the Company in the East. Others had had experience in the field of European commerce. Ability, however, was not the determining factor in appointments.[6] For example, when Dumas died in 1746 there were several aspirants for the vacant post, Gilly, who was sponsored by the Prince de Conti, one of the great shareholders, and Claessen, who had the support of Maurepas, Minister of Marine. Although Gilly was a perfectly capable individual and Claessen, to judge by his later activities was not particularly outstanding, it was he who through political favoritism received the appointment. Family connection also played its part. Godeheu was able to secure the appointment of his brother, Godeheu d'Igoville, to the post of director when it was necessary to name someone to occupy his place during his absence in India.

The directors were not accustomed to pay strict attention to royal decrees concerning the form of administration. They had been told in the decree of 1748 to meet in an administrative assembly and assign themselves to the various departments. Appar-

ently this was not done. The armaments and commerce department should have had four directors but in practice had only two, and but one syndic in place of the statutory two. This meant that too much power was in the hands of these directors, and the abuse was further aggravated by the fact that one of them assumed almost full control. The second general department also had fewer directors than required by statute, for Castanier, one of its nominal members devoted most of his time to a secret war committee. The sales department had more directors than the decree called for. Part of this undermanning of some departments was due to the establishment of the secret committee on which several directors served, along with the commissioners of the King. This committee, originally established in time of war, was continued after the peace of 1748 to deal with military affairs in India. It was then known as the Indian committee.

Each director had certain daily duties. He was expected to discuss the affairs of the departments with the heads of the several bureaux under his control, to give orders, to look over his correspondence, and to attend committee meetings and the administrative assembly. For these services the directors were well paid. If not born gentlemen, they were in many cases soon given titles of nobility. Then they received liberal monetary returns. At first in the period of great speculation, they had been paid twenty thousand livres a year, later reduced to twelve thousand. Not without reason the stockholders pointed out that they would be better pleased if the directors received a fixed percentage of the profits, so from 1732 to 1742 they were on that basis. This system proved profitable for the directors. Their commissions up to 1740, although in two years they did fall below the twelve thousand mark, averaged more than ten percent above that figure, and in 1739 passed eighteen thousand livres. In 1741 however, the directors felt that it would be best to revert to the old system, since their commissions in 1740 were in the ten thousand class. They believed that they were entitled to twenty thousand in 1741, but this figure was arrived at by a careful disregard of losses due to shipwreck. With this deduction made, their remuneration would have been reduced about five sixths. The directors had neither

nerve to pocket the twenty thousand livres, not the heart to accept the three thousand actually due them, so they arranged that their salaries should once more be placed on the fixed basis of twelve thousand a year. A sympathetic royal council even made the measure retroactive for 1740.[7]

The King exercised control over the Company through certain royal officials. In the days of the Regency, the Duke of Orleans, Cardinal Dubois, and the Duke of Bourbon all held posts of honor in the Company. The Comptroller General had final say in many matters. After 1723 there were royal commissioners actively associated with the Company. There were two main reasons for their presence in the administration. The King was one of the main stockholders, owning over eleven thousand shares. Then too, the Company was of a very public nature. The interests of many Frenchmen were centered in it, and it had sovereign rights in the colonies.

Some of the Comptrollers General[8] did the Company very real service, notably Law, who in opening the local trade of India to the public, paved the way for the Company's success under Dupleix. They usually made their influence felt through the royal commissioners. Comptroller General Orry, 1730-1745, originally intended to supervise personally the affairs of the Company but found it expedient to name his brother, Orry de Fulvy as commissioner to represent him. Madame de Pompadour was responsible for the dismissal of Orry in 1745, and his brother shortly followed him. The new Comptroller General, De Machault, decided on two commissioners. That this was no mean post is seen in the fact that three individuals who served between 1745 and 1754 were presently advanced to the ministry.[9] In the period following 1748 the number of commissioners varied from one to eight. These men fixed the time of the administrative assemblies over which they chose to preside. Before the decisions of this body could become effective the consent of the Comptroller General was necessary. This was sought by the commissioners who met with him weekly. Here they reported on all the Company's activities, and drew attention to those requiring special consideration. If the Comptroller General saw fit to change the decisions, they were

reconsidered by the administrative assembly at its next meeting. The various commissioners representing the King's interests were paid[10] by the Company, one of them as high as twelve thousand livres a year. The usual salary seems to have been about half this amount. The Company had a right to deduct these salaries from the dividends paid to the King.

It is questionable whether these royal officials were desirable.[11] Many of the stockholders objected to their presence in the administrative assembly. Some approved of them, since they served as concilliatory agents when the syndics and directors disagreed among themselves. The directors were, however, more apt to curry royal favor by serving as the commissioners' mouthpieces than to seek the welfare of the Company at the risk of their displeasure. This was particularly regrettable considering the incompetence of the commissioners. These did not give their entire time to the Company's affairs, and there is reason to believe that their actions were not always disinterested. But certainly without some form of royal control such as this the Company would not have had the resources of the government behind it.

The directors, syndics, and royal officials, together with a considerable body of other employees, particulary clerks, were distributed among the various departments, bureaux and committees. Departments were purely arbitrary divisions constantly changing in number and scope. Bureaux were logical divisions for the handling of any one particular class of work. Each had its *chef* or head, and a number of clerks. A working bureau was superintended by one or two directors and one of the working syndics.

The financial affairs of the Company which were rather complicated were handled by six bureaux. This multiplicity was due in part to a rather crude system for the payment of dividends, numerous loans, and a seemingly unnecessary subdivision of labor. Moreover, the Company's business ran into thousands of livres daily. At the time of the auctions, it ran into millions. The first of the bureaux, the *caisse générale*, paid the Company's debts, received payments on account, and arranged temporary loans. Its payments were in the form of orders on the *caisse comptant* rather than in cash. The *caisse comptant* handled the money re-

ceiving funds from the *caisse générale,* and paying them out only on its order. Indiciatve of the extent of the work was the presence of two men whose sole duty was to weigh money, arrange it in the vault, and withdraw it to make payments. The *caisse des dividends* was a much smaller bureau, which paid the dividends and the interest on loans, and redeemed bonds at maturity or when they were drawn in the lottery. It also had charge of safety deposit boxes in which was kept the stock of persons wishing to participate in the meetings of the general assembly. Other valuables could be deposited here by arrangement. This bureau was very well built. The walls were three feet thick, with a view to making it fireproof; cases enclosing the valuables were triple locked. Two separate registers of the valuables on deposit were kept, each in a different place. Another small bureau was that of *rentes.* Its original function was to pay annuities which were due either to persons who secured them through lotteries which the Company ran as part of its financial program, or to one time stockholders who had exchanged their shares for them. We are told that this bureau handled its affairs in the same manner as did the corresponding bureau in the Hotel de Ville in Paris. The fifth financial division was known as the *bureau pour la conversion des actions et billets d'emprunt.* The information available concerning its functions is very meagre. Apparently not only the bonds but also the stocks of the Company bore coupons, and when these were exhausted, new bonds and stocks were issued by this bureau in their place. Their fabrication, signing and sealing were in its hands. It had charge of litigations, including matters relative to the garnishee of employees' wages. The last of the financial bureaux, the *caisse d'escompte* or discount bank was originally an organization financed by the King and Company, from which the royal funds were soon withdrawn. It was its practice to discount commercial paper at six percent, and later at five.

Commercial matters were handled in part by the purchasing bureau. Correspondence with the Company's posts in which there were requests for supplies was turned over to this bureau as soon as it had been approved by the administrative assembly. Lists were then prepared of purchases which had to be made.

These fell into three groups, foreign, provincial, and Parisian. The first two classes were handled by correspondence. The Company's representatives in various cities were ordered to buy the goods and ship them direct to Lorient. Purchases in Paris were handled by one of the clerks. This bureau also had charge of the purchase of goods requested by the Lorient administration—materials for naval construction and armament, food stuffs, etc. Purchase of specie, of which large quantities were sent to India, was also cared for by it. It did a certain amount of bookkeeping, for it had charge of the accounts of each of the Company's European representatives. It had also the task of keeping Lorient informed as to what goods might be expected for shipment to India.

The Indian department was one of the largest of the bureaux. It had a very voluminous correspondence to carry on as all documents of any kind, whether for the councils or the employees in India, China, the Isles of France and Bourbon, and Canada emenated from it. It brought the various Indian requests for supplies to the attention of the administrative assembly, and when they had been approved, sent them to the purchasing bureau. The Company's troops were also under its control. It handled correspondence with friends and relatives of the employees in India who sought information as to their condition and whereabouts. Two of its number had charge of the Company's store of confiscated goods. These two were also in the service of the India committee, and so had many of the Company's secrets entrusted to them.

Naval affairs were handled by the *bureau des Armamens, Sénégal et Guinée*. Its name indicates its scope; however, its chief interests were in the navy. The construction and equipment as well as the upkeep of vessels and the lading and discharge of cargos were its principal concern. It corresponded with the naval officers, assigning them to their posts. It had control of the recruiting of sailors, and furnished information to their families as to their activities or fate while in the Company's service. It performed the same function for the African posts as the Indian bureau did for those in India. Rather illogically it would seem, it handled matters relative to the debts due the Company from private individuals in India.

There was only one other important bureau, the bookkeeping department, which handled an enormous amount of work, as it not only had the Paris accounts to care for, but had also to audit the books of all the posts, and then from these make up a general record book. It had to verify accounts of all kinds, bills presented by correspondents, transportation charges, naval accounts, auction sale records, accounts of seizures, etc. The annual statement was drawn up by this bureau. It received some assistance from the bureau of supernumeraries, a group of young men destined by their families to serve the Company in Europe or abroad. Its numbers varied, being usually about ten or twelve. These youths had little capacity on entering the Company's service, ability to write and calculate alone being required of them. They served without pay in the hope of eventually finding remunerative employment with the Company.[12] Their work, mostly mere copying, gave them a chance to get a superficial acquaintance with the Company's business, and an opportunity to show their ability, zeal and intelligence. When there were vacancies, a promising supernumerary might be advanced to the post.

Last of all there was the archives department. Its head, Dernis, has left us a valuable compilation of the Company's charters and privileges. Most of the Company's papers were kept here for a period of one year, and were then burned on order of the administrative assembly. The more important, such as its titles, receipts, and principal correspondence were kept on permanent file.

There were two special organizations within the Company apart from the bureaux and departments. The first of these was the secret committee established during the war,[13] and commonly referred to as the India committee (to be distinguished from the Indian bureau). Another special committee was the *Comité des Caisses et Fonds*. It was established in 1753 in a period of financial stress at the request of one of the directors and one of the syndics who wished to be relieved of part of the responsibility which, up until this time had devolved upon them in determining what letters of credit should be discounted by the *caisse d'escompte*. It also decided what purchases the Company could afford to make, then these matters were referred to the adminis-

trative assembly for its approval, and finally to the purchasing bureau.

The work of all these departments and bureaux was dependent on the decisions made by the administrative assembly which met daily. It was supposed to assemble at ten A. M. and remain in session until two P. M. In reality it seldom met before midday and then there was insufficient time for a satisfactory consideration of its business. The assembly was supposed to discuss matters which were later to be laid before the commissioner of the King. It could however make provisional decisions being guided by precedent. Incoming letters were read aloud, and the general tenor of the reply determined. The heads of the bureaux brought in the outgoing correspondence which had already been approved by one of the directors, who in turn read their letters. These were then signed by three members of the administration. This body was usually of divided opinion and had great trouble in reaching any decisions. It was none too well informed concerning Indian affairs. The Company's statute required that there should be a special weekly meeting with the commissioner.[14] In practice meetings were frequently held twice a week. Reports were made by a director from each department; the syndics stated their opinions; after due discussion, a decision was reached by majority vote. The King's commissioner and the oldest of the King's councillors who happened to be present acted as tellers. The commissioner then informed the assembly of the action which the Comptroller General had taken on matters referred to him from previous meetings.

In addition to the persons attached to the bureaux there were a few others in the Company's employ at Paris. There were five messengers at the service of the syndics, directors, and department heads; a concierge, who in addition to the janitorial functions attached to that office purchased odd supplies, such as wood and candles, and was supposed to see that they were economically used; and two Swiss guards, stationed at either entrance to the building.

It is obvious from the foregoing survey that there were many defects in the organization of the Company.[15] The division into

departments was doubtless necessary, but it seems to have been overstressed. This is especially the case in those periods where there were a dozen different departments established with no apparent reason other than to gratify the ambition of a director to be at the head of something. Even when in 1748 most of the work had been brought into two general departments, there were still three minor ones, each with a director. Any system such as this which left one person in full charge of a department had its drawbacks, in that there was no one trained to take over the work in case of emergency. Then, too, the directors all voted in the administrative assembly, but when their interests were circumscribed by the limits of their own departments, their actions in the assembly would be biased. While there was liberal provision for directors in all administrations, that of 1748 was glaringly deficient in that no provision was made for general secretaries. There was no one on whom the responsibility of keeping the minutes devolved, no one whose special duty it was to inform the various bureaux of the action taken in the assembly which might affect them, no one to reply to any general letters addressed to the Company which did not relate to any one particular bureau, no one to call the attention of the assembly to its unfinished or new business. Had there been minutes it would have been easier to check up on the various syndics, directors and department heads. because there would have been a written statement of the duties which had been especially assigned to them. These same minutes might have served to enlighten the commissioners when they met with the assembly, obviating the necessity for reports by several of the directors.

More important than mere defects in the form of administration were defects in its personnel. The presence of the King's commissioners must have, at best, added little to the success of the Company. There is reason to believe that their influence was nefarious. They were not trained in the field of commerce, usually having a political or legal background. They are said to have had "a special incompetence." Yet they were able to force their views on the Company. The directors, for all that they may have been ordinary men, through their long contact with the Company neces-

sarily knew something of commerce. Yet they were not free to have views of their own, for voting was not by secret ballot but openly. Few indeed were the directors who cared to incur royal disfavor by opposing the wishes of the commissioners.

1. Weber, *La Compagnie des Indes,* pp. 423-452 summarizes the several edicts relating to the Company's administration. The edicts themselves are found to be in Arch. Nat., AD ix, 384-385 and Dernis, *Recueil des titres concernant la Compagnie des Indes,* vols. III and IV. DuFresne de Francheville, *Histoire de le Compagnie des Indes,* quotes some of them.
2. Most of the material for the rest of the chapter is drawn from a memoir on the administration of the Company, prepared by M. Gilly, a director of the Company, under date of February, 1755. Unless otherwise noted, the facts are based on this memoir, in Arch. Col., C2, 40, fols. 89-129, or on Dernis, *op. cit.*
3. Bib. Nat., N.A.F. 9150, fol. 94.
4. Bib. Nat., N.A.F. 9147, fols. 26, 278.
5. Bib. Nat., A.F.F. 8980, fol. 92; N.A.F. 9145, fol. 196; 9149, fol. 215; India Office, French in India series, vol. 1, bundle 1, packet 4, letter 1; Dernis, *op. cit.,* IV, 525.
6. Bib. Nat., N.A.F. 9147, fol. 278; 9355, fol. 59.
7. Arch. Nat., G7, 1705; Dernis, *op. cit.,* IV, 458,459; Arch. Aff. Etr., Fr., 1991, fol. 238.
8. Doneaud du Plan, *Histoire de la Compagnie des Indes,* pp. 513-547; Duchêne, *La Politique coloniale de la France,* p. 38.
9. Moras and Rouillé became Ministers of Marine—Bib. Nat., N.A.F. 9497, fols. 22-23, and De Silouette, Minister of Finance—Weber, *op. cit.,* p. 451.
10. Dernis, *op. cit.,* IV, 515; Arch. Col., Inde 2, VIII.
11. Bib. Nat., N.A.F. 9355, fol. 169; Arch. Nat. F50, IV.
12. Arch. Col., C2, 30, fol. 83.
13. Bib. Nat., A.F.F. 8983, fol. 2.
14. Bib. Nat., N.A.F. 9150, fol. 41.
15. Cultru, *Dupleix,* p. 11; Arch. Aff. Etr., Asie, XIII, 239, 256.

CHAPTER II

Relations With the French Government.

The Company was thrown in many ways into contact with the French government.[1] Its principal stockholder was the King, from whom it secured many privileges; the navy sometimes afforded it protection; the royal treasury played a prominent part in its finances; the ministry of foreign affairs protected its interests when they clashed with those of the English or Dutch Companies. A study of the Company's organization necessarily entails consideration of these and allied factors.

Contact between the Company and the government took one of three forms; personal contact of government and Company officials, correspondence, or the promulgation of decrees by the King in Council. The Comptroller General was the great officer of state who had the most regular contact with the Company. Many important political or financial undertakings had to have his consent. He met with the board of directors at least twice a month, thereby greatly influencing its action. In the interim there were usually from one to four commissioners of the King who served as his mouthpieces, and who were directly dependent on him. On occasion, the directors journeyed to Versailles to consult the Comptroller General when prompt approval of some new project was desired. The Minister of Marine was another state official whose relations with the Company were regular. Matters in which he was interested were of a maritime nature. Similarly, the foreign minister played a part in handling diplomatic affairs. In view of the intimate relations existing between the Company and the state, he was not as active as might be expected.

Correspondence, other than the sending of regular reports to the Comptroller General and to the Minister of Marine, related primarily to the seeking of special favors. Sometimes it was of a purely formal nature, such as congratulations to some new minister, accompanied by a request that he continue to manifest the good will toward the Company that his predecessor had.[2]

The Company derived its corporate existence from the Crown. The famous Scotchman, John Law, while serving as French Comptroller General played an active part in organizing it. The

charter of 1719 was modified in certain details during the next thirty-five years (Louisiana, for example, was retroceded in 1731); but in so far as it related to the Company's Indian interests it remained unchanged. This charter was supplemented by numerous edicts issued by the King in Council regulating the form of government for the Company, commissioning its governors and councillors, establishing a special court to try cases in which the Company was a party, and from which there was no appeal after 1725, and the granting of political jurisdiction at Lorient. Some edicts concerned individuals in the Company; the Parisian directors were granted titles of nobility, and Dupleix a marquisate. It was also decreed that goods belonging to the directors should be free from seizure for debt. A few ministerial orders relate to the Company's government. Orders to reconsider the nomination of officials who were to receive royal commissions are of this type.

The Crown was interested not only in the Company's government, but also in its domain. The French Government "had only disdain for colonies" so it used its influence to curb the expansionist tendencies of Dupleix. In this the Paris directors coöperated most heartily.[3]

The government's foreign service was of great value to the Company. In many parts of Europe it had its own agents who could handle routine commercial matters; but if it had any trouble with a foreign company or power, it was desirable to have the avowed support of the French government. Fear of reprisals might lead the foreigners to give way, whereas if they had nothing more than the antagonism of the Company to worry about, they might refuse to make concessions or amends. Three types of cases were handled by the diplomatic corps. They related to territorial possessions, vessels taken as prizes, and commercial concessions.

The territory owned or occupied by the Company was generally regarded as French, and like the regular colonies, was a diplomatic pawn. In 1697 by the treaty of Ryswick the French government had secured the restoration of Pondicherry by the Dutch into whose hands it had fallen. Naturally enough then, having cap-

tured Madras in 1746, the Company turned to the government to safeguard this new possession and prevent its falling back into the hands of the English. But in this case the Company's interest was sacrificed, and Louisburg virtually exchanged for Madras. Even in cases where it did not ask the crown to intervene to recover lost territory, or to safeguard that recently acquired, it made a point of keeping the government well informed as to the status of its possessions.[4]

The wars of the 1740s gave rise to another problem which the Company turned over to the state department,—the recovery of, or compensation for vessels seized. French ambassadors in both Spain and Holland handled such cases. The trouble with Spain related to the seizure of the *Cerf Volant,* a vessel engaged in the Senegal trade. It consequently falls outside our field. The Dutch question is dealt with elsewhere. Mention need only be made of the fact that St. Contest brought the matter to a satisfactory close.[5]

Another type of problem, safeguarding commercial concessions, is exemplified by the conflict with the Porte at Constantinople.[6] The Company carried on some commerce with Bassora in its local Asiatic trade. The authorities there were dependent on Constantinople; hence, when they began to tax French trade more than the "Imperial Capitulations" called for, a protest was lodged with the Turkish government. Villeneuve induced the Porte to order the Pasha at Bassora to refrain from making any illegal demands on the French. Then the Company took steps to prevent further mulcting on the part of the Pasha by agitating for a more efficient consular service at Bassora. The missionaries who had served theretofore were replaced at its solicitation by a regular consul.

The state department aided the Company in other ways than that of negotiating for it. In 1750 advice was given that a renewal of the efforts to establish a policy of neutrality between the French, English and Dutch Companies would be favorably viewed by the government;[7] but it was pointed out that the initiation of any such movement should be on the part of the directors of one of the companies. This advice was not acted upon immediately, but it may possibly have been a part of the reason for sending Duvelaer to London a year later. Then too, when one of the King's agents

sent to Versailles suggestions as to where new markets might be established, this information was transmitted to the Company when of interest to it.[8]

There was no regular proceedure followed when the Company had the diplomatic corps working for it. Sometimes its agent worked along with the ambassador or minister; sometimes he did not. It was not even necessary to solicit the government's assistance. As noted above, the state might be so anxious to act that it proffered its services, requiring only that the Company appear to take the initiative.

The state department had occasion also to discuss grievances brought to its attention by various persons. After the peace of Aix la Chapelle, the English Company in particular was constantly making demands. There was a quarrel over what supplies taken from Madras should be restored; conflicting alliances in India also were a source of constant trouble. English memoirs concerning these matters, brought to the attention of the state department by the English ambassador would be sent to the Comptroller General, who had to get the reaction of the French Company to them.[9]

The Company received material aid of three kinds from the government, naval, military and economic. The French navy under Fleury was notoriously weak, and its officers saw so little service that many of them were quite out of training. Nor, despite the efforts of Rouillé and de Machault, did it become particularly powerful. Yet from the naval department, if not from its ships, the Company received considerable aid and reciprocated the favor.[10] Most valuable of all the concessions granted was that of conscripting sailors. The Company was in the eyes of the sea faring populace a hard and at times a cruel master. So it had frequently, sometimes more than once a year, to seek permission to conscript sailors from among the naval reserves of the French government. Without such permission the Company would have been quite unable to man its ships.

In time of war the naval department rendered further assistance by providing convoys and by sending a fleet into eastern waters. A convoy was furnished the Company's vessels in 1745. The Comptroller General arranged for it,—not without some

difficulty due to the smallness of the navy. It was to escort the vessels to Cadiz, where they were to take on their gold supply, and thence to accompany them as far as the Canaries, beyond which point it was hoped that they would be free from capture by the English. Such a convoy was not furnished free of charge. For a vessel of sixty four cannon and a frigate the Minister of Marine asked 100,000 livres. The Company was also required to pay for royal vessels sent to the East. Montaran in a memoir in 1748, points out that during the war the crown had sent out the *Appolon* and the *Anglesea,* and had loaned *Le Lys* to the Company, at its expense. The government also sold it *Le Contest,* a vessel which was of no value save for war purposes.[11]

Naval officers as well as vessels were made available to the Company. When it wanted Drian, a secretary to the King, to command one of its vessels, special dispensation was granted to enable him to leave the kingdom. Officers who thus served the Company directly gave satisfactory service, but this was not the case when a royal ship commanded by royal officers was placed under its control. "God save us from the circumstance where it would again be a question of seeking aid from the King's navy," wrote the Company to Dupleix. Jealousies between royal and Company officers were all too frequent, the former failing completely to understand that there might be times when they should receive instructions from the governor or council at Pondicherry.[12]

Supplies too were furnished by the naval department to the Company, which in turn supplied royal vessels at times. This latter action was much more customary than the former, for the French navy made liberal use of the resources at Lorient. Timber and other commodities for the construction and repair of vessels, foodstuffs, naval supplies, medicines, even artillery were furnished. The hospital at Lorient was likewise placed at the service of the government, but it was usually too crowded by the Company's sailors to receive many outsiders. One instance of joint building enterprise is also noted, a bakeshop, built at Lorient during the war of the Austrian Succession.[13]

At times the naval department issued orders affecting the Company's property. La Bourdonnais in 1741 conceived the plan of

having a fleet in the vicinity of the Isles of France and Bourbon to safeguard French and injure English commerce in case the impending war broke out. Since he was not at the moment in the good graces of the Company, he presented his plan to Maurepas who approved of it, as did the King in Council. Whereupon, although the advice and consent of the Company had been neither sought nor given, the government ordered that four ships be fitted out, armed for war, and placed under the command of La Bourdonnais. Knowing what a furore this would cause in the Company's administration, he asked to be excused, but Orry insisted that he accept the post. With ill grace the Company obeyed royal orders, fitted out the fleet, and despatched it to the Isles. It so happened that it served a useful purpose at Mahé in curbing the aggression of native rulers there; but its success, while appreciated by the Company, failed at the time to bring La Bourdonnais back into its favor. The close connection between the Company and crown could scarcely be better illustrated than by this episode. A mere order from a minister outweighed all protests on the part of a board of directors as to the disposition of the Company's property, even in times of peace! War time orders relative to the disposition of vessels and their officers were therefore to be expected.[14]

In other minor ways the naval department and the Company were brought into contact with one another.[15] Relatives of employees frequently appealed to the secretary of the navy for aid in recovering the pay of a deceased or lost sailor. Almost as a matter of form these were passed on to the Company apparently without attempt to influence its action. A close check was naturally kept on maritime activities by the naval department. One justification for the Company's existence was that it trained men for possible service in the navy in war time. Therefore the King and his ministers were interested in knowing what was the state of affairs in the Company's service. No vessel arrived at or left Lorient without word of it being reported to the Minister of Marine. Its return was ordinarily reported both by the King's naval officer at Port Louis, and by the Company's director at Lorient. These reports contained a summary of the voyage, its duration,

the cargo carried, the health of the crew, and the deaths on board. These last items were important, for they gave the minister an idea whether or not proper food was supplied to the sailors. Most of the illness and deaths were caused by scurvy.

In military affairs there was much less occassion for the Company and the royal government to have dealings with one another. Royal orders were issued establishing the Company's garrison, and at times additional orders followed enlarging it; but nothing corresponding to the close check which was maintained over the fleet was exercised over the troops. Only on rare occassions were orders issued concerning their activities. After the treaty of Aix la Chapelle instructions were sent to the Superior Council at Pondicherry that Madras be evacuated, but under normal conditions the Company was left to direct its own military activities. This in practice meant that control of the troops rested with the governor at Pondicherry. In one way only did the government regularly participate in the Company's military affairs; that was in the issuing of commissions to its officers.[16]

The royal government was kept informed of the activities of the troops, through the Comptroller General who attended the directors' meetings. In addition, Dupleix in the 1750s corresponded with the *Garde des Sceaux,* since he had requested that he be kept informed of all that had any bearing on the war being waged in India. French military officers were sometimes made available for the service of the Company. They were not sent to India, but were simply placed at the Company's command for some special purpose in Europe. On several occassions an artillery officer and his aides with proper testing apparatus, were permitted to serve the Company temporarily when it needed aid in inspecting and testing armaments. The Company simply guaranteed the safe return of the testing equipment to the royal arsenal from which it was borrowed. Supplies in small quantities were occassionally made available. However, there was nothing in connection with this military phase of the relations of Company and state to indicate that the government was the controlling or guiding spirit.[17]

The economic relations of the Company with the government fall into two divisions, financial and commercial. In connection

with the first of these, attention can be drawn to the chapter on finance, where it is noted that the King was one of the Company's chief stockholders, that government loans played an important part in keeping the Company on its feet, and that special financial concessions such as the right to run lotteries were at times granted. The financial position of the Company was aided somewhat by customs exemptions. It could import into La Rochelle munitions of war, foodstuffs, and merchandise duty free, by virtue of an edict of 1727. Head rights for slaves transported by the Company to the West Indes, and a tonnage bonus granted on goods introduced into France also served to keep the Company from becoming too deeply involved in debt. However, there were occassions when it did not receive the financial concessions or aid which it desired. A request for a loan of 40,000,000 livres following on the outbreak of the war of the Austrian Succession was refused. Marseilles merchants were allowed to infringe upon the coffee monopoly, and the monopoly of the lotteries, once accorded, was withdrawn.[18]

In the commercial field, government aid took the form of grants of very extensive monopoly privileges. It was not enough that the Company had exclusive rights of trade with the East; in addition, the sale of tobacco was for a long time in its hands. Its monopoly rights were limited however by edicts which had been promulgated during the career of its predecessor forbidding the importation of most silks and cottons. This restriction was in part withdrawn in 1724 when handkerchiefs were taken off the list, ostensibly because there was no French product which filled the need, actually because efforts to stop the smuggling of that particular article had been quite ineffective. Lest these concessions lead to a false belief that other commodities theretofore banned could also be now introduced, the King in Council decreed in 1729 that earlier edicts respecting the commerce in, transportation or wearing of certain Indian textiles were still effective. With a view to facilitating the enforcement of these several edicts, provision was made for marking goods imported and sold by the Company. Moreover, the Comptroller General had an agent at the annual sale to see that prohibited goods when sold should be reëxported; yet it was the

Company which had to pay this agent. The Comptroller General had also to approve the director named to have charge of the auction.[19]

In return for many favors and concessions the Company rendered some service to the government, by supplying certain commodities to it. Naval supplies have already been referred to; large quantities of goods were furnished the royal troops which participated in the defense of Lorient in 1746; agents of the Company made purchases in foreign fields—marble in China for the navy, religious books in India for the royal library, oriental coins for the French mint authorities, and Asiatic beasts for the zoological gardens. As a graceful gesture, the Company also named some of its vessels for leading statesmen. To the kingdom as a whole it rendered a much greater service. Its navy was the training ground for many who might eventually serve France. Its commerce brought into France many foreign merchants with funds, whereas, lacking a company, France would have had to seek her goods in England, Holland or elsewhere, exporting bullion to pay for them, a prospect little pleasing in days of mercantilistic economy.

1. Arch. Aff. Etr., Fr., 1991, fols. 241-82, Memoir by Plissay; Dernis, *Recueil des titres concernant la Compagnie des Indes,* contains various edicts conferring privileges on the Company.
2. Arch. Col., C2, 23, fol. 63; 29, fol. 261; Arch. Lorient, IP, 279, fol. 24.
3. Commissions, Arch. Nat., P, 2441, Royal Edict, 1740; Nobility, Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8971, fol. 5; Court, Dernis, *op. cit.,* III, 533, 748; Orders, Hamont, *Lally Tolendal,* pp. 59, 65, 66.
4. Arch. Aff. Etr., Asie, VI, fol. 96, Memoir by the Company *re.* Ft. St. George and Madras; Arch. Col., C2, 30, fol. 11, Deliberation of Co. 1742.
5. Arch. Col., C2, 29, fols. 181-82; See also chapter XIII.
6. Arch. Col., C2, 22, fols. 221-26, Villeneuve's correspondence with the French Gov't., 1729; Bib. Nat., N.A.F. 8927, fol. 88, Co. to Superior Council, October 19, 1736, *re.* consul at Bassora.
7. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9225, fol. 63, Puzlieux to de Machault, September 3, 1750; Arch. Col., C2, 36, fol. 226.
8. Arch. Col., C2, 38, fols. 3, 13.
9. Arch. Col., C2, 36.
10. A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History,* p. 260; V. Duruy, *History of France,* pp. 489-95, ed. of 1920; Arch. Lorient, IP, 67, fols. 2, 10; *Ibid.,* 251, *liasse* 1; Arch. Col., C2, 22, fol. 60.
11. *Re.* convoys, see Arch. Col., C2, 33, fol. 15; Arch. Marine, B3, 439, fols. 317, 319, 321, Correspondence of Orry with Maurepas, July 1745;

Ibid., B2, 326, fol. 781, Maurepas to Company, July 13, 1745; Arch. Col., C2, 34, fol. 108, Montaran's Memoir.

12. Arch. Marine, B2, 305, Maurepas to Company, September 2, 1738; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 9145, fol. 12, Company to Dupleix, January 29, 1750.
13. Supplies, Arch. Lorient, IP, 264, *liasse* 13; Arch. Marine, B3, 385, fol. 171, Marias to Minister of Marine, August 18, 1738; Accounts of the King and the Co. are to be found in Arch. Lorient, IP, 263 and 266, *passim;* Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 161; *Ibid.*, Inde 2, VIII; Hospital, Arch. Marine, B3, 396, fol. 13; Bakeshop, Arch. Lorient, IP, 263, *liasse* 3, fol. 3.
14. P. Crepin, *Mahé de La Bourdonnais,* pp. 140-48, 173; Arch. Col., C2, 31, fol. 197; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9144, fol. 102 *seq.*
15. *Re.* sailors' pay, Arch. Col., C2, 22, *passim;* Movements of vessels, Arch. Marine, B3, *passim.*
16. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9144, fol. 200, Co. to Dupleix, December 23, 1748, *re.* the evacuation of Madras. Several lists of officers in the Company's service for whom royal commissions were issued are to be found in Arch. Marine, B2.
17. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9146, Dupleix to the Co., October 16, 1753; Arch. Col., C2, 22, fols. 66, 122.
18. Girault, *Colonial Tariff Policy,* pp. 15, 24; Dernis, *op. cit.,* III, 710; IV, 113; Weber, *La Compagnie des Indes,* pp. 550, 562.
19. Arch. Col., F3, 238, fol. 431, Edict of 1723, *re.* tobacco monopoly; Arch. Nat., XIA, 8696, Ordinances of Louis XIV, 1664 and 1685, *re.* prohibited goods; Arch. Col., C2, 22, fol. 94; *Ibid.*, 34, fol. 135, list of prohibited goods; Weber, *op. cit.,* pp. 504-05; Dernis, *op. cit.,* IV, 113; Arch. Nantes, HH, 215; *Ibid.*, 224.
20. Arch. Col., Inde 2, VIII; P. Co. I, 104; C.S.P.V. III, 57, 232, 261.

CHAPTER III.

Lorient.

On turning to Lorient one begins to see the ideas of the Paris directors being put into operation. This port, which had originally belonged to the French naval authorities, and later to Colbert's Company, fell into the hands of the French India Company at the time of its reorganization in 1719. Here much of its European business centered; here were built its vessels, here were they laden, and here the cargos were discharged and sold.

The post of director at Lorient was referred to by Dupleix as the finest in France.[1] Such it was for one who had a great capacity for work, and who enjoyed the burdens of responsibility. Some of the work involved nothing more than carrying out the orders sent from Paris; however, many duties called for the exercise of the director's own initiative. He supervised the activities of all bureaux and shops at Lorient. He also conducted the sales. In the early days before these were transferred to Lorient, this required his going to Nantes at the time of the annual auction. He sometimes had to determine what vessels were to be sent on a particular campaign. Part of the responsibility of recruiting sailors fell on him. He purchased large quantities of goods, either in the open market or by contract. The officials of the Royal Navy had found that when they relied exclusively on this latter method, the merchants were prone to combine to keep up prices. For this reason the director was left free to purchase as he saw fit.[2]

Lorient, for all that it had only one director, had quite as many employees as the Paris office. A list[3] of these prepared in 1726 shows that in addition to the director there were in his office a chief clerk, a cashier, and five assistants. A bureau of armaments and disarmaments had three clerks, and there were three more attached to the workshops dependent on this bureau. A bureau of supplies had two more; the same number were attached to the merchandise bureau; and there was a large non-clerical force. There were port officers, a pilot, a surgeon, three men engaged in the apothecary shop, an architect, a number of guards or watchmen, and

many employees for the maintenance of ships. A carpenter, a blacksmith, a calker and a cooper were employed, all master workmen. Numerous other less skilled workers assisted them in the rope and sail factories, and in the construction of vessels. The Company had also to maintain a considerable force of sailors and officers for their guard and upkeep, and for the manning of the small boats needed about the port. A company of troops served as a garrison, from which detachments for the ships were drawn.[4] The work at Lorient was divided among bureaux as at Paris. Since there was but one director who had supervision of all affairs, it was not necessary that the divisions be so highly organized.

An examination of the expense accounts[5] gives considerable insight into the activities of the port. Salaries made up a great part of the expenses. The director was paid on the same basis as those at Paris. A few of the principal clerks received 2,400 livres a year; the apothecary 2,000; the captain of the port 1,500; and the others, salaries or wages ranging down to but 252 livres which was a sailor's annual pay. The number of employees seems to have increased steadily. Salaries, which in 1735 had amounted to a little over 76,000 for clerical and skilled employees, passed the 95,000 mark in 1740.[6] Purchases also figure largely in the expense accounts. The almost endless list of these included great quantities of foodstuffs, such as cereals, dried fruits and vegetables, flour, meat, (mostly salted), fish, eggs, oil, vinegar and wine; and of supplies, such as drugs, tobacco, charcoal, iron for the forges, nails, leather, furniture, hardwood for guns, candles, cloth for suits and sails, linen and wrapping materials. Supplies for India were usually secured by the Paris office. The expenses of recruiting the troops and sailors were borne by the Lorient administration. Recruiting was usually done on a contract basis, the "press" constituting at least a quarter of the cost of the garrison. The accounts also include such items as payments to the crown, known as the "droit du domain d'Occident," certain minor payments to the admiralty, contributions to charity, rental of various buildings, and charges for communication and transportation. Freight[7] was one of the important items. There are references to shipments from most of the commercial centers of France, and

from foreign points such as London, Newcastle, Cork, Danzig, Riga, Stockholm, Hamburg, and Amsterdam.

The port was active in the sales field for about six weeks of the year, for it was here that the Company's auctions took place. These are dealt with in the chapter on commerce.

It was at Lorient that the Company's fleet was built and equipped, the sailors were assembled, and their records kept by the bureau of armaments.[8] Here a naval school[9] was maintained, where cadets were given an insight into some of the elementary features of navigation before they first embarked. Moreover, a school[10] was run in connection with the garrison, for the training of artillery men and officers; even a dancing master and a sculptor were attached to it, in addition to those more practical teachers of engineering, hydrographics, and building.

The care of soldiers and sailors in case of illness or toward the close of a lifetime's employ devolved on the Company. Certain funds were set aside for this social service. First, there was a sum known as "l'un pour mil de la vente." Its name might imply that the Company set aside one tenth of one percent of the income from its sales, but anyone who reads this idea into the expression is crediting the Company with more of a philanthropic tendency than it possessed. Rather it was the purchasers who provided this sum, it being added to the price of their goods as a surtax. There was also the unclaimed salaries of deserters. In addition, the Company retained from the wages of the sailors "six deniers par livre" which amounted to two and a half percent. This was given over to the French naval authorities for the care of invalid sailors. The other funds were administered by the Company, a part going to the poor at Lorient, and a part to the pensions of the employees.[11]

The Company maintained a small hospital for the care of its sailors. These men, when they disembarked at Lorient frequently had scurvy or some other disease contracted during the voyage. A few were strong enough to go home, but the others had to be treated in the hospital as far as its limited resources permitted. Private individuals were not received there, except for emergency

treatment of wounds, but French soldiers and sailors might be admitted, their expenses being paid by the government.[12]

In only one other way does the Company appear to have taken any interest in the afflicted at Lorient. Women and children could come into the enclosure to gather chips for firewood, and—great deviation from the accustomed order of things—carry them away without receiving a clearance slip from the head storekeeper.[13]

The Company was naturally thrown into close relationship with the municipal authorities after Lorient was established as a city. The Company's stores proved an ever ready source for needed supplies. A list of goods furnished from them to the city, 1738-1755, includes powder, powder bags, rifles, old cannon, copper, locks, cramp-irons, signal lights, nails and parchment. Even money was advanced at times, notably when the streets were to be straightened in 1740. The Company was much interested in the improvement of the city's roads, that they might be more passable at the time of the annual auctions. The mayor and aldermen also expected the Company to show an interest in the town's welfare by interceding with royal officials in case some matters not dealt with in the city's charter relative to the streets, quays, police, taxes, or eminent domain needed attention.[14]

The town itself was of little account, at least before the siege by the British in 1746. After this, rather massive walls, of which parts still stand, were erected. The Company's buildings[15] were quite substantial, in sharp contrast with the surrounding districts of the municipality, (a condition which is still true today). The Company had had the good fortune to fall heir to its predecessor's buildings, which the naval department had occupied from 1704 to 1719. Numerous additions were made to them, so that in time there were wharves and quays, great warehouses, a salesroom, workshops, forges, a bakeshop, hospital, watchtower, and a fine residence for the director. These were grouped together in a walled enclosure whereby they might the more easily be guarded.

Even today these buildings serve a purpose. That formerly occupied by the director houses the local naval offices. A part of the massive walled warehouses shelter the few remaining docu-

ments which evidence the activities of the port under the Company. The barracks are still in use. And an occassional tourist climbs to the top of the watch tower, and tries to visualize the enghteenth century picture of the *Indien,* the *Pondichéry,* or the *Compagnie des Indes* sailing up the channel toward the harbor.

A royal decree[16] was issued in 1730 with a view to safeguarding the Company's property from fire. It stipulated that new houses at Lorient be roofed with slate, and that this same material be used to repair thatched roofs. Any violation was punishable by a fine of 500 livres, and the guilty party was held responsible for any damages arising from his negligence. Decrees however could not absolutely prevent the outbreak of fires. It speaks well for the zeal of the employees that there were no very serious losses.[17]

Properly to be regarded as a part of the Company's physical equipment, was its waterworks system. For some years water was secured from Hennebont, several miles up the river Scorff; however, this was at times spoiled by the tide, with consequent illness on shipboard. About 1733 the Company discovered a spring a mile and a half from Lorient, and asked for permission to appropriate property needed for a pipe line. This request the King in Council granted.[18] Thirty years later an attempt was made to safeguard a vessel's water supply by installing apparatus for removing salt from sea water on board the *Duc de Praslin* at an expense of 2600 livres. It is reported that such experiments were not deemed satisfactory, and vessels continued to rely on barrels of water for their supply.[19]

In addition to its fixed property at Lorient, and the ocean going fleet, the Company had several small boats which were used for harbor duty. There were six of these in 1723, three *gabarres,* two *chaloupes* and a *canot.* Only a small crew was attached to each. Six or eight men manned a *chaloupe,* while the others had fewer.[20]

Practically no records remain which serve to enlighten us as to the way in which vessels were loaded. However the presence of these small boats leads one to believe that here, as elsewhere among the Company's ports, goods were loaded on them to be

carried out to the vessels which were anchored in the harbor, a tedious and rather expensive operation. Passengers were allowed to embark only on order of the local director. Unlike the present day practice, their transportation was paid for on the completion of a voyage, because charges were based on the number of days spent on the vessel, and the consequent drain on the commissary.[21]

One can form a somewhat more complete picture of the disembarkation process. On the return from India, it was customary for a French government sloop stationed at Glenans to meet the vessel and accompany it up the channel, until the government officials from Lorient could board it. In war time the use of this sloop was suppressed, and in its place a detachment of troops from Groise on the Channel, accompanied by French customs authorities, boarded the vessel as soon as possible after recognizing it. The customs officers placed seals on the bars over the hatches, and on the store rooms and lockers, and with the troops accompanied the vessel as far as Lorient. Here other government employees from Port Louis, and a detachment of the Company's troops came on board and took charge. Seals were at once placed on the officers' quarters, in conformity with instructions sent out by the Comptroller General in 1739. Then with the troops strategically placed to prevent confusion and theft, an agent of the Comptroller General and a representative of the Company proceeded with the inspection, first of the baggage of the crew and officers, and then of the cargo. A journal of all goods, both those passed and those seized, had to be kept. Goods seized were taken to a special store room for contraband under the control of the government, and a report of them was sent to the Comptroller General and to the commissioner of the King. All other goods were placed in the warehouse to await the annual sale.[22]

A careful check was also made of the naval and commissary supplies. The purser rendered an account to the port director, and along with it a statement of legal dispositions and attestations made before him as notary during the trip. He turned in also a salary list, and deposited various papers at the archives at Lorient.[23] Technically these reports should have been turned in with-

in twenty-four hours of arrival, but technicalities meant little to the Company's employees.

A part of the care of the harbor naturally fell to the Company.[21] In order that the port might be kept in good condition, it was necessary that it be policed, especially to see that ballast was not dumped in the harbor and channel. It was customary for the French naval authorities to look after such matters. In 1739 the suggestion was made that the Company be entrusted with the task. The local director approved the idea, but hedged at the Company accepting the financial responsibility. It appears to have been left in the hands of the French naval department. However, two shipwrecks in the river channel in the 1730s led the Company to mark the channel with buoys, of such a nature that in time of war they might easily be raised to prevent the enemy making use of them to enter the harbor.

1. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8982, fol. 161, Dupleix to Du Laurens, October 7, 1739.
2. Arch. Col., C2, 22, fol. 155; Arch. Lorient, IP2, XI; Arch. Nat., F5o, V, sec. 2.
3. Arch. Col., Inde 2, IV.
4. Arch. Col., C2, 29, fol. 264; also F3, 238, fol. 427.
5. Arch. Lorient, IP, 18, *passim.*
6. Arch. Lorient, IP2, 44, sec. 2.
7. *Ibid.*, 17, fols. 34-48.
8. At one time the records included the sailor's name, parish, rank, salary, ship on which he served, its destination, date of departure and return, and a comment on his fate—death, desertion, capture, or discharge, as the case might be. Separate financial records were also kept concerning these sailors. These were somewhat complicated by the fact that a man was entitled to a certain allowance on being conscripted, his family to a part of his pay during his absence, deductions were made for supplies furnished during the course of the voyage, and for a contribution to an indigent fund. Furthermore, the sailors often deserted before the vessels sailed. Thereupon a statement would have to be sent to various parts of France so that the Company's correspondents might endeavor to collect advances already made to the sailors. Arch. Lorient, IP, 66; IP2, 71, fol. 3.
9. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 7799, fol. 245.
10. Arch. Lorient, IP2, 2; Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 546.
11. Arch. Nantes, HH, 224, Condition of sale; 1725; Arch. Lorient, IP, 16, fol. 143; 278, pc. 1, fol. 4; pc. 2, fol. 30.
12. Arch. Marine, B2, 302, fols. 150-51; Arch. Lorient, IP2, 37, fol. 33; 69, fols. 5-7.
13. Arch. Lorient, IP2, 69, fols. 3-4.
14. *Ibid.*, 37, fol. 6; 47, fol. 4; Arch. Morbihan, E, 238, *passim.*

15. Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-62, 543-45; Arch. Morbiham, E., 238, fols. 1-15; Arch. Col., C2, 28, fols. 334, 339; Arch. Marine, B2, 310, fol. 109; Arch. Lorient, IP2, 69, fol. 2.
16. Arch. Lorient, IP2, 37, fol. 17.
17. Arch. Marine, B3, 385, fol. 195.
18. Arch. Lorient, IP2, 49, fol. 119.
19. *Ibid.*, 71, fol. 21; Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 535.
20. Arch. Nat., F50, V, sec. 2.
21. Arch. Lorient, IP, 279, pc. 21, fol. 5; 287, pc. 104, fol. 9.
22. Arch. Col., C2, 31, fols. 30-31.
23. Arch. Lorient, IP, 1, art. 25.
24. Arch. Marine, B3, 391, fols. 226-30; 396, fol. 36.

CHAPTER IV.

Indian Administration

In dealing with the French administration in India it is necessary to consider first the extent of the territory over which the Company had jurisdiction.[1] This varied during the period 1725-1754. At the time of Dupleix's arrival it included only a few scattered trading posts. It was measurably increased under the administrations of Lenoir and Dumas. When Dupleix became governor, there was a period of very rapid expansion so that during the greater part of his administration the French ruled over the following regions:—Pondicherry, Mazulipatam, Yanaon, and Karikal on the Coromandel coast, Chandernagor in Bengal, and Mahé on the Malabar coast. In addition it had trading posts at Daka, Balacor, Patna, Cassimbazard, Gigouria, Calicut and Surat. At each of these the Company made provision for one or more paid employees. The English and Dutch likewise had posts at or near most of these places. Besides these localities which were developed as commercial centers, the French had claims also to a vast extent of territory because of titles and honors conferred on the Company's officials by native rulers.

Thus the French possessions may be divided into two groups. In the first, the Company's interest was primarily commercial; in the second, political. The commercial possessions were of three types.[2] *Chef lieux* were places owned by the French in which were established councils for administrative purposes. *Comptoirs* and *loges* were commercial posts, subordinate to one of the councils. In *comptoirs* the French had proprietary rights; in *loges* they had no such rights, the posts being under native jurisdiction. The political possessions, which included the *chef lieux* above mentioned, and other territories of vastly greater extent ceded to Dupleix or the Company, were made up of a large number of *aldees,* or Indian villages. Jurisdiction over them had been granted to the French by native rulers,[3] sometimes for a financial consideration, or because of a ruler's desire to increase the trade of the region. Most of the possessions we have classed as political were secured

in return for military aid. In acquiring these territories, the French had high hopes of deriving substantial returns therefrom. Such especially was the view of Dupleix, although the Paris directorate constantly took pains[4] to point out that commercial rather than territorial expansion should be the primary aim of its employees in India. However, the Company was not opposed to holding a reasonable amount of territory, adequately protected, where its workers might be safe in time of trouble—all too frequent in India. Such lands should be sufficiently extensive to furnish foodstuffs for the inhabitants. It was also desirable that they produce a revenue sufficient at least to pay the expenses of their administration, so that funds destined for commerce need not be diverted. Indeed the Company on one occassion went so far as to compliment Dupleix, the usual butt of its censure, for having acquired Vilnour as the result of an alliance with Sander Saeb—but this of course, was one of those territories which was supposed to be not only self sustaining but also renumerative.

The administration of these territories was in the hands of a governor and a considerable number of councillors and local directors. These were aided in their work by French and native clerical employees, and numerous Indian agents. Headquarters were at Pondicherry, where there was a Superior Council and the Governor General, who together were responsible to a large extent for the welfare of the Company in the East. There were four governors in the course of Dupleix's sojurn in India, Lenoir, De Courchant, Dumas, and Dupleix himself. These men received their appointments from the directors in Paris. Their nominations by the Company had to be approved by the French government, whereupon letters patent setting forth their powers were granted in the name of the King. However they could be removed by the Company on its own responsibility. Minute instructions were given a newly appointed governor. His constitutional powers included presiding over the Superior Council, governing not only the Company's employees, but also any French who might be resident at Pondicherry, administering justice, dealing with the natives and making treaties. He had power to make certain minor expenditures provided for in the Company's by-laws without hav-

ing to seek the consent of the Council, but otherwise financial affairs were in the hands of that body. In practice he exercised a number of extra-constitutional powers, some of them being decidedly high handed in the case of Dupleix, which resulted in frequent conflict with the councils.[5]

Among all the officials in India, the Governor General was probably the person in closest contact with European affairs. His duties required that in addition to communicating with the Company through letters sent by the Superior Council, he personally should write. In turn the company wrote directly to him, not only instructing him concerning its affairs, but also informing him in considerable detail of political affairs in Europe. This so that in case of war or threat thereof, appropriate shipping orders might be given, and the proper attitude adopted toward rival companies in India. Dupleix at least had many private correspondents. Besides his family, several of the directors of the Company wrote to him, in many cases with a view to advancing their own economic interests, or those of some friend or relative in India, and also to give their personal views on matters about which the Company had written Dupleix. The Governor General also had occassion to correspond directly with various French governmental officials. These, like the Paris directors, wrote him in both their official and private capacities.[6]

Toward the close of his career in India, Dupleix appears to have become somewhat negligent in his correspondence with de Machault, the Comptroller General, for the latter had occasion to write censuring him.

> "I cannot forbear" (he writes,) "expressing my discontent to you. This silence accredits all the bad news which is current gossip, and when one is charged with as important affairs as you are, one should give a more exact and detailed account."[7]

Dupleix's silence can easily be explained by his manifold activities; that he was not trying to hide his acts is seen in the despatch of D'Auteil as a special courier to France, to present his views to the Paris officials, and his willingness, eagerness in fact, to go to Paris to defend his actions and develop his views. In his correspon-

dence he was at times quite outspoken. It was perhaps part of his nature so to be, but the Company took a different view of the matter, and regarding this as impudence, asked that to it at least he show due respect.[8]

The Company seems to have been fortunate in its choice of governors,[9] even in the case of Dumas, who it is claimed secured his appointment by bribery. Lenoir, a man who had the unhappy faculty of making enemies and who scrupled neither to show favoritism nor to advance his personal interests, nevertheless, was regarded by his associates as a man of capacity. His name was held in high esteem by the French in India long after he had returned to Paris to serve as a director there. A peacetime career had not opened the way to spectacular achievements, but the Company seems to have prospered under his direction.[10]

Beauvallier de Courchant,[11] governor in the interim between Lenoir's two administrations, is but a shadowy figure, since little of his correspondence has been preserved. He seems to have been a man of energy, upright and honest, but without particular desire to be at the head of affairs. He had great faith in Dumas' opinions, bringing him out to Pondicherry as his advisor. When Dumas saw fit to return to France, Beauvallier asked to be replaced. Lenoir's earlier and temporary services to the Company were now rewarded by the highest honor at its command. He, like De Courchant appears in time to have voluntarily surrendered his post, and Dumas, ex-councillor at Pondicherry, more recently governor of the Isle of Bourbon, replaced him.

Dumas was probably the greatest of the French governors in India.[12] Under him, commerce flourished and valuable concessions were secured from the natives, including the right to mint roupies at Pondicherry. This Dumas estimated to be worth as much as 200,000 roupies per annum to the Company. Additions were made to the territory about Pondicherry and a site for a new post at Karikal was secured. Moreover, the prestige of the Company was enhanced as a result of successful skirmishes with native forces near Mahé, and by the despatch of a military expedition to Moka to demand reparations for insults. Sepoys appear to have been used for the first time in his administration. It was

his policy to befriend deserving natives, and to enter into alliances with them. Thus he very efficiently prepared the way for his illustrious successor.

Dupleix, governor for fourteen years, hero *par excellence* of the French colonial historian, capitalist, administrator, general, diplomat and potentate, avid for power, but crushed by fate in carrying out and enlarging upon the policies of Dumas, envisioned for France an empire at whose potential wealth even a Bourbon might marvel. It was not destined that this empire come under Gallic sway. Dupleix's vision, developed late in his own career, never penetrated the minds of that group of money mad directors in the Rue Neuve des Capucins. Nor could the Bourbon ministers at Versailles visualize a time when Indian wealth might solve a problem which was to baffle even Necker and Calonne. Unaided, hampered indeed by his superiors, he labored on alone. Could such a man be bound by petty rules and regulations? Would he scruple to take into his own hands matters to which a council might lay claim? History gives us our answer. To 1748, as capitalist and administrator he played his part as a cog in the Company's machine. Thereafter, visionary and prophet, though intensely practical, there is little history of the Indian administration which is not his own.[13]

There were several councils in India, chief of which was the Superior Council at Pondicherry.[14] It was composed of five regular councillors. The first *sous-marchand* served as secretary, as he was next in line for promotion to the post of councillor. At times there were one or two supernumeraries, and, until 1752, a few honorary councillors. These latter were ordinarily retired employees whom the Company wished to honor. The supernumeraries were individuals whom the Company was obliged to appoint to the Council for political reasons, but for whom there was at the moment no regular vacancy. They enjoyed a deliberative voice, and the same honors and prerogatives as the regular members. All the councillors were good Roman Catholics, since no others could qualify. Frequently they had powerful friends in France—otherwise it would be difficult to explain many of the promotions.

Regular councillors might be appointed directly by the French authorities, or be promoted from the lower ranks.[15] Prior to 1734 the governor controlled promotions, then the power was in part transferred to the local councils when they protested against this system, length of service being now established as a basis for advancement. In practice, this did not always obtain. For example, in 1742 the Superior Council had occasion to appoint M. de Leyrit as director at Mahé on the death of M. Signard. It then wrote to the council at Chandernagor advising it of the action taken, "in order that those among your number, gentlemen, who have pretensions to this post may make such arrangements and such representations to the Company as may be judged suitable." In 1750 the governor was again given control. All promotions, whatever their source, were *ad interim,* pending the approval of the Company. Once in office, a councillor was practically sure of life tenure. It is true that the council itself had the power of interdiction over its individual members, and the Company that of revocation. Such powers were rarely used against members of the Superior Council, although the provincial councillors were not so fortunate.

In 1749 the Company, without greatly altering the nature of the councils, introduced slight changes. The number of councillors was fixed at twenty-five, although at that time there were actually twenty-seven. These men were distributed among the various councils. The twelve ranking councillors, bearing the title *Conseiller des Indes* with the governor formed the political council. Nothing in the records indicates that this body ever met as a whole, or was intended so to do. These men were to be members of any secret committees which might be summoned by the governor at Pondicherry or the director in Bengal. In case of absence or death of one of these directors, the local members of the political council were to administer affairs until the Company or the Governor should take action. Heretofore the regulations of 1735 had provided that secret instructions from the Company be deposited with each council, to be opened in such emergency, that the wishes of the Company might be known. This was a rather foolish policy, considering the possibilities of change in a person's charac-

ter or status after the Company had decided on him as a possible director.[16] The other twelve men, each termed *conseiller ordinaire,* filled the quota of the various councils, having deliberative voice. In 1752 their number was increased to eighteen, the Company at that time contemplating the establishment of new provincial councils at Mazulipatam and Coleche. Even this increase was not sufficient to satisfy Dupleix who believed that the Company's activities warranted at least twenty-four ordinary councillors. At the same time the Company stated that there were to be no more supernumeraries, and that the practice of having honorary councillors should be brought to an end with *les Sieurs* Pilavoine and Cornet, unless the Company should see fit to retain the title.[17]

In considering the work of the Superior Council it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that its constituent members had duties quite apart from their functions as councillors. We are here concerned with the varied activities of the body itself.[18] It was expected to meet daily, but in actual practice the normal interval was fifteen days, provision being made for special meetings when necessary. It was a great administrative organization, receiving and executing directions from Paris, formulating policies when left free to do so, and even busying itself in this field at times in contravention of the orders of the Company. It directed the activities of the employees in India, and supervised their training, promotion and transfer. It had also to supervise the provincial councils, as some of their actions were of an *ad interim* nature, such being the case with treaties entered into, or major promotions made by them. It was not unusual for the Superior Council to adopt a haughty attitude toward the provincial councils which would then complain to the Company, sending copies of obnoxious correspondence to justify their cause. Consequently the Company in 1734 instructed the Superior Council to moderate its tone, and endeavor to develop more harmonious relations. Nevertheless the provincial councils were definitely subordinate to it, and when it saw fit to change any decision made by one of them it had the right to do so. This in itself indicates that the provincial councils were left to exercise their own initiative in many instan-

ces. It was the Council at Pondicherry which frequently assumed the initative in establishing new posts, and which almost invariably decided where they should be located. New provincial councils were named by it for those new posts, or to fill vacancies, as when the Company discharged the existing council at Mahé *en masse.*

It was naturally its duty to keep the French headquarters informed about the state of affairs in India.[19] It, and the provincial councils as well, had to send an annual list of persons comprising the garrison, giving Christian and surname, *nom de guerre,* town and province from which each came. This practice was instituted about 1729. A similar list was required for the civil employees, age, time of arrival, salary and posts held, being included in the data. For more important employees a statement as to character and capacity was also made. In 1735 the Company ordered the Council to send annually the minutes in duplicate of its meetings. Vital statistics were also sent home each year; the priests kept these records, and deposited duplicates with the Council; these had to be signed by the secretary and certified by the director, in order that they might be legally recognized in France. The Council provided for the administration of the estates of sailors and other employees who died without heirs in India, and for the probate of wills where such existed. It had also to keep the Company informed regarding local Asiatic commerce, by submitting profit and loss statements.

The Superior Council had political jurisdiction in Pondicherry. Such hospitals and schools as were established were under its care, as were sanitation, the creation of public parks, the widening of streets and the water supply. There is some evidence of its having established a police system. The Company in its charter had been given civil and criminal judical power over the French. The natives also were brought under its sway by the consent of the Indian rulers, embodied in treaties. A special court known as the *chaudcrie* was established for these latter. The French were tried by a select group of councillors who sat as a court usually one half day a week.

Relations with native rulers also came within the sphere of the Council's jurisdiction. Here it was concerned only with determining policy, since actual negotations were carried on by especially delegated individuals. Relations with rival Europeans came within its purview, and as these were frequently handled through correspondence rather than by direct contact, the Council as a whole was concerned with the transactions. The Company here insisted that a peaceful policy be adopted.[20]

The building and repair of fortifications and other details of a military nature were cared for by the Council. It had the power of promotion and interdiction over the Company's military employees, could determine the size and number of detachments to be sent out, and could authorize acts of hostility and reprisal. The military officers resented this interference, but it was expressly stipulated by the Company that they were subordinate to, and should receive their instructions from the Council. The feeling between the two organizations is indicated by the frequency with which the Company reiterated this idea.[21]

Maritime affairs[22] likewise were somewhat under the Council's control. It was its duty to consult with each captain on his arrival concerning the treatment of his crew and the quality of food supplied. It was supposed to have on hand an adequate store of provisions for the home voyage. It determined whether or not a ship was in proper condition to make the return trip, condemning it, or arranging for its repair if feasible. Sailing orders were issued to European bound vessels, and at times to vessels engaged in Oriental trade. Passports were given these latter, and furnished in blank to subordinate posts such as Surat, which was not allowed to issue them in its own name. If occassion demanded, the Council could remove a captain although it had no jurisdiction over the other ship's officers. Any instructions it had for them were transmitted through the agency of the captain. If they or the sailors came ashore they were expected to obey the local ordinances; but even here in case of offense they were turned over to the captain for punishment. If he failed to influence them and a second offense were committed, then only had the Council direct disciplinary power. Few indeed are the words of praise in regard to this

branch of the Council's activities. Its members were not trained in maritime affairs, and even the governor might be overawed by the highly technical although not necessarily accurate discussions entered into by the captains.

The economic problems faced by the Superior Council may be dealt with in two connections, financial and commercial. Advances to the merchants, loans to or by the Company, letters of credit, control of the mint, supervision of local accounts, and the disposition of funds occupied much attention. These matters are considered in detail in the chapter on finance. Naturally the chief agent of a commercial corporation busied itself largely with commercial matters. This phase of the economic question also receives separate treatment elsewhere.

There were a few miscellaneous duties[23] performed by the council, such as the nomination or presentation to ecclesiastical offices, the passage of regulations governing the conduct of employees, and provision for occassional celebrations such as those ordered by the Company at the time of royal births or marriages.

While the Council was allowed a very free hand in most matters, definite limitations were placed on some of its activities. Some of these seem trivial, such as the prohibition of granting of pensions, considering the fact that it was the Company's practice to bestow these regularly in accordance with the suggestions of the Council. Others can well be understood when it is recalled that political influence played a large part in the Company's activities. Certain offices had almost of necessity to be granted to protégés of powerful French personages. Promotions could not therefore be left entirely in the hands of the Superior Council. Then there was the policy of political aggrandizement which certain of its members were wont to advocate. This conflicted with the policy of commercial expansion ever dear to the Company, so the Council could not be left free to acquire new territories when and as it saw fit. Few letters of the 1740s from the Company to the Council failed to stress the point that political aggrandizement must be discontinued since it was contrary to the wishes not only of the Company but also of those ministers of the Crown whose

good graces the Company had need to cultivate. This advice proved to be wasted.

Many affairs at Pondicherry were ordinarily handled not by the Council but by its individual members, and by subaltern employees.[24] Each councillor had his special duties, which in 1743 were apportioned thus; the "Second," a title given to the head councillor, inspected purchased goods; his prospective successor had charge of the accounts and funds; others in order of rank were charged with assisting the "Second" in inspections, serving as Procurer General, keeping the stores, and directing the mint. The two supernumeraries served one as secretary, and the other as assistant bookkeeper. Until 1734 it had been the custom to attach certain functions to the councillor longest in office, others to newer appointees; then it was decided to allot work according to aptitude. Thus each promotion among the councillors would not *ipso facto* mean a general shake up, for one would continue with the same duties irrespective of his advancement in seniority.

There were various French employees who were not members of the Council;[25] clerks sent out from Paris, frequently half trained and even at times unable to write; skilled artisans ordinarily engaged at Lorient for a fixed period of service in India; carpenters, cannoners, gunsmiths, coopers, locksmiths, etc. The Council regularly had in its employ an architect or engineer to supervise the erection of various buildings at Pondicherry. A large part of the employees were clerical,[26] known as *sous-marchands* and *commis*. Some of these were recruited from among the local population. *Metics* or half-breeds might serve in subordinate positions, but they were not to be hired by the Council unless it received the Company's prior consent. This limitation applied also to Europeans who had gone to India as private traders. Although some of the *metics* proved quite capable, and Dupleix favored their promotion, the Company seldom allowed them to advance beyond the post of *sous-marchand* at the very nominal salary of 800 livres a year. Finally there were Indian courtiers, agents, interpreters and merchants.[27] Necessity forced the Company to leave the nomination of these officials to its employees in India. The Jesuits were anxious that only Christian natives be named to

important posts, such as that of courtier, but the Company did not see fit to adopt any such restriction. Some of these natives were faithful and loyal, while others seemed bent on advancing their own interests. In some cases laxness on the part of European employees facilitated their schemes. For instance, L'Arombate, an agent whose knowledge of native tongues and of the interior made him indispensable, was able to collect large and unwarranted sums from the Council at Pondicherry because little effort was made to check up on his activities. Godeheu found that he as purchasing agent had frequently turned in accounts for goods supposedly supplied the army, but never delivered. On the other hand, the loyalty of one of the agents, Indinaram, at Chandernagor was such that the Superior Council had greater faith in him than in the provincial council.

Subordinate provincial councils were scattered throughout India at the chief posts,[28] Chandernagor, Mahé, Mazulipatam, and, for a short time at Madras. These directed the affairs not only of the factory in which they were located, but of outlying posts as well. Chandernagor, for example, controlled five *loges*. At the time of Dupleix's administration in Bengal there was considerable agitation for changing the council at Chandernagor into a superior council. Reasonably good arguments were advanced by Dupleix.[29] Both the English and the Dutch had independent councils in the vicinity. The English council at Calcutta had once been subsidiary to Madras, but the system had been changed, so why could not the French do likewise? They maintained as large a force in the district as any of their rivals, so weakness could not be cited as a reason for continuing only a provincial council. A change would eliminate many altercations between the employees at Chandernagor and those at Pondicherry, and the former would not then be subject to the dictation of a group far distant and lacking knowledge of local affairs. The head of the council could then be styled governor instead of director. Thus Dupleix's personal ambitions could be satisfied, although it sounded better on paper to say that the title of governor would place the French official on a par with the English and Dutch. Dupleix failed to bring the Company to his point of view, so no change was effected. Yet in prac-

tice the Council at Pondicherry tended to abandom its control over Chandernagor in the late years of Dumas's administration. Dupleix and his associates paid little heed to criticism or advice, so the Superior Council finally in 1740 stated that it would make no more comments on action taken at Chandernagor since to do so was a waste of time and effort. But when Dupleix was established at Pondicherry he lost the Chandernagor view point, so censure and advice were again meted out to the provincial council when needed.[30]

In addition to receiving orders from Pondicherry formulated by the Council, or sent by the Company in its care, the provincial councils also received orders direct from Paris. Their personnel was recruited in the same manner as that of the Superior Council, paid on the same scale, and technically considered as members of the higher body, thus being in line for promotion to major offices. Their powers too were similar, although in some respects more restricted. They were not permitted to formulate commercial policies but were expected to carry out as best they might the orders received from Paris or Pondicherry. They had less control of their own members, having no right of revocation, but only that of interdiction from office. Appointments, treaties, and building appropriations made by them were subject to confirmation by the Superior Council.[31]

Each council was presided over by a local director. At each of the *loges* there was also a director, sometimes assisted by one or two subordinates, although there was no council. Wherever there was such a body, the director had to discuss the affairs of the Company with it. When Dupleix was director at Chandernagor, he tried to ape the governor at Pondicherry and get along without consulting his council, a practice which was directly contrary to the orders of the Company. In one detail the director at Chandernagor did have full control. In 1745 the Superior Council gave him power to appoint and discharge the native clerical force. This measure was an outgrowth of Burat's maladministration in the preceding years.[32]

On the whole, despite some trouble with recalcitrant employees, and an occassional quarrel between the Superior Council and the

council at Chandernagor, the administration was a satisfactory one. Occassionally a bit of ill feeling over salaries, promotions, and such matters dampened the ardor of some employees, but the majority of them were faithful, at times even ardent in the service of the Company. Their efforts to assist the Company with its financial problems are especially deserving of praise, and that at times the Company was appreciative is seen in the admission of both Lenoir and Dumas to the Paris board of directors on their return to Europe.

1. Arch. Col., C2, 33, Estimates for 1747; *Ibid.*, 38, fol. 67, *Mémoire sur l'Inde*, 1752; G. B. Malleson, *The French in India*, pp. 272-73. See also Chapter XII.
2. Arch. Col., C2, 38, fol. 67.
3. *Lettres et conventions des Gouverneurs de Pondichéry, passim.*
4. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9145, fol. 20, Company to Dupleix, March 31, 1750; fols. 197-208, Company's instructions to Godeheu, October 15, 1753; *Ibid.*, 9146, fol. 94; *Ibid.*, 9147, fol. 93.
5. Doneaud du Plan, Histoire de la Compagnie Française des Indes, *Revue Maritime et Coloniale*, 1889, p. 536; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 65; *Ibid.*, 28, fol. 12; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 11332, fol. 299, Letters patent for Lenoir as Governor, November 6, 1725; *Ibid.*, 8993, fols. 30-31, Godeheu gives one the impression in his Journal that Dupleix browbeat the Council and took all initiative from it. *The Records of Fort St. George*, entry of July 27, 1752, also indicate that Dupleix paid little attention to his Council.
6. The voluminous correspondence of Dupleix has been partially preserved, and is scattered throughout the archives at the *Bibliothèque Nationale*, the Ministry of Colonies, the Arsenal, and Versailles. There is no similar collection of documents relating to Dumas or Lenoir, although a few of their letters are to be found in the archives of the Ministry of Colonies, and in the Ariel collection at the *Bibliothèque Nationale*.

   Concerning nepotism, see for example, Bib. Nat., N.A.F. 9147, fol. 3, D'Argenson to Dupleix, January 15, 1753; fol. 16, Louis de Bourbon to Dupleix, February 17, 1752; *Ibid.*, 9144, fol. 15, Company to Dupleix, November 21, 1743. The Company, after explaining that it would send out no new employees that year, makes one exception:— "Il vous parviendra cependant en cette qualité et aux appointements de 700 livres le Sr. Soubert, frère de l'une des femmes de chambre de la Reine pour satisfaire aux ordres de Sa Majesté, vous aurez pour ce jeune homme tous les égards que exigent une aussi auguste récommendation." *Ibid.*, 9147, fol. 90, Cavalier to Dupleix, October 12, 1741; *Ibid.*, 9148, fol. 210, Godeheu to Dupleix, February 16, 1743; *Ibid.*, 9150, fols. 141-181, Saintard to Dupleix, 1741-49; *Ibid.*, 9151, fol. 118, Dupleix to De Laistre (syndic) October 21, 1753; Arch. Col., C2, 80, fol. 7, Dumas to Comptroller General, January 10, 1740.
7. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9150, fol. 7, de Machault to Dupleix, January 19, 1753.

8. Dupleix had to ask the Company for an assistant in 1753. He intended to exercise control over commerce through this assistant, and devote his attention to political affairs. The request was not granted. *Ibid.*, 9146, fol. 112, Dupleix to the Company, October 16, 1753; *Ibid.*, 9150, fol. 60, Dupleix to Montaran, September 9, 1753; Arch. S. et O., E, 3749; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8971, fol. 115.
9. The governors during the period under consideration were:—Lenoir (temporary appointment by the Superior Council) 1721-23; Beauvallier de Courchant, 1723-26; Lenoir, 1726-35; Dumas, 1735-40; Dupleix, 1740-54. H. Weber, *La Compagnie des Indes*, p. 466; A. Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 146. Martineau quotes Dupleix as saying that Dumas obtained the governorship of Pondicherry by distributing money on all sides. Beginning with 1738, Dupleix himself used "un peu de séduction" to insure his own succession to the post. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 484-85.
10. *Ibid.*, I, 59, 60, 140-43; Arch. Col., C2, 25, fol. 177, Memoir by La Bourdonnais, 1733; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8980, fol. 14, Dupleix to De Marquayson, July 26, 1737; Prosperity of the Company under Lenoir may in part be judged by the value of its stock. In 1726, on January 1, it was quoted at 711; in 1732 it reached 1,776; then in 1734 it dropped to a point below 1,200, but quickly recovered and reached 2,085 on January 1, 1736. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 561. A profit of more than 100 per cent over the price of goods in India and China was realized during the course of his administration. *Ibid.*, pp. 495-99.
11. Martineau, *Dupleix*, 1, 64, 65, 67, 74, 141.
12. *Ibid.*, I 403; II. 82; Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 492, 495, 499; C.S.P.V., III, Appendix; Malleson, *op. cit.*, Chapter 3.
13. Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, vi.
14. Arch. Col., C2, 30, fol. 75, the number of regular councillors was not always limited to five; About 1741, eight were nominated. Vol. 26, fols. 26, 32. Deliberations of Company 1734.
15. *Ibid.*, vol. 26, fol. 24, vol. 29, fol. 211, Delib. of Co., 1741; Bib. Nat. A.F.F., 8980, fol. 51; N.A.F. 9145, fol. 53; C.S.C.C. II, viii, 256.
16. Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 175, Delib. of Co., 1735; *Ibid.*, D2D, XI.
17. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9146, fols. 65, 231.
18. C.S.P.V., I, II, III, *passim;* C.S.C.C., I, II, III, *passim;* Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 165, Delib. of Co., 1735; *Ibid.*, fols. 21, 24, Delib. of Co., 1734; *Ibid.*, 29, fol. 186; *Ibid.*, 38, fol. 82; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8980, fol. 128; *Ibid.*, N.A.F., 9146, fol. 65; 9147, fol. 160.
19. C.S.C.C., I, 39; Arch. Lorient, IP, 273, pc. 38; Bib. Arsenal, 4743, fol. 16.
20. Arch. Col., C2, 29, fol. 200, Delib. of Co., 1741; see also sections on relations with rival companies and with natives.
21. Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 165; Arch. Aff. Etr., Asie, VIII, fol. 52.
22. Arch. Col., C2, 22, fol. 236; 25, fol. 182, La Bourdonnais' Memoir; 26, fols. 19, 165; 27, fol. 20; Arch. Lorient, IP, 123, pc. 7; IP, 1, Marine regulations of 1733: C.S.P.V., II, 225.
23. C.S.P.V., III, 195; Arch. Col., C2, 76, fol. 231, Agreement between the Jesuits and the Council at Chandernagor, 1739; *Ibid.*, F3, 238, fol. 523.
24. Pillai's *Journal*, IV, 119; Arch. Col., C2, 30, fols. 144-45, Delib. of Co., 1743; 26, fol. 25, Delib. of Co., 1734.
25. Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 25; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9146, fol. 65.
26. Arch. Col., C2, 26, fols. 22, 27, Delib. of Co., 1734; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8980, fol. 51; *Ibid.*, N. A. F., 9145, fol. 41; P. Co., *passim.*

27. Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 27, Delib. of Co., 1734; 31, fol. 43; 79, fol. 93; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8980, fol. 51; 8993, fol. 159; *Ibid.,* N. A. F., 9145, fol. 42. C.S.C.C., II, 389, 410, 428-25.
28. Arch. Col., C2, 38, fol. 67, Memoir of 1752; C.S.C.C., II, 52, 128; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9151, fol. 10, Dupleix to Comptroller General, October 11, 1746; Bib. Arsenal, 4743, fol. 46.
29. Dupleix in a letter to his brother, September 23, 1737, in which he discusses the possibility of Chandernagor becoming the site of a Superior Council, points out that the Isle of France had been granted such a Council although only thirty leagues distant from that of the Isle of Bourbon, whereas Pondicherry was some four hundred leagues from Chandernagor. Bib. Nat., A. F. F., 8980.
30. C.S.C.C., II, 126, 146, 272, 273, 365, 368, 374, 375; III, 171, 173, 184.
31. C.S.C.C., II, 106, 199; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 34 Delib. of Co., 1734; fol. 166, Delib. of Co., 1735.
32. C.S.C.C., I, 173; II, 389. Bib. Nat. N.A.F., 9145, fol. 93; 9355 fol. 152.

CHAPTER V.

Justice

The Company through the medium of the councils had the right of administering justice in various parts of the East. This right was based on decrees of the French government, and on treaties made with the natives. In 1701 when the Superior Council was established by royal edict[1] it was given the power of administering both civil and criminal justice, as were the provincial councils. In time, certain of its members were empowered to act as admiralty court judges so that prizes taken by the French in the Indian Ocean might be adjudged.[2] At first the Council served not only as a court of original jurisdiction for cases arising at Pondicherry, but also as a court of appeal from the provincial councils. Part of its power was removed in 1723 when a superior council was established at the Isle of Bourbon. This was because appeals from the island to Pondicherry enabled unscrupulous litigants to prolong cases needlessly, and because the criminal element had little respect for an inferior court.[3] The Council at Pondicherry continued to be the superior court of the Company in India.

Royal edicts might give the Company the right of administering justice for French subjects, but could scarcely give it control over the natives. This was secured by treaties with native princes. Numerous cessions of territory were made to the Company, usually including the right of taxation and of administering justice. The exact terms of the grants varied. The following give an idea of their nature. The King of Bedrou in 1740 granted the Company a certain portion of land. Disputes arising between persons on this territory or within one hundred *cobes* of it were to be handled by the Company. The King and his agents renounced the right of intervention on any pretext whatsoever in these disputes If trouble developed between a resident of the Company's territory, and a person in the unceded land of Bedrou, the resident was to be turned over to a native judge. If he were found guilty, he was to be returned to the Company for punishment.[4]

Mutual rendition of fugitives from justice was a fairly common practice. The ruler of Colechepatam even went a step further when he ceded a town to the Company, for he provided that merchants in his territories who were delinquent debtors of the French should be surrendered to the Company.[5]

Another type of treaty relationship was with native groups settled in territories already ceded to the Company. Such treaties perhaps should not be regarded as the basis of the Company's right, but rather an explanation of the way in which justice was actually administered. For example, the treaty of 1738 between Bunel, the director at Mahé, and the Moorish merchants of the town provided for the preservation of order in the bazaar of the Moors. The French were to be informed in case of disorder, and the director was to have the trouble maker arrested. At his trial before the French authorities, three Moors were to be present to see that the case was tried in accordance with the customs of the country. If any fine were imposed, it was to go share and share alike to the Company and the mosque of the Moors.[6]

The Company did not always receive full rights of justice in ceded territories. Bayanour, King of Bargaret, provided simply that if any of his subjects caused trouble for the French he would punish them. In turn, if the French misbehaved beyond the boundaries of their territory, they would be turned over to the Company for punishment.[7] At Chandernagor, justice was administered in the name of the Moorish government. Here the councillors acted as *Gemidars* or *Izardars*—native judicial officers—in lands in which the Company had only limited rights. Technically the native laws alone should be enforced, and appeals might be made from the decisions of the *Gemidars* to higher courts of the Nabab. The council preferred to enforce French law, and serve as a court of final jurisdiction. Usage gave a certain sanction to these pretentions, so the council avoided action which might antagonize the natives and lead to Moorish intervention.[8]

It will appear from the foregoing that the French jurisdiction varied considerably. In some places it was complete: in some it was subject to the superior jurisdiction of the Nabab's court; and in some it could be exercised only over the French. In all cases

the French had control only in territories actually ceded to them and their immediate vicinity, although under special conditions persons from outside these lands might be turned over to them by the native authorities.

What were the laws and customs enforced by the French? The Company's charter stipulated that the "Customs of Paris" be enforced.[9] In dealing with natives, however, it was often necessary to observe local practices. Frequently, too, the judicial authorities based their decisions on no established laws or customs, but on their personal whims or desires. In some instances, the laws were of a purely local nature[10] such as tax regulations and ordinances passed by one of the councils relative to the conduct of employees and other inhabitants of the post.

There were several agencies for law enforcement. The councils where they existed were the most important. They had original jurisdiction in cases involving Europeans, and heard native appeals from the lower courts. At Pondicherry five members made up the judicial branch of the council, a president and four judges. In civil cases the parties usually presented briefs which were considered by a special commissioner. The verdict was based on his report.[11] As these councillors were seldom trained for the bar there was some agitation in the 1720s to the effect that cases be judged only on the basis of what might appear fair to them. If a case were particularly complicated the advocate of this scheme suggested that it be referred to France, all the papers relating thereto being sent to French courts.[12] Nothing came of this.

The councils avoided their duties as judicial bodies in so far as possible, and discouraged those who would bring lawsuits before them. Consequently, in 1735 the Company issued a statement to be posted in public places in India, setting forth the judicial obligations of the councils, thus making public to the residents their rights at law. The councils were not, under any pretext, to refuse to examine cases brought before them. The procedure for bringing a case into court was to post a memoir or complaint with the secretary or registrar, who was obliged, under pain of removal from office, to receive such documents and bring them to the Council's attention.[13]

The inferior tribunals[14] were known as *Chauderies* or *Cacheries*. They had three members, a president and two assistants. At Chandernagor as at Pondicherry the second ranking councillor acted as president. The Company's regulations of 1735 provided that the two clerks with the rank of *sous-marchand* longest in its service should serve on the tribunal at Pondicherry. Decisions were by majority vote. These courts, at least in the early part of the eighteenth century, met twice a week, on Monday and Friday. They had jurisdiction over the natives, and appear to have been quite busy, for the Superior Council refers to their judgements as relating to "an infinite number of affairs." They had the right to imprison the blacks, order them to be whipped or have their ears cut off—this last being a mark of ignominy. The death penalty might be inflicted on the natives, but it was the practice to reserve such action for the Superior Council. The *Chauderie* also controlled the police, and had the right to fix the prices of foodstuffs. Like the higher tribunal, it had to rely on native interpreters in many instances. In civil cases the general practice was to refer the case to the Company's native courtier. He made an investigation, and reported to the presiding judge who then discussed the matter with his assistants and rendered judgment. Sometimes however, an interpreter was used and the case decided at once by the judges. The Company had some difficulty in finding suitable Malabar interpreters. In 1730-31 there was only one at Pondicherry, whereupon steps were taken to prevent the recurrence of such a state of affairs by offering rewards to young Frenchmen who would train themselves for this service.[15]

In the smaller posts where no provincial council existed the Company did not administer justice for the natives. The French employees, few in number, were for judicial purposes placed under the control of the local director. Similarly in the great provinces granted to the Company or its directors during the course of the wars of the 1740s and 1750s the French left the native courts to exercise their accustomed jurisdiction.[16]

The procedure as has been intimated above, varied in the different courts.[17] The usual practice in civil suits was to have briefs made by the parties. After considering these, judgment was given.

In criminal cases the accused appeared in court, or in times of lax administration, at the home of the judge. The case was tried in the presence of an interpreter, and punishment, if deemed necessary, was meted out. The third degree was occasionally used to secure a confession. Ananda Ranga Pillai states that natives suspected of having relations with the English in war time were maltreated to wring confessions from them. A sort of summary justice was also at times meted out. Governor Dupleix in a fit of rage ordered three incendiaries punished without formal trial. They were given fifty lashes apiece, their wounds rubbed with salt, and were then cast into the dungeon of the fort.

The punishments normally imposed ranged all the way from fines to the death penalty.[18] Confiscation of property, whipping, imprisonment, banishment from the Company's territory, branding, clipping off ears, and slavery were all included. This latter might be temporary or permanent; those enslaved were sent to the Isles of France and Bourbon. Whipping was very common, and might be administered along with some other form of punishment. The fines collected from natives at Chandernagor were placed in a special fund from which were paid pensions to widows of the Company's employees. At Pondicherry they were used for the erection of fortifications. The death penalty was avoided as much as possible, but was enforced in some cases of theft, and by the military tribunals for desertion. At all times the fear of native intervention seems to have influenced the councils and other tribunals. Rather than inflict the death penalty the Superior Council is known to have mixed justice with a goodly share of discretion and satisfied itself with ordering fifty lashes and deportation from the Company's territory of natives guilty of the capital crime of theft. This action, by the Council's own confession, was taken lest the Nabab of Bengal, of whom one of the guilty natives was subject, should cause trouble for the French in his domains.[19]

The Company had its own prisons, which in the early days were not very satisfactory. Here Christians and Hindus alike served their terms. The missionary element disapproved of this mixing, but the practice continued. For a time at Pondicherry there was no special prison building, so the natives were incarcerated in the

home of one of the local officials, the Grand Provost. This caused him such inconvenience and expense that the Council in 1728 authorized the building of a prison, suited to the climate of India. A few dark cells were available for those to whom some special punishment had to be given.[20]

From the decisions of the lower courts there was provision for appeal to the higher tribunals.[21] Civil cases originating in the *Chauderie* could be carried to the Council if the sum involved exceeded one hundred roupies. Europeans could appeal from the decisions of a provincial council to the Superior Council, and ultimately to the courts in France if they felt so inclined. There are several instances of such appeals to the former, but few appeals to royal French courts have been noted. The procedure in case of appeal to France was established by the Company in 1735. Memoirs or complaints were to be sent by the aggrieved party to the French government or to the Company, but notice would be taken of these documents only if they had been previously sent to the tribunal in India in order that that body might explain the reasons for its decision. The authorities in France then would decide the case on the basis of the two sets of documents. The Company threatened to punish severely anyone who made false or slanderous statements in his appeal.

For a short time during Burat's administration at Chandernagor, 1743-46, it became customory for disaffected natives to appeal from the Company's courts to that of the Nabab. Paravanas would be secured from him arbitrarily ordering the directors to surrender to native authorities Europeans who had cases against natives pending in the Company's courts. About 1746 a timely gift of seven thousand roupies from the Company to the Nabab seems to have restored matters to something like their ancient status.[22]

The judicial system was frequently under fire. Such criticism as has been preserved is mostly that of French officials although an occasional native complaint also exists.[23] Some of this criticism is directed at the enforcement of French law rather than native custom. In theory, French law was not applicable in the *Chauderie;* but the members of this tribunal who knew little law

of any kind, ordinarily knew still less of native custom, so they had either to enforce such law as they were acquainted with, or base decisions on their own whims. The Superior Council, handling as it did the more important cases, often involving a European as one of the parties, might more easily be expected to enforce the Customs of Paris. Yet as many of its cases related to commerce, a native was frequently an interested and at times a dissatisfied party when the application of French law led to judgments against him.

St. Priest, the King's commissioner to the Company, in 1751 felt that there were too many abuses, especially in the *Chauderie*. He believed that the governor should bring about a change.[24] Godeheu, who came to India in 1754 reported conditions still unsatisfactory.[25] Natives were punished at the homes of the judges without so much as a trial, and some, disgusted with the system, had fled from the region. At an earlier date Tiruvangadan,[26] a native merchant, addressed a complaint to the French Minister of Marine saying that he had been thrown into prison without trial and then, after several months, had been driven out of Pondicherry.

Bribery also played its part in the maladministration of justice. In the *Chauderie* the judges, even if they had the most open minds and the best of intentions, were dependent on interpreters. These Malabars could present evidence as they saw fit, so if they had an interest in either party they had an excellent opportunity to advance it, and did not scruple so to do. Thus unintentionally injustice might be done by the court, but the aggrieved natives would be none the less disgruntled at French justice and the Company's administration of it.[27]

French as well as natives suffered, for in the councils the decisions were too frequently based on the wishes of the judges, not on the terms of the law. If the ends of the judge could best be achieved by applying the law, this was done; if reason rather than law would justify a verdict pleasing to him, then reason became the basis; if neither law nor reason would serve his purpose, he simply took matters into his own all powerful hands. No efforts were made by the Superior Council to prevent or correct these

abuses. It was the agent of the governor. Any councillor who dared have a mind of his own was likely to encur the governor's emnity, and he had sufficient creatures who would obey his least suggestion to destroy utterly the influence of anyone who might oppose his wishes. At times justice was not only perverted, but in some cases completely stultified. In several instances persons attempting to bring suits in the council were obstructed by the governor, who simply pocketed the legal petitions. It was probably these abuses which led to the issue of the aforementioned regulations of 1735.[28]

Could the system have been improved? Could a group of expatriated and intriguing Frenchmen have given justice to the natives and to their fellow Europeans? Several of the abuses might have been removed, and in some cases this was done. The *Chauderie* need not have terrorized the natives by the irregularities noted. There was no need for the judges to try cases in their homes rather than in the court room. Interpreters may have been scarce, but a policy of training likely young natives, such as the Company eventually adopted, might well have been put into effect earlier. Then several of them could have been assigned to each court, thus lessening the chance of justice being corrupted by bribery. In the councils the overwhelming influence of the director or governor could not have been so easily checked. There, the chief hope for reform, more easily aimed at than achieved, was in the appointment of high minded officials. La Bourdonnais, one time governor of the Isles of France and Bourbon, suggested that the higher judicial officials be made responsible for the expenses of an appeal in which their decisions were reversed by a tribunal in France. This would certainly have kept the judges on their guard against a too ready compliance with the governor's wishes, or the purposeful maladministration of justice; but would any have accepted the office with these strings attached to it?

It may be that we have shown the judicial activities of the Company at their worst, and that ordinarily the abuses were less numerous and less glaring. The chief critics were La Bourdonnais and Godeheu. Neither was in position to give an unbiased opinion. La Bourdonnais was an able administrator and looked to

others to be the same. So too with Godeheu. His comments date from the time when he was in India investigating the abuses which existed. He naturally tends to show only one phase. Some light as to conditions of the time may perhaps be shed from the fact that his criticism is chiefly of the *Chauderie.* The same holds true of St. Priest's comments. The lot of the Europeans, if not that of the natives, had apparently improved since 1735.

1. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 11332, fol. 301.
2. Dernis, *Recueil des titres concernant la Compagnie des Indes,* III, 679; Arch. Col., C2, 33, fol. 288. C.S.P.V., I, 9, 15; P. Co., I, 103-4.
3. Dernis, *op. cit.,* III, 586.
4. Arch. Col., Inde 2, VI, 165.
5. Arch. Col., Inde, 457, fol. 24.
6. *Ibid.,* 457, fol. 23.
7. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9062, fol. 7.
8. Arch. Col., Inde 2, VII.
9. P. Kaepplein, *La Compagnie des Indes Orientales,* p. 7; C.S.C.C., III, 172.
10. Pillai's *Journal,* I, 98.
11. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8924, fol. 269.
12. Arch. Col., C2, 73, fol. 19.
13. *Ibid.,* 26, fol. 173.
14. C.S.C.C., I, 20; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8924, fol. 269; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 173; C.S.P.V., I, 104, 130; II, 293; P. Co., I, 366; Arch. Col., Inde 2, VII; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8993, fol. 159.
15. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8924, fol. 269; Reference to a "tribunal de la police" exercising jurisdiction in minor cases is found in a manuscript history of Pondicherry written in 1840. No mention of it has been found in the 18th century documents.
16. Arch. Col., Inde 2, VI, 17.
17. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8993, fol. 159; C.S.P.V., I, 130. Pillai's *Journal,* III, 316, 425.
18. C.S.P.V., I, 130; II, 140; III, 66; C.S.C.C., I, 328; Arch. Col., Inde 2, VII; P. Co., I, 79.
19. C.S.C.C., I, 20; C.S.P.V., I, 127.
20. Arch. Col., F5A, 19; C.S.P.V., II, 205. Pillai's *Journal,* I, 194, 237.
21. Arch. Col., Inde 2, VII; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 174; C.S.C.C., I, 384; III, 171. Pillai's *Journal,* I, 100.
22. Arch. Col., C2, 34, fols. 149-50; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9355, fol. 152; A. Martineau, *Dupleix,* II, 104, 107.
23. Arch. Aff. Etr., Asie, III, 168; Arch. Col., C2, 25, fol. 186; Arch. Col., Inde 2, VII.
24. Arch. Col., C2, 37, fol. 103.
25. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8993, fol. 159, Godeheu to De Leyrit, February 12, 1755.
26. Arch. Aff. Etr., Asie, III, 168.
27. Arch. Col., C2, 25, fol. 159.
28. *Ibid.,* 25, fol. 158, Memoir by La Bourdonnais, 1733.

CHAPTER VI.

Financing the Company—Paris and India

A Company which enjoyed the monopoly of French trade with the Orient necessarily had many financial problems. The capital investment in buildings, vessels, and articles of commerce was large. Vast sums of bullion had to be shipped to India and China to maintain the balance of trade. Concessions from the natives were to be had only in return for generous gifts. The ways of the sea were perilous; pirates and shipwrecks were to be expected, and provision had to be made for losses due to these causes. Employees had to be paid. Even charities demanded some attention. What were the resources of the Company with which it could satisfy these demands? For the greater part they were funds obtained in France, but in India also some monies were to be had. An exhaustive study of the Parisian end of the problem need not be entered into here as the various memorialists of 1769 have given us detailed accounts of the financing of the Company to that date. Weber, in his *Compagnie des Indes* has made a careful study of their memoirs. Our purpose then is to give only what appear to be the essential points in the field covered by him. Particular attention is given the Indian phase of the problem which heretofore has been a neglected subject.[1]

Fortunately for Law's Company there had been forerunners in the field. Its immediate predecessor, the Company of the Occident, had been capitalized at 100,000,000 livres. However, most of this was not available for commercial purposes for it was closely associated with Law's Bank, which in 1718 became a royal institution. To this company the profitable tobacco monopoly had been granted in 1718. Early the next year it fell heir to the rights of the Senegal Company, thus securing a monopoly of certain West African trade. Presently it absorbed the China Company, and then the East India Company, to which little belonged except its charter and a few concessions in India. In 1719 these several companies were by royal decree reorganized to form one great *Compagnie perpetuelle des Indes.* In earlier days concessions

from the crown had been secured and a start made in the erection of buildings to which the new Company fell heir. It had to pay for these legacies, but this payment was easily postponed and was only made after much litigation. The Company found itself burdened with the debts of its predecessors, and these proved so troublesome a problem at Surat that for many years it scarcely dared attempt to establish trade relationships there. Obviously with the many monopoly privileges it enjoyed, it must be regarded as potentially powerful. It had charter privileges running from 1719 to 1770, so that it had great inducements to hold out to capitalists and speculators. For two years there was a period of frenzied finance such as we find at few times in pre-revolutionary France.

New stock to the amount of 25,000,000 livres was issued to care for inherited debts and current expenses. Soon another 50,000 shares with a par value of 500 livres each were issued to provide additional capital. Time payment was now provided for, and a speculative element introduced. In order to obtain stock in the India Company stockholding in the former Company of the Occident was made a prerequisite, whereupon its shares came to be called "Mothers." Faith and interest in the new Company was maintained by the rapid accumulation of new privileges. During the early months of 1719 it absorbed the African Company, gained control of the mint for a period of nine years, and secured the administration of the *Ferme Générale,* the *Gabelle,* and the general finances of the State. Another 25,000,000 livres worth of stock was thrown on the market in the summer. Much of the money from this did the Company little immediate good as it was absorbed in payments into the royal treasury for privileges accorded. Law kept public interest at a fever heat by the declaration of a six percent dividend payable the first of the new year, and a second six percent payable later in the year. His acquisition of the financial system of the State had been accompanied by an agreement to pay off the public debt in return for an annuity equal to three percent of this sum. More stock therefore in blocks of 100,000 shares flooded the market, and those already issued rose from the par value of 500 livres to 10,000 and even

12,000 livres. Even a twelve percent dividend would look small with shares inflated as much as seven hundred and fifty percent. But Law prevented any slump at the moment by issuing an encouraging report which sent the stock mounting ever upward.

Presently adverse reports filtered through from Louisiana. La Motte-Cadillac, who had been a governor of the region in an earlier day, discounted Law's glamorous reports of conditions there. Commerce elsewhere it is true was being promoted; the Company's fleet was increased from eighteen to thirty vessels during 1719. But this was far from sufficient to prevent a panic once people grew skeptical. Stock began to fall in value. Law hoped to save the Company by additional concessions from the State. The privileges of the St. Dominigue trade, and a monopoly of that of the Guinea coast were made to it, at the same time that a part of the public debt was shifted from the Company's shoulders. Lower and ever lower went the stock. Then Law cleared out of the country, and it became the task of the new Comptroller General with the aid of a special commission to settle the financial affairs of the State and the Company. It now had to be reorganized. Its vast non-commercial concessions were stripped from it, save only the tobacco monopoly. This, although temporarily taken away, was restored when the Royal Commissioners had finished their work, for they found the King indebted to the Company to the extent of 100,000,000 livres for payment made to the treasury in 1717.

The resources of the Company were now its trade monopoly, the tobacco monopoly, and the income from the *Domaine d'Occident,* or taxes on goods from French colonies in America. This was made over to the Company as it was figured that the tobacco concession alone would not yield a fair return on the money advanced to the King. The Council of the Indies was created in 1723 to safeguard the interests of the stockholders. These were now guaranteed a fixed dividend of 100 livres for 1722, and 150 livres per share thereafter. All told, some 56,000 shares were recognized as having a right to this dividend. Of course any returns from commerce might augment these fixed dividends, which were based on the expected income from the tobacco monopoly.

In its early years under the new system the Company found its privileges constantly changing. After two years the income from the *Domaine d'Occident* was taken away. Meanwhile it had received a monopoly of the lotteries in 1724 which it enjoyed for only one year, thereafter sharing the privilege with the State. Then too it received a monopoly of the coffee sales in France in 1723, a very natural concession considering its rights in the East. The tobacco monopoly remained under its control for many years although it was handled in different ways at different times. Until 1730 the Company exploited the privilege itself, and then turned it over to the *Ferme Générale* in return for an annual fixed income of seven and a half millions for the first four years and eight millions for the next four. The system was then continued for another six years on the same basis.

Thus its resources are seen to be still quite extensive. The capital of the Company in 1725 as estimated by the Abbé Morellet was 143,640,987 livres, and rose slowly after this time until it reached 161,900,000 livres in 1740. The greater part of this sum, 100,000,000 livres, was in the royal treasury, and from this the Company had only the annual income from the tobacco monopoly. In addition it had its income from sales with which to carry on business and pay dividends. This income, especially in war time, failed to meet its current needs. Recourse was had to loans from either King or stockholders. On several occassions the King advanced the funds necessary to pay the fixed dividends, about 9,000,000 being so advanced all told. Even with such aid the Company had to forego the payment of dividends in 1746.[2] It looked forward hopefully to some indemnity from the crown for its surrender of Madras to supplement its depleted treasury. It felt that the King might at least grant it a remission of the debt incurred, for payment of the fixed dividend, but its hopes were vain.

In addition to the funds raised by loans, lotteries were used, one in 1724, a second in 1730, and a third in 1744. That of 1730 was not to raise new funds but to reduce the capital of the Company, provision being made for calling in 25,000 shares payable 1,300 livres apiece at the first drawing, 1,400 at one six months later, and so on by increments of 100 livres up to 3,000 livres. It was hoped

thereby to give shares a somewhat more steady value. The lotteries of 1724 and 1744 bear more resemblance to those of modern times. It was estimated that that of 1724 would give the Company a profit of fifteen percent.[3]

Sales of stocks, loans, and lotteries gave the Company a variable income; its regular annual income was made up from the revenues from the tobacco concession, or the annual payment made by the King when the State took it over, and from sales. The latter produced about 10,000,000 livres per annum prior to 1730; as high as 21,000,000 in the next decade, and over 26,000,000 in 1751-52. Then theoretically the Company should have received a tonnage bonus of 50 livres on exports and 70 livres on imports, and a head tax of 13 livres on negroes it carried as slaves from Africa. But these payments were not made regularly. The Company claimed in 1747 that its tonnage bonus had not been paid for sixteen years, and estimated that over six million livres was due it from the King on that account alone. At the same time the negro head rights were over five millions in arrears.

The Company carried on its business in France in the usual currency of the realm, *livre tournois*. But in India it was forced to use roupies, pagodas, etc. It could not ship livres from France for transformation into Indian coin because the export of currency from France was forbidden. The greater part of the gold and silver used to meet the needs of the Indian posts came from Spain, which received much of it from America. Although technically this could no more be exported than could French coin, the Spanish authorities made an exception in favor of the Company in return for a three percent payment on the sums exported. Montaran in a memoir of the 1750s points out that there was much contraband in Spanish gold and silver, and that the Company could if it wished secure it for a one percent rather than a three percent payment. He felt, however, that it was in the Company's interest to remain aloof from smugglers, for it had trouble enough with such individuals without setting a bad example for others. Ordinarily the Company had some of its own vessels call at Cadiz for the bullion, although at times it had others perform this service

for it. It was careful not to entrust all its funds to one vessel, four calling at Cadiz in 1748.[4]

The employees in India usually received too little money from Europe to carry on the Company's business, so they developed such sources of revenue as they could.[5] The shipments of bullion made up a very large part of the available funds, which had to be converted into native coin. In the early days it was sent to Madras or one of the native mints to be changed. This was expensive, as there were mint fees as well as the costs of transportation and guard. Later, through the activities of Dumas the Company secured the right to operate mints of its own. The funds were distributed from Pondicherry although later the Company adopted the practice of sending vessels direct to Mahé and Chandernagor, thus simplifying the problem, but not altogether eliminating it, as some of the minor posts had still to be supplied from Pondicherry. If the funds at a particular post proved insufficient the local council might try to supplement them temporarily by bills of exchange drawn on other councils or on the Company. Then there was a limited amount to be secured from the sale of European goods, but this was a minor source of revenue. In the period 1723-1743 the bullion shipments to India and China totalled 150,800,000 livres, whereas merchandise was valued at only 28,365,000 livres. When offered for sale the chances were that merchandise would move rather slowly; moreover, some of it was destined to be used as presents for the natives, or for free distribution among the employees.

Such were the obvious and normal means of financing the Company's Indian posts. There were in addition many other sources of revenue which are less well known. First among these is credit.[6] Some natives had so high a regard for the Company that in times of need they advanced money without security and without interest. The Superior Council was careful to pay such debts of honor, and to reward those who thus evidenced their faith in the Company. Then there were interest bearing loans which were authorized by the Company since it realized that the sums it sent to India were insufficient for commerce, salaries, fortifications, gifts, and other expenses. From very early days it had thus capi-

talized on its credit. In the seventeenth century money had been secured from the natives at the rate of three percent per month. From that time on the practice seems to have been established although we but once again hear of such exorbitant interest. Some of the natives made these loans quite regularly, although there is little indication of the total sums involved. In 1748 interest was being paid to many natives, several of them receiving over 3,000 roupies a year. Assuming that the interest rate was eight percent, as it was at that time for loans made by the Jesuits, this would indicate that individual natives had loaned the Company sums in excess of 150,000 livres. This type of income was undependable. In 1731 the Superior Council in a reply to a letter of censure from the Paris headquarters concerning the Council's failure to secure goods on credit stated that the matter of credit was no certain thing in India. Merchandise, despite the Company's opinion to the contrary, could not be secured on six months credit, but only by advances before manufacture was undertaken.

"There is not," (the Council wrote,) "a single merchant in the colony in a position to loan us 2,000 pagodas in our need; when we have negotiated loans in your interest, we have made use of means which it is not in our power to use every time we have need of the same."

Loans from employees might receive interest at the prevailing rate, but the following option was offered. The Company would pay a twenty percent premium one month after the sale of goods bought with the borrowed money. It assumed responsibility for the principal, but if the goods were lost at sea the premium need not be paid. If the creditor would assume the risks of loss, then the Company would pay thirty percent when the goods were safely delivered at Lorient. In war time, the premium paid to those who did not care to risk losing their capital was reduced to fifteen percent, whereas those who were willing to gamble on successful delivery in France received forty instead of the customary thirty percent.[7]

The Jesuits and other religious orders at times placed some of their resources at the Company's service. They ranged from relatively small sums such as 500 roupies to princely loans of 64,000.

These drew interest at six, seven, or eight percent, and served as a trust fund to provide the missions with a regular income. The missions not only of French India but also of China contributed to this fund, and the English accused "the French Portugese Padrees" of supporting the French with funds from Madras.

LOANS TO THE SUPERIOR COUNCIL—1719-1739.

Date	Amount	Rate	Creditor
1719	2,000 roupies	—	——
	6,000 pagodas	—	Delavigne and St. Malo Company
	1,003 pagodas	—	Delavigne and St. Malo Company
1720	162 pagodas	—	Pilavoine Estate
	300 pagodas	—	Albert
	1,900 pagodas	—	Narsou
1723	2,502 roupies	—	Tremisot
1727	4,000 pagodas	8	Diverse
	4,000 pagodas	10	Diverse
	9,500 pagodas	—	——
	1,553 pagodas	8	Dulaurens
1728	5,000 pagodas	8	Pondicherry merchants
1729	8,000 pagodas	8	Pondicherry merchants
	15,000 piastres	—	——
	5,000 pagodas	—	——
	8,000 pagodas	—	——
	200,000 roupies	—	——
1732	60,000 pagodas	free	Chancarabany
	20,000 pagodas	—	——
1734	26,000 pagodas	—	Chancarabany
1735	99,000 pagodas	8	——
1736	50,000 pagodas	8	Chancarabany
1737	40,000 pagodas	8	Chancarabany
	20,000 pagodas	free	Iman Saheb
	40,000 pagodas	8	Iman Saheb
1738	40,000 pagodas	8	Merchants
	one lak roupies	free	Chanda Saheb
1739	50,000 pagodas	—	Iman Saheb
	20,000 pagodas	8	——
	14,500 pagodas	8	St. Sauveur
	6,000 pagodas	8	——
	26,000 pagodas	6	Jesuits
	50,000 pagodas	—	Iman Saheb
	12,000 pagodas	—	Narenachetty
	2,000 pagodas	—	Miran
	10,000 pagodas	—	Pedre Modeliar
	40,000 pagodas	free	Diverse

Dupleix's friendship for the Reverand Father Thomas of that city gives some basis for their accusation. At times the Armenians of Madras were the Company's creditors, and the English were wont to associate them with the Jesuits. When the Superior

Council was settling the affairs of the Company in 1769 it prepared a list of sums due the Jesuits wherein it acknowledged having received about 8,000,000 livres between 1739 and 1761.[8]

The councils also made use of funds entrusted to the registrar, composed of unclaimed inheritances and the fortunes of orphan minors. Rather than allow these funds to lie idle the French Company in common with others borrowed them. The Superior Council considered seven percent a fair rate of interest for such involuntary loans. The amount of money available from this source was small in comparison with the needs of the Company and the extent of the loans from natives and the Jesuits.[9]

Rentals furnished a small income.[10] These came in part from the Jesuits who occupied several pieces of the Company's land, but were so small as to justify only passing mention. The income from land over which the Company had full proprietary rights was insignificant compared with revenues derived from territories over which it had sovereign rights. These revenues included customs dues, property taxes, and the income from the sale of monopoly goods — araque, betel and tobacco. The Company either handled the transactions itself or farmed out the right to some person or corporation. It ordinarily collected customs dues, but other imposts such as those levied on its aldees or villages were more frequently than not farmed out to natives.

Customs fees varied with time and place. They were collected on goods coming in both by land and sea, although naturally they were not levied on the Company's own importations. Export taxes were customary. At Pondicherry the rate on both imports and exports was four percent in 1715. It was then raised to five percent. Presently the Company which desired that tradesmen and craftsmen be attracted to the city ordered all such dues abolished, only to reestablish them in 1722. In later days, because of famine conditions, it was at times necessary to suspend the tax on foodstuffs, this being done in 1728, 1734, 1737 and 1747. When conditions improved these customs were restored. Sometimes there was a temporary surtax, as was the case in 1728-35 when special funds were required for the walls. Direct taxation of the natives for this purpose had been experimented with but was abandoned.

A surtax of one half of one percent was also collected for the Usurlines when they undertook to establish a school in the colony.[11]

The customs system at Pondicherry where a straight ad valorem tax was collected was comparatively simple. At Mazulipatam and Narzapour Europeans and Moslems paid a three percent tax while "Gentiles" or Hindus paid five percent. At Chandernagor less stress was placed on the customs as a source of revenue than at Pondicherry, as a sales tax furnished part of the colony's income. A one percent tax payable in money or in kind was imposed on goods brought in by way of the river and sold at wholesale. A special impost was levied on indigo, six pence for each load brought in by an ox, and one penny for each load carried in by a man.[12]

Very few statistics as to the income from the customs have been preserved. About 1753 Mazulipatam had returns of nearly 35,000 roupies, Narzapour of 4,000. Figures for other cities seem to be entirely lacking. The income was somewhat supplemented by the sale of goods fraudulently embarked or disembarked and confiscated by the customs authorities.[13] The system was purely for revenue purposes. The Company was almost entirely dependent on the merchant class for its supplies and so made a point of fostering commerce by keeping the tax burden low. At the same time the retention of a small tax is understandable, since the income from this was, at Pondicherry, used chiefly to finance the walls and other fortifications. These gave a sense of security to the city, which to the merchant class might prove quite as strong a drawing point as low taxes.[14]

The various posts were left free as to the policy they should pursue regarding taxes and monopolies. Farming was generally the practice of the councils and directors. Even Dupleix and the Superior Council, who regularly undertook to direct affairs from afar, graciously allowed their subordinates in other parts of India to use their own judgment in this matter. Their only suggestion seems to have been that it would be best not to place the farm in the hands of the Company's native servants, although Dupleix himself while at Chandernagor had done this; and at the time of

CUSTOMS TAXES

Place	Date	Import tax		Export tax
Pondicherry	1715	4 percent		4 percent
Pondicherry	1715	5 percent		5 percent
Pondicherry	1720		Taxes of all kinds temporarily suspended.	
Pondicherry	1722	3 percent		1 percent
Pondicherry	1728-35	1 percent	surtax (4 percent total) (Surtax not applicable to foodstuffs or goods destined for Company's vessels).	⅓ percent surtax
Pondicherry	1728-30		Famine period; foods tax free.	
Chandernagor	1732	1 percent	on goods introduced by river route for wholesale; some slight specific taxes.	
Pondicherry	1734-36		Famine period; foods tax free.	
Pondicherry	1737		Famine period; foods tax free.	
Pondicherry	1738	3 percent		1 percent
Bengal	1738		No tax for French.	2-½ percent
Pondicherry	1739	½ percent	surtax for Ursulines. (Surtax not applicable to goods destined for Europe).	½ percent surtax
Pondicherry	1742	3 percent		
Pondicherry	1747		Famine period; foods tax free.	
Narzapour	1751	3 percent	for Europeans:	
		5 percent	for all others.	
Mazulipatam	1753	3 percent	for Europeans and Moors:	
		5 percent	for "Gentiles" *i. e.*, Hindus.	

REVENUE FROM TAX FARMING AT PONDICHERRY
(in pagodas.)

Date	Pondicherry	Ariancoupan	Mourougapac	Hollandai	Pakenambac	Oulgaret	Betel and tobacco	Change	Araque de Paria	Araque de Colombo	European beverages	Fishing	Tabellion	Total	Duration in years
1712	900	490					2,300	850	650		Co.				
1713			X	X	X									630	
1715			X	X	X									550	
1715	1,025														4
1716	X	X					X	X	X			X		5,800	2
1716													250		2
1718	720	420				950	2,600	460	760			70	170		4(a)
1720	Co.	420	520			950			Co.	Co.					4
1721	X											X		550	3
1722								230					S		
1725								800							
1727									1,710	451					3
1728	535	415	520			1,050	Co.	S							5
1730							5,000								
1733	X	X	X	X	X	X								2,600	
1735							5,300								
1736									1,700						3
1738	900	475	717			2,060				700					5
1739									1,800						3
1740							9,257								
1741							11,413								
1743	944		751												5

Co.; handled by Superior Council for the Company.
S; suppressed or abolished.
a; contracts annulled by Company, as of June 30, 1720.
X; itemized figures not available; totals include all items checked in horizontal column.

Burat's maladministration at Chandernagor to advise the council to continue the existing system in its entirety. This latter suggestion was because the Superior Council had faith in the native farmer, and very little in the provincial director and his associates.[15]

Various explanations are given as to why the farming system was used. For one thing, the income was thus assured. When the Company itself collected the taxes, as it did until Dupleix arrived there as governor, it had employed native collectors who regularly robbed it, or were negligent in their duty. Native tax farmers, on the other hand, knew the tricks of both the natives and the collectors, hence they had the faculty of getting the greatest possible revenue out of a particular region. Success on the part of one of them during his term might lead to more spirited bidding when the region was again up for adjudication. This happy result was not always forthcoming. In 1731 the Superior Council had to take special precautions to keep up the value of the farms. Word came to it that the Malabar merchants who might have an interest in the tobacco and betel monopoly had combined to reduce the figure at which it should be awarded to 4,500 pagodas. The Company countered by having one of its trustworthy native clerks bid up the farm to 4,995 pagodas. He managed it so successfully for the next six years that the Company's income from it reached as high as 7,000 pagodas in 1737. Thus the Company might at times attempt to protect its interests but more often it found it advisable to make concessions to the tax farmers. Some three year contracts could be terminated at the end of one year if the farmer so wished. Provision was made for fines on those infringing on the farmers' rights, a portion of such fines to go to him. Rebates might also be allowed if circumstances warranted them. If new roads were built, thus reducing the amount of taxable property and produce; if the brickmakers in their search for raw materials destroyed productive agricultural areas; if the Company transferred a part of the population to another region; or if the weather were unusually dry, the Superior Council sometimes compensated the farmers for their losses. A rebate might

be granted or the farm renewed on terms satisfactory to the native without the need of bidding against rivals at an auction.[16]

One of the most profitable, and certainly the most promising sources of revenue in India was the aldees, from which the Company as a sovereign power could collect taxes. Before Law's Company had been established its predecessor had secured possession of some territories and was deriving revenue therefrom.[17] Under Dumas and Dupleix the land under the Company's control was increased enormously. Dupleix came to visualize a great French empire in India which would be financially self supporting, and which would richly compensate the Company for its investments. That dream was not to be realized, temporarily because of the vast expenditures on troops and in loans to natives, eventually because his successors did not carry out his policy. Nevertheless, from the aldees which were acquired before this imperialistic policy was adopted, one can get an idea of how the Company benefited from their possession, and appreciate Dupleix's dream of untold wealth flowing into the coffers.

The Company sometimes handled the aldees itself, as when, due to bad economic conditions in some regions the bids received were very unsatisfactory. Ordinarily however the council gave notice that it would receive bids for the right to collect taxes, and then select a farmer from among the bidders. The income from any one aldee was not very large, and varied considerably from time to time. At Chandernagor Dupleix had brought such prosperity to the region that within less than a decade the revenues from the several aldees had been increased from about 5,000 to 15,500 roupies.[18] Likewise at Pondicherry the net income from five aldees jumped from 2,600 to over 4,100 pagodas in the period 1733-1738. From these and other figures one finds that the revenue from any one aldee seldom exceeded 1,000 pagodas;[19] but the aldees were numerous, their total number under Dupleix running into the hundreds.

Of course all was not clear sailing in securing the revenue. Natives disliked paying taxes, and the Paleagars of Arcat had the habit of waiting for a show of arms before parting with their money or produce. There was also the problem of securing honest

native clerks to handle matters when the taxes were not collected by farmers. At Karikal in 1750 the native writers decamped before their accounts were fully settled. It was not until a year later when these men ventured back to town and were seized, imprisoned and whipped, that copies of the accounts were secured and the Company learned what taxes were outstanding. In the Bengal region native practice complicated matters somewhat, for in the lands of the Mogul a white man could not legally serve as tax collector. Faithful employees held the land in their names for the Company. It is doubtful if there would have been any redress had these men proven unfaithful.[20]

The Company also enjoyed benefits from sale of some monopoly products[21]—araque, betel and tobacco, which at times were farmed out, at others sold in the Company's canteens. A goodly number of special and at times temporary sources of revenue existed in the various colonies in addition to the general ones already mentioned. At Mazulipatam there was a toll or *saire* which was collected at certain heavily travelled parts of the roads, and the *montrassa,* a tax on persons, shops and other buildings, ordinarily included in the taxes which could be collected in an aldee.[22] A tax corresponding to the *mantrassa* was collected at Chandernagor. This colony furnishes the most extensive list of unusual taxes.[23] There was a small sales tax on goods retailed in the bazaars and markets, and a five percent levy on the sale price of slaves. *Salamy* was collected by one of the judges from persons acquiring property in the colony for the first time, from those who had lost caste, and wished to give a banquet to their relatives to be readmitted to the fold, from those who wished to protect friends whom they were entertaining from outside the aldee from seizure for debt, and from those who wished to be honored as head of one of the castes. This was usually an arbitrary sum fixed by the judge. Those wishing to marry were assessed three roupies for the female, and one and a half for the male. In case of remarriage the amount was left to the discretion of the judge who considered the parties' ability to pay. Ships built or overhauled in the port were taxable, although fishermen who paid an annual fee were exempt. Strangers in the colony were subject to the

gonsura which was collected if they paid no land tax to the Company. Even the clergy paid for their privileges.[24] The Brahmins regularly paid for the exclusive right of conducting funeral services and assisting at the suttees of the Hindus. In 1725 they were even forced to contribute 500 roupies for the construction of a native Christian chapel in order to secure toleration for their own pagoda and the free exercise of their religion.

Some of the terms used, and the forms of certain taxes clearly indicate that the colony was regarded as a feudal estate with the Company as its lord, for one reads of *censitaires,* of *cens et rentes,* and of *lodes et ventes.* The *salamy* taxes also smack of feudalism; so too in a measure do the tolls collected at bridges and the monopoly rights of making and selling certain goods.

At Pondicherry religious needs were also responsible for a special tax. The Ursulines who were to establish a school were accorded the income from a tonnage tax of one half roupie levied on privately owned ships arming at Pondicherry, Surat, Mahé and Chandernagor. This was in addition to the surtax mentioned above.[25] Hospital fees also added slightly to the general fund. The erection of fortifications led to two other taxes, both levied on the residents. One was in the form of a monthly payment equal to one day's wages by the Moors while the walls were under construction in 1724. The other tax was rather arbitrarily imposed by the Council about 1742 on those whom it felt could afford to pay. It yielded 8,417 roupies.[26]

The Company received some income from the administration of justice,[27] as fines which were imposed passed into its coffers. At Chandernagor the *cachery* or native court charged a commission of two annas per roupie on sums recovered through its channels. The Company's mints also produced some income. This was of a precarious nature, as the debasing of coins by rival mints at times discouraged merchants from patronizing those of the French Company. The Superior Council tried to correct matters in 1737 by revising its standards so that it could meet this competition. About 1742 the creation of a fund of 100,000 roupies, derived from mint profits, to buy gold and silver from the natives indicates that the Council's policy was not without results. How-

ever, it was disapproved of by the Company (1743) as the firman establishing the mint right had provided that coins be minted only of the same fineness as those of the Prince of Arcat, and the Company had no desire to endanger its privileges by violation of the terms of the grant.[28]

Commercial activities, other than the normal sale of European goods, also added to the resources. At Mazulipatam there were great salt deposits exploited by the Company, from which a net revenue of 60,000 roupies was obtained one year.[29] Then there were the sales of confiscated goods, seized by the customs authorities. At Pondicherry auction sales were held and the income was distributed one third to those participating in the seizure, and two thirds to the defense works of the city.[30] Revenue from the sale of goods of deserters is of a somewhat similar nature. When the Company participated in local Asiatic trade its purpose was not only to secure cargo for ships bound for France, but also to derive profit from goods disposed of in the East. Freight was another minor source of income.[31] Dupleix pointed out in 1738 that at Chandernagor alone the freight charges on coastwise shipments made in the Company's vessels by the natives amounted to 70,000 roupies a year. The Council at Pondicherry allowed shipments to Mahé on the payment of a five percent freight charge. The few available figures indicate that conditions at Chandernagor described by Dupleix were unusually favorable. Occasionally privately owned goods, especially valuables, were transported from Europe. Money, for example, was carried for a three percent charge.

It is not surprising to find that the Company which had strayed so far from the commercial field as to engage in the conduct of wars, and to administer justice, was also engaged in various types of business which one ordinarily associates with a financial institution. Elsewhere it is noted that it served as a discount bank in Paris. In India it was constantly handling and transferring bills of exchange, as the various posts drew on one another to supplement their funds in times of stress, or secured bills which could be collected more easily at other of the Company's posts. These bills also served as a ready means for Europeans to settle

their accounts at points under the Company's jurisdiction, or for the missionaries to transfer funds from one mission to another.[32] The Company at times also handled bullion for the missionaries, receiving their funds in France, exchanging them for Spanish coin for export, and then transferring them to India.[33] It also fell to the lot of the Company to manage the estates of those dying in the East, and leaving heirs in Europe.[34] In granting loans to the native rulers the Company also figures as a financial rather than as a commercial institution. These loans are particularly characteristic of Dupleix's administration. Besides, there were advances made to native merchants for the goods they contracted to deliver.[35]

The last point to be considered is the Company's occassional attempt to control the local silver market. Silver was shipped to India in large quantities from Lorient or Cadiz, and exchanged for native gold coins, pagodas. In the 1730s gold was at a premium in India, so the Council was hard pressed to secure what it needed for advances to its merchants who would accept nothing but gold. Moreover native traders would arrive in port with considerable silver and offer it at low prices. The Council on occassion bought this up lest it glut the market and render the expected shipments from Europe of little value. The same tactics were followed when bills of exchange fell due. Even if they called for silver payment, the Council would offer gold lest too much silver in the hands of individuals drive down the price. In times like these gold was secured by the council at Arcat, but despite the favorable relations it maintained with some of the merchants there, it suffered considerably because of the exchange. Finally in 1739 because of the exorbitant prices demanded in India gold was sought as far afield as China.[36]

It is apparent that the Company had a varied and considerable income from sources other than its regular trade. There were very few ways in which the revenue could have been augmented. There was some possibility of developing the salt industry at Mazulipatam. Certain aldees could be made richer and consequently more profitable—and it was the policy of the directors in India to encourage their development.[37] Dupleix aided in the

improvement and development of the cocoanut groves about Pondicherry, as the crop from these trees was unusually certain. He also envisioned the exploitation of certain diamond mines in the Company's territories, but apparently nothing came of this. Considering the variety and nature of the Company's financial resources in India, one may safely state that the chances of augmenting the income lay in the development of the existing system rather than in the addition of new and speculative enterprises.

1. The greater part of the information in regard to the Paris end of the Company's finances is derived from Weber, *La Compagnie des Indes*, third part, chapters 2 and 10, and from Dernis, *Recueil des titres concernant la Compagnie des Indes*, vol. III. The latter contains edicts concerning special concessions to the Company, the payment of dividends, the tobacco and coffee monopolies, and the right to negotiate loans.
2. Bib. Nat. N.A.F., 9147, fol. 26, Brignon to Dupleix, Feb. 3, 1753; fol. 102, Cavalier to Dupleix, Feb. 25, 1745. Both give brief accounts of financial conditions at the time.
3. Arch. Nat., F50, vol. 52.
4. Arch. Col., C2, 37, fol. 16 *seq.*, Memoir by Montaran; fol. 39, *re.* cost of bullion; Arch. Marine, B3, 391, fol. 111, Devincelles to Minister of Marine, Aug. 21, 1739.
5. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9145, fol. 38; Arch. Col., C2, 30, fols. 141, 142, 221; 73, fol. 35; C.S.C.C., I-III *passim;* C.S.P.V., III, 262; Malleson, *The French in India*, p. 73.
6. C.S.P.V., I, 29; II, 128, 158, 342; III, 82, 229; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 18; 28, fol. 127; F5, A, 16; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9167, fols. 25, 33; 9349, fol. 25; P. Co. I, 401-2; IV., 4.
7. Martineau, *Origines de Mahé*, p. 179; Arch. Col., C2, 30, fols. 141-42; 31, fol. 91.
8. Arch. Col., F5A, 16; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8982, fol. 171; India Office, Home Misc., 93, fol. 17; C.S.P.V., I, 16; III, 220, 228-29, 252. Father Lavaur, who fell into the hands of the English after the fall of Pondicherry in 1761, had titles to enormous sums of money, according to his critics. The Jesuits were thereupon accused of devoting their attention to commerce. Present day opinion is that these papers representing values of some 1,250,000 livres, were receipts for money loaned at one time or another to the Company. P. L. Besse, Liste alphebétique des missionaires du Carnatic de la Compagnie de Jésus, *Revue historique de l'Inde française*, II, 175-242.
9. C.S.C.C., I, 3; Arch. Col., C2, 73, fol. 247; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9167, fols. 24-33.
10. Arch. Col., F, 19; Inde 2, VII; Nat., N.A.F., 9145, fol. 4.
11. Arch. Col., C2, 33, fol. 125; 73, fol., 209; C.S.P.V., I, 174, 341; II, 208-9, 281, 420-21; III, 24, 72, 172-73.
12. Arch. Col., Inde 2, VIII; Affermage des Revenues de Chandernagor, 1732, *Rev. hist. de l'Inde fr.*, I, 374-77.
13. Arch. Col., Inde 2, VIII; C.S.P.V., II, 121.
14. C.S.P.V., I, 217, 235; II, 420-21; Arch. Col., C2, 31. The Table of

Customs Taxes is derived from C.S.P.V., I, II, III *passim* and Affermage des Revenues de Chandernagor, 1732, *Rev. hist. de l'Inde fr.*, I, 374-77; Arch. Col., C2, 28, fol. 133; 30, fol. 10; Inde 2, VIII; India Office, Home Misc. 93, fols. 14-15.

15. Arch. Col., C2, 28, fol. 288; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8929, fol. 82; Arch. S. et O., E, 3756, fol. 16; C.S.C.C., II, 390.
16. Bib. Nat., N.A F., 8925, fols. 118-19; 8933, fol. 58; Arch. Col., Inde 2, VII; *Rev. hist. de l'Inde fr.*, I, 369; P. Co., I, 225; II, 45; C.S.P.V., II, 31-32, 209-10, 316, 391, III, 252-53.
17. C.S.P.V., I, 199.
18. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8981, fol. 17.
19. C.S.P.V., III, 215, 244; *Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix;* ed. 1759, p. 216-17.
20. Hamont, *Lally Tollendal,* p. 163; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8925, fol. intercalated between 77-78; Arch. Col., Inde 2, VII.
21. C.S.P.V., I, 199, 266-67; II, 159; III, 162-63; 252-53; Arch. Col., F3, 238, fol. 519; C2, 37, fol. 103; Martineau, *Dupleix,* II, p. 54-55. The canteen rights for these various commodities were usually farmed out thus; araque of Paria as one lot; araque of Colombo, Goa and Batavia, sometimes with the addition of the right to sell European beverages, as a second; betel and tobacco as a third.
22. Arch. Col., Inde 2, VIII.
23. Affermage des Revenues de Chandernagor, 1732, *Rev. hist. de l'Inde fr.*, I, 374-77; C.S.C.C., II, 390.
24. Arch. Col., F5A, 19.
25. C.S.P.V., III, 172-73; Arch. Col., C2, 29, fol. 200; 30, fol. 158; P. Co., I, 304.
26. Malleson, *op. cit.*, p. 60; C.S.P.V., II, 29-30; Arch. Col., C2, 30, fol. 10; P. Co., I, 313.
27. Pillai's *Journal,* I, 98; Affermage des Revenues de Chandernagor, 1732, *Rev. hist. de l'Inde fr.*, I, 374-77; C.S.P.V., I, 267.
28. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9144, fol. 11; C.S.P.V., III, 79-80; Arch. Col., C2, 30, fol. 134.
29. Arch. Col., Inde 2, VI.
30. C.S.P.V., II, 121; P. Co., I, 367.
31. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8981, fol. 17; C.S.P.V., I, 271; III, 19; P. Co., II, 43.
32. Arch. Col., C2, 36, fol. 35; C.S.C.C., II, 338, 381, 406, 416; III, 27.
33. Arch. Col., C2, 29, fol. 28.
34. Arch. Lorient, IP, 273, pc. 6.
35. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8971, fol. 122; *Lettres et conventions des Gouverneurs de Pondichéry,* p. 83, 90; Malleson, *op. cit.*, p. 245; C.S.P.V., III, 198, 219, 262, 271.
36. C.S.P.V., II, 273, 313, 314, 323-24, 356, 371, 373, 375; III, 227.
37. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9145, fol. 105; 9146, fol. 96.

CHAPTER VII

Commerce

The field in which the Company had commercial dealings in the thirty years under consideration was a large one. Canadian beaver, Chinese tea, and Senegal slaves seem to have little in common, but they all commanded the attention of the more conscientious directors in Paris. Our attention will be given only to those branches of commerce which are associated with the Company's Indian interests.

Acquisitions made by the Company can be classed as European and Indian; the former can be divided into two parts, goods required for the Company's own needs, and those destined for sale in India. Naval and military stores were the most important items. It would be most difficult to make a complete list of these, ranging all the way from candles to large sea going vessels. One might well imagine that the list of goods destined for India would also be large and imposing, but such is not the case, for most European goods did not find a ready market in the East in the eighteenth century. The chief exports for sale were woolens, wines and liquors, hardware, cordage, glassware (especially trinkets) and coral. At times the Company tried to introduce new goods among the Orientals. Cloth from Rheims, termed "*perpetuelles*," and Chantilly porcelain were sent out in 1736 to see if there were any market for them. Efforts to enlarge the variety of European goods consumed in the East do not appear to have been very successful and the types of commodities offered for sale changed little between 1720 and 1755.[1]

Whether for the Company's use or for subsequent sale these goods were to a large extent purchased by the Paris office. To it the various posts addressed their requisition lists. Orders were filled either by direct purchase in Paris, or by agents scattered throughout France and the principal foreign cities of Europe. The Director at Lorient bought naval stores. The captains of the vessels, when they called at European ports purchased supplies and Xerxes or Canary wines, usually at Cadiz or Tenerife. This wine,

destined for use in India, was probably obtained in this way so that the Company would not have to pay freight to some foreigner for transporting it to Lorient. There was no fixed rule as to how purchases should be made. Usually goods were bought in the open market in competition with all comers. Gun powder was an exception, for the Company had an agreement with the organization furnishing the royal authorities whereby it secured its powder at a fixed rate of seventy livres the hundredweight for the regular commodity, and slightly more for the better grade. It was only at Lorient that commodities for which there was a fairly steady demand, such as supplies for the port and for the ships and clothing for the garrison were usually purchased at a contract price. Sometimes the quantity to be purchased was stipulated in the contracts, but more often this was not the case.[2] Occasionally goods were received on consignment,[3] unsolicited by the Company, from its agents who doubtless hoped to impress the directors with their attentiveness to the Company's interests, and at the same time add to their own profit. Nor was there any hard and fast rule about settling accounts. Usually cash was paid for purchases made at Lorient or by the captains of vessels. Accounts were kept with the various European agents which may indicate that advantage was taken of their credit or that of the Company. With the royal government and the powder company there was usually credit, as interchange of goods and accounts could be more easily settled by periodic balancing.

It would be interesting to know just how much was sent out to India by the Company each year, but there is now little hope of securing accurate figures. Contemporary records are unsatisfactory as the accounts open and close at different times in direrent years, and overlap somewhat.[4] Moreover, statistical tables were not highly developed in the eighteenth century, and the few which do exist are not sufficiently detailed for our purpose. There is a table[5] preserved in the Colonial Archives which gives a general view of the Company's trade with the East—India, the Isles, China, and Moka, from October 1, 1723 to June 30, 1743. It shows the Company to have shipped bullion and coins valued at 150,801,036 livres in that period. This was mostly silver until

1741; thereafter gold begins to figure more prominently. Merchandise shipments totaled only a fifth of this amount, 28,364,977 livres, and of this a part was supplies for the employees. Scattered throughout the minutes of the Company are statements of what the shipments in a given year should be. These figures are of value as they show the comparative amounts sent to the various sections of India. Ordinarily notice is taken only of Pondicherry and Chandernagor, although in the 1750s Mahé receives separate mention. The figures will perhaps be comprehended most readily in tabulated form. (See Table A.) The shipments to India increased in the 1750s despite the conflict being waged with the English Company. (See Table B).

TABLE A

BULLION SHIPMENTS PROVIDED FOR IN THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COMPANY

Date	Pondicherry Vessels	Pondicherry Marcs*	Chandernagor Vessels	Chandernagor Marcs*	Total to India Isles and China —livres*	References
1734	3	55	2	40	1,600	Arch. Col, C2, 26, fol. 17.
1735	3	40	2	40	800	*Ibid.*, 26, fol. 215.
1736	3	90	2	76	1,750	*Ibid.*, 27, fol. 4.
1737	4	84	3	66	1,000	*Ibid.*, 27, fol. 106.
1738	5	127	3	90	1,479	*Ibid.*, 28, fol.4.
1739	5	154	3	77	2,229	*Ibid.*, 28, fol. 258.
1740	4	193(1)	2		2,584	*Ibid.*, 29, fol. 5.
1741	3	175(1)	3		2,972	*Ibid.*, 29, fol. 189.
1742	2	23(2)	1	24	2,688	*Ibid.*, 30, fol. 4.
1743	2	49	2	44	3,023	*Ibid.*, 30, fol. 130.
1744	3	85(3)	2	64	1,937	*Ibid.*, 31, fol. 38.
1745	2	55	0	0	815	*Ibid.*, 31, fol. 143.
1746	5	46			1,440	*Ibid.*, 32, fol. 19-20.

* Expressed in thousands—000 omitted.

(1) This sum includes the shipment to Chandernagor.

(2) In addition the Company counted on using 15,500 marcs which M. Castanier then had invested in India.

(3) Only two vessels were despatched to Pondicherry with merchandise; the third, *Le Dauphin*, was simply to call there en route for China to leave 15,000 marcs.

TABLE B

SHIPMENTS PROVIDED FOR IN THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COMPANY

Date	Vessels	Merchandise* Pondicherry	Bengal	Mahé	Bullion*	Total*	References
1750-51	7	1,494	501	172	10,195	12,362	Arch. Col., C2, 40, fol. 28.
1751-52	6	1,396	1,670	145	9,974	13,185	*Ibid.*
1752-53	13	3,094	956	232	6,111	10,392	*Ibid.*
1753-54	9	2,155	1,530	261	8,769	12,715	*Ibid.*

* Expressed in thousands of livres—000 omitted.

Like the purchases made in Europe, those of India fall into two classes, goods for the use of the Company and its employees, and those intended for sale. Foodstuffs bulk large in the first[6] division. Vessels, intended for use in the local trade of the East are also an important item. Then there are the various supplies intended for use in the Isles of France and Bourbon, including such unusual commodities as rhubarb and indigo seeds. The Company hoped to develop the culture of these products in its own possessions. Slaves, also, were acquired in India for use in the development of the Isles. These were ordinarily purchased, especially favorable bargains being made in time of famine. Sometimes they were secured by judicial process, that is, a native guilty of some offense would be condemned to slavery in the Company's court.

Much more important than the purchases which the Company made to supply the needs of its employees were those made to furnish cargos for the vessels bound for Europe. Local conditions, such as the supplies available, prices, peace and war, played a large part in determining the type and quantity of goods. And so too did advice from the directors of the sale at Nantes or Lorient. At times the Paris office supplemented these suggestions with orders of its own.[7] What these goods were may most readily be ascertained by consulting the handbills which the Company issued prior to its annual auction sales, or the cargo lists of the vessels.[8] However it is not always possible to tell from these whether goods come from India or China. Ninety-six items appear on the advertisements of the sale at Nantes in 1730. This number would be much reduced were one to group the articles. Seven different varieties of tea are listed. Coffee, over 400,000 pounds of it, appears on the list, as do pepper, rhubarb, aloes, gomme laque, saltpetre, redwood, cotton thread, raw silk, palm branches or fibre, and many varieties of cloth, such as cotton, fine and coarse, including organdie, muslin, gingham and percale, and silks, satins and damasks. In addition, there were scarves and handkerchiefs, fans, silk flowers, little tables and trays, China ware and porcelain.

Practically all these goods were purchased in the immediate vicinity of the coast, for, as Godeheu explains in his journal,[9] inland transportation facilities were very inadequate and the costs burdensome. He refers to one route leading into the interior where there were seventeen streams to be crossed on tree trunks. Patna, situated far up the Ganges, was the only important inland point from which the Company drew supplies. From it most of the saltpetre was obtained. Like Patna, the other posts were ordinarily of value for the acquisition of some particular commodity. Mahé and Calicut furnished pepper; Pegou, wood and vessels; Cassimbazar, silks; Dacca, embroidered work; Chandernagor, cotton goods, foodstuffs, and Burmese products; Balassor, goods of a cotton and linen mixture; Mazulipatam and Yanon, handkerchiefs and cotton cloth, especially muslin; and Karikal, rice, which was needed at Pondicherry where famines were not infrequent. Pondicherry itself was a center of production for cotton goods, and also a focal point for trade in Eastern products.[10]

Two general plans were followed in securing goods, purchase and manufacture. Purchase was not the simple process implied by the word today. Stocks of goods sufficient to make up a ship's cargo could not be found in the native markets unless special arrangements were made far in advance of the date of the desired delivery. It was only in exceptional cases that the European employees served as purchasing agents,[11] for most of them were not skilled in the languages of the East, nor in the ways of the Orientals. Occassionally however, one of them would be commissioned to go into a particular region and assemble goods which might be picked up later by one of the Company's vessels. At Chandernagor in the 1740s the stores keeper sold the Council butter, oil and candles at a fifty per cent profit, and cord and wrapping materials at a sixty percent profit. There was no reason why the Company should not have secured these things directly from the natives instead of from this grafter. To have done so would, it has been estimated, have saved 10,000 roupies a year.[12]

Much of the local Asiatic commerce was carried on by Europeans, alone or in conjunction with natives. This furnished the Company with that part of its goods which was not made in the

immediate vicinity of its counters. At times the Company participated in this *Commerce d'Inde en Inde*[13] in the region between the Cape of Good Hope and China. The extent of its interest was variable.[14] In the early days the Superior Council acted as it saw fit. It might furnish the vessel as its contribution to the adventure, sometimes supplementing this by having a part interest in the cargo. Then in 1738 the Company ordered that the Council have a quarter interest in undertakings organized at Pondicherry, Mahé or Chandernagor. In 1740 it reversed its decision and ordered no more of its funds invested in local trade. In spite of this the Council continued to divert some funds to this end. But more often the trade was left to local enterprise on the part either of the employees acting in a private capacity, or of other Europeans. Dupleix saw the possibilities inherent in trade of this type. He made Chandernagor one of the great commercial centers of the East, and won and lost for himself several fortunes. Until 1722 the Company had forbidden its employees to carry on local trade. After that date it realized that its interests were to be best served by allowing them to engage in it, except in China and Moka where they would have competed with the Company's posts,[15] and in centering its own efforts in carrying Asiatic products to Europe. Many of the directors and other persons in France sent funds to India to be employed in local trade. Some one of the employees, not infrequently Dupleix himself, administered the funds for them. Dupleix charged two and a half per cent for this service. The employees in India found in the Asiatic trade a profitable means of supplementing the none too generous allowance the Company accorded them in the form of wages. It was not at all unusual for them to be associated with English and Dutch employees in these ventures. Private persons, having no connection with the Company also engaged in the trade, some even going out from France to do so. It was usually carried on by a company formed for the sole purpose of financing and directing one particular venture. On the return of the vessel and the sale of its cargo the company divided the profits and came to an end. Thus there was a constant succession of small companies being formed and dissolved.[16] The Company gave these local traders some measure of protection

against pirates who infested the Malabar coast. At times it made them customs concessions, although the regular practice was to charge Europeans the same duties as were paid by the natives when they introduced goods into the Company's territories. The Councils also issued them passports which entitled a vessel to no special privileges, but were simply requests that those to whom they might be presented render whatever service they could. Frequently the traders made use of the French Company's name, thereby enjoying the privileges which various princes had conferred on it, especially customs concessions.[17] Dupleix in a letter to Dumas in 1737[18] pointed out that in this way the private traders avoided a twenty-five per cent tax which the Moors levied in Bengal. He refers to his having to go before the native customs authorities to swear that certain vessels belonged to the Company, lest they and their cargos be seized, and private trade thereafter very closely watched. He suggested that it would be a good idea if the various councils on issuing passports to these traders would warn the captains to subjugate themselves to the Council at Chandernagor when they were in the Ganges basin, in order to disguise the fact that their trade was a private venture.

The Company also encouraged local trade by allowing natives and others to ship goods from one part of India to another in its vessels if its own shipments did not fill all the available space. During the war with the English the Company in turn had occassion to use freight facilities furnished by the natives. Freight rates were a variable quantity, those charged by the Company being designed to undercut the English. If commerce with a particular region were not flourishing the Company had a tendency to cut its rates. War also affected them, as the Company had then to man and arm the ships more heavily. The charges were regularly figured on an *ad valorem* basis. Sometimes the same rate was charged for all types of goods, while at others coarse bulky goods carried a higher rate than fine ones.[19]

There were many types of goods which the Company could conveniently purchase in the neighborhood of its posts. Usually the contract system was used,[20] a native merchant agreeing to supply a stipulated quantity of a certain commodity, the type, quality and

price all being specified. Immediate delivery was out of the question, for the merchant had to arrange for the manufacture of these goods. Occassionally merchandise was purchased in the open market, but the quantities obtainable in this way were quite inadequate to meet the Company's needs. Foodstuffs were the only commodities of any importance purchased in this manner in India. There are a few instances of purchase in coöperation with other companies, of saltpetre and pepper, at Patna and on the Malabar coast respectively.

Purchase from the natives was a rather complicated process. Most of the negotations were carried on by a native agent called a courtier who sometimes was himself one of the principal merchants of the community. Since the employees were unacquainted with the interior of the country, and did not know how to deal with native trickster merchants, the various European companies had to employ these courtiers. Naturally they were not supposed to furnish merchandise to the company employing them, but this rule was frequently disregarded.[21] A memorilist,[22] writing about 1753, has left us a description of the way in which a courtier carried on his negotations. A day would be fixed for an assembly of the merchants, which took place in the presence of the Council and such employees as wished to attend. The merchants would be told the quality and quantity of goods desired, and then bargaining would begin, accompanied by a discussion of the time of delivery, and what advance payments would be made to enable the merchants to get the goods manufactured. The chief duty of the courtier, theoretically, was to inform the Council as to the solvency of the merchants. For this he received at Chandernagor in 1753 one half of one per cent of the value of the contracts. So far as was possible the Council adhered to the contract prices of the previous year, prefering to allow a bonus if necessary rather than establish a new and higher price from which it would be difficult to recede in the future. If conditions were such that the merchants could not profitably fill their engagements after a contract had been entered into, if for example a famine forced them to buy at a much higher figure than they had contemplated, the Council sometimes granted a bit more than the contract price. This was per-

fectly logical, for the Council had always to keep in mind the fact that contracts must be again made the coming year. Also, when they had delivered their goods it was customary to give the merchants a present, usually a golden chain, varying in value according to the importance of the merchant.[23] Cassimbazar was the one post where goods were not secured on a contract basis.[24] There the merchants brought in the raw silks, and bargained over the price they should receive.

La Bourdonnais[25] found that the system of purchase in India had several defects, not all due to inattention or incapacity on the part of the employees, although he implies that this would account for most of them. The Company paid more for its goods than did private individuals, and prices were not sufficiently revised from year to year. Purchases were made hurriedly, because there was no reserve fund at Pondicherry. It was only when vessels arrived from Europe with funds that the merchants showed any active interest in the Company's business. He felt that Lenoir and his associates at Pondicherry were the dupes of the merchants, paying them bonuses whenever they complained of hard times. Also there was not a sufficient number of merchants available, so that the Council was forced to take steps, otherwise unnecessary, to maintain their good will. That these views were not pure theory is seen in La Bourdonnais' contention that in 1731 he had secured a cargo of goods similar to those purchased by the Company, for which he paid two and a half per cent less than the contract price fixed by the Council. In addition, he paid no bonus, thus bringing his total advantage over the Company to a figure between ten and eleven per cent. To remedy the evils he suggested that the Company take the merchants into its permanent employ, thus attaching them to its interests. His enumeration of the three servants of the Company whom he felt were qualified to carry on commerce with the natives—Dupleix, Vincent and Guillaudeu—may perhaps be regarded rightfully as nothing more than a thinly veiled suggestion that a general shake up among the employees would not be amiss.

Provision was made for the inspection of goods delivered to the Council. There were three reasons why this was desirable; to

avoid the purchase of defective goods, to prevent native fraud, and to facilitate sales in Europe. That the inspection was not always thorough is seen in the fact that poor quality goods at times arrived in Europe. The excessively bad quality of those arriving on *Le Dauphin* in 1752 led the Company to order[26] four samples returned to Pondicherry to draw the Council's attention to the need for more careful inspection.

Sometimes the natives were guilty of fraudulent practices[27] which could be prevented only by keeping a careful check on all deliveries made by them. When the councillors were rushed trying to load a vessel late in the season the natives had an opportunity to indulge in the ancient but not strictly honorable practice of sanding the pepper. Dampening it was another means employed to defraud the Company. Coffee, too, arrived in Europe in other than its pristine form. Little wonder that the Moka product moved slowly in the 1740s when one had to take an unwanted portion of cotton seed and sand with each parcel of coffee purchased.

If goods were carefully inspected in India so that the quantity and quality in a particular parcel could be guaranteed, sales in Europe would be facilitated. Goods could then be sold at the auction from samples, and the Company would not be troubled constantly by persons finding their purchases pood quality or short measure. The exact form or procedure of inspection varied slightly in the different posts, but the general practice was like that at Pondicherry. After the merchants had assembled a considerable quantity of goods, a day was set aside for the examination. Cloth would be roughly graded by the employees as acceptable or unsatisfactory. Those pieces passing the preliminary inspection were sent to the Company's laundry to be washed and ironed. They could then be more carefully graded. Those classed as unsatisfactory might be purchased by the Company as fourth class goods, but even if rejected they were kept in the Company's hands until the inspection was completed, lest the natives present them a second time hoping for a better classification.[28] Sometimes a shortage forced the Company to take these poor materials in order to make up a cargo for its vessels. The price paid for these seconds was about a sixth less than that given for acceptable cloth.[29]

At Chandernagor where high class goods were purchased the examination had to be more careful. "One of my chief cares" wrote Dupleix while director there "is to preach, from morning on, assiduity in the inspection." Some employees, he remarks, are all right for this type of work, but others never find anything wrong. Even with careful employees it was difficult to secure uniform grading, for goods were inspected at different tables where the light might vary, and where different employees each with his own ideas as to quality were on duty. Goods arriving from outlying posts where they had already been examined, had also to be inspected at Chandernagor. At one time the merchants were held responsible for repayment to the Company if on this later examination their goods were reclassified in a lower level. However, as the natives could not or would not pay, this system had to be abandoned. Merchants naturally objected to taking back rejected goods. They apparently felt that if they left them with the Company it would eventually have to pay for them. But Dupleix took a firm stand. Writing to Barthelmy at Karikal in 1753, he stated "if they don't wish to carry away the rejected goods, that's their fault, but the orders are given that hereafter these rejected goods shall not be taken into the storerooms; they are to be abandoned near the inspection hall, so the merchants can do with them what they will."[30]

The French system of inspection was much simpler than that of the English Company,[31] which required the merchants to grade their own goods before submitting them. A native employee first examined them, then a white employee repeated the task. If he were dissatisfied with the previous classification, the Council as a whole then inspected the goods in question. Three samples would be taken from a given lot, and on the grading given these would rest the classification of the whole. There was no reason why an honest native should protest against such a system, for the grade originally given depended on his own classification. If by chance he had erred it was only just that the Council correct the fault. Moreover, the several inspections prevented errors, so the merchants were thus insured payment for the class of goods they actually presented.

Goods purchased in the principal posts, Pondicherry, Chandernagor and Mahé, were subject to no payment to native authorities. The Company had to come to terms with the natives concerning customs on goods purchased elsewhere. If no duties were charged presents were expected. Sarkars, or native agents, were usually employed to carry the goods from the outposts to the principal centers whence they could be shipped to Europe. Transportation was ordinarily by boats flying the French colors, accompanied by a detachment of sepoys. Passports were issued to each ship. A customs declaration was given the officer in charge by the director of the post making the shipment. This served as a clearance paper when presented to the native authorities. The French vessel was allowed to proceed to the customs point nearest its destination where the dues would be acquitted. Arrangements of this nature are indicative of the faith the natives had in the Company.[32]

Not all goods acquired in India were purchased, but a considerable number were manufactured on the spot by the Company.[33] Some of these were for its own use; flour, for the garrison and employees, for shipment to the Isles of France or Bourbon, and for the vessels returning to Europe; biscuits for a similar purpose; rope, manufactured in a cord factory at Mahé, which, because of its proximity to the kaire supply of the Maldives gave promise of success; and gunpowder, which, while not quite as good as that made in Europe, was cheap and satisfactory. A few goods were also manufactured for sale. The silk of Cassimbazar was the most important item in this field. There the Company purchased raw silk, and gave it out to native supervisors for distribution among craftsmen who made it up in their own workrooms. Much of the work was done by children six, eight or ten years of age. The storekeeper of the post served as supervisor of this industry, inspecting the product at various stages. Then there were the dye works of Mazulipatam where goods from the several parts of India were sent to be finished before being transported to Europe. At one time it was hoped to transfer this dyeing industry to Europe. Beaulieu was commissioned by the French government to send some Indian dyers to France. Failing

to find any good ones who were willing to leave the country, he himself made a special study of the industry. He then bought supplies of the several chemicals employed in the various processes, and sent them home with instructions for their use. He stated, perhaps to safeguard his reputation should experiment in France prove a failure, that he feared the chemicals, ageing *en route,* might not prove altogether satisfactory. Although we do not know what use was made of them, we do know that Mazulipatam and other posts long after continued to receive goods,especially from Bengal, to be dyed before being shipped to Europe.

No very satisfactory figures remain in regard to the value of the goods sent from India to Europe. Lists purporting to give the total value of goods sold in Europe in a given season are preserved, but they do not furnish a view of the comparative importance of the several commodities exported from India. Weber gives a list which shows the total sale price in France, and the gross profits.[34] Purchases in India in the period 1725 to 1755 fluctuate between a minimum of 1,509,465 livres in the season 1747-48 and a maximum of 15,295,963 livres for the season 1754-55. Sales in France for the same period range from 972,380 in the disastrous year 1747-48 to 28,081,408 livres in 1754-55. Profits were of course nil in 1747-48, but all other years show some gross profits, varying from 2,266,785 livres in the next year to 13,719,353 livres in 1751-52. Between 1744 and 1748 when there was a war for which the Company could not be held responsible the profits were very small; but in the 1750s when Dupleix's vision was being fulfilled and there was promise of France becoming a great Asiatic power business was both plentiful and profitable. Dupleix's contest with the English, for all that it eventually proved disastrous, was not at the moment particularly destructive of commerce.

A rough idea of the extent of the Company's trade can be formed from a statement issued in 1743 reviewing the activities of the previous twenty years.[35] During this time, 136,104,522 livres were spent on purchases in the Orient. The goods sold for approximately double this amount, 262,517,805 livres, showing a profit of over sixty five million livres. The average annual purchases of

Oriental goods thus amounted to 6,805,226 livres, and sales to 13,125,890 livres.

In dealing with the sale of goods in Europe there will be occassion to mention certain price fluctuations noted at the auctions. Here attention may be called to prices in India.[36] Famine conditions, especially in and about Pondicherry caused very noticeable fluctuations in the cost of cotton goods. Lenoir found them twenty to twenty-five per cent above normal in 1730, and blamed the rainy season to which he attributed fever with its consequent high mortality. Many villages were largely depopulated with the result that raw cotton was very scarce. Coarse goods were consequently difficult to procure, but fine materials which required but little of the raw product were relatively plentiful. Again in 1737 prices were high; approximately double the normal amount had to be paid at Pondicherry. Governor Dumas attributed this to the dry weather and famine. Sometimes goods could not be secured in sufficient quantities at any price at a particular post. Then the burden of getting an adequate cargo for the vessels which had arrived from Europe would have to be shifted to one of the other factories. Sometimes this was done without warning, which helps to explain why a vessel might have to spend an entire year in the East instead of the customary three months. The Maratte army in the vicinity of Pondicherry in 1741 forced the Superior Council to send an extra vessel to Chandernagor, and although there are no statistics available to prove it, one may well imagine that the native merchants met the increased demand with price augmentation. Later the War of the Austrian Succession practically closed the Bengal region to French trade, so purchases had to be made primarily on the Coromandel coast with a similar era of high prices prevailing. This may be accounted for partly by another factor than increased demand, namely, paucity of funds and native scepticism, in view of the presence of an English fleet in the Indian Ocean, of any additional bullion arriving from France.

Labor conditions in the East also affected prices.[37] A dispute in the cloth makers' caste at Pondicherry in 1731 forced the merchants to go far afield for material, so they asked for more than

the previously agreed sum. The Council, ever anxious to keep the good will of its merchants increased its payments by as much as fifteen per cent over the contract price.

Prices varied not only from time to time, but also from place to place. For example, the Company found it expedient to send as far afield as Bengal for some of the foodstuffs needed for the garrison at Pondicherry. Lumber frequently was purchased at Pegou rather than on the Coromandel coast. Pepper, although it could be obtained elsewhere, was ordinarily purchased at Mahé, the great center of production, where it was generally procurable at a reasonable figure. Other factors than spot cash determined where purchases should be made. Vessels usually sailed for Europe from only two ports, Pondicherry and Chandernagor, and occassionly from Mahé, so transportation costs from the post where the purchase was made to the shipping center had to be considered. The upkeep of these outposts had also to be provided. Moreover, the nature of the payment for native products was important; if an exchange for European products could be effected, the Company could then afford to pay a slightly higher price than if gold, always scarce, were required. Thus the determination of actual price for any particular item involves more than a mere consideration of the sum paid the native merchant.[38]

TABLE C

Pepper Prices in India

Date	Approximate price	Unit	Locality
1720	23 pagodas	bar	Pondicherry
1720	55 to 60 roupies	candil	Mahé
1721	23 pagodas	bar	Pondicherry
1728	22.5 pagodas	bar	Pondicherry
1733	84 roupies	candil	Mahé
1734	98 roupies	candil	Malabar coast
1738	37 pagodas	bar	Pondicherry
1738	80 to 84 roupies	candil	Mahé
1742	36 to 38 roupies	bard	Pondicherry
1744	31 roupies	bard	Pondicherry
1747	70 roupies	candil	Mahé

Candil equals 540 pounds
Bar equals 480 pounds
The records refer to the price for 1742 as exceptionally low. Not having been able to find a statement of the difference, if any, between a bar and a bard, it is presumed they are the same.

Having shown how the Company acquired its goods, the next problem is to point out how it disposed of them. In India there was no great demand for goods such as the Company had to offer, particularly those of European origin. Much of the merchandise sent to the East was not offered for sale to the natives, but was for the Company's own employees and troops. Patna, in the northerly section, alone seems to have furnished a good market for European woolens. Other European products for which there was some demand were wine, coral, iron, steel and lead. The majority of references found to European goods are those commenting on their slow turn over. The storeskeeper, when he felt it expedient would warn the Council that cloth, for example, was moving slowly. Then the Council would take some action to dispose of it. At times the soldiers would thus become possessed of new uniforms; at others, sales were made to the natives at auction or on long term credit. One should not stress too much the idea that European goods were slow moving. The records are too few to safely draw any conclusion. There must have been a market for many thousands of livres worth of European merchandise. The directors, for all their inefficiency, would not have sent goods valued at 3,000,000 livres as they did in 1743 into a region where was no market for them. Martineau, referring to this type of trade, states that wines and liquors sold at two hundred per cent profit, but that the greater part of a cargo was sold at cost or less. A profit of fifty per cent could not be expected even on a well assorted shipment. This was of course gross profit. Of net profit there was probably none. According to him, the Company expected only to break even on its European merchandise. It had the choice of sending it or ballast on its ships; and with gold and silver sometimes hard to find, together with the French desire for an overseas market, the Company naturally sent such goods as could be sold at cost or better.[39]

Besides these European products, the Company sold Asiatic goods in the East, acquired in the *commerce d'Inde en Inde*. Some of the goods thus purchased eventually reached Europe, but a large part were debited in India. There was a steady demand for cereals at Mahé, as most of the neighborhood was devoted to other

pursuits than grain raising; Surat and Chandernagor found here a ready market for rice and wheat, while Pondicherry sent to it cottons and ginghams. From Bengal opium was sent into various parts of the East, and to it came considerable quantities of pepper. This interchange of goods was apparently profitable for there were half a dozen boats purchased or built by the Company to engage in this and similar trade.[40]

As was almost inevitable, the Superior Council or one of the local ones fixed the price at which either European or Eastern goods should be sold in India. Nevertheless the Company at times fixed the sale price, this being the case when wine was sent out from France. The Councils did not in all cases adhere to the price thus established.[41]

The disposition of goods in Europe is sharply in contrast with the system in India. Only a very small part of the cargos arriving from the East was sold at retail, only that portion indeed of which the Company failed to dispose at its annual auction. Nantes and Lorient were in turn the sites of these sales. When Lorient was first occupied by Law's Company it was not a flourishing trade center, so it was thought wise to send the goods to Nantes. By 1733 the Company had spent a great deal on the development of its own port, and decided to transfer the sales there. Moreover in Lorient it had police power which it lacked at Nantes, so it could take steps to prevent some of the disorders which had marked its recent sales on the banks of the Loire. In addition, transportation expenses and payment of dues charged on the goods when introduced into Nantes would be saved. It was predicted by Nantes merchants that these advantages would be offset by a smaller number in attendance, and consequent lower bidding, a condition which does not appear to have developed. Lorient was however in many respects not well adapted to the needs of the Company. As late as 1739 the streets were in such bad condition that the city fathers appealed to the Company, asking it to intercede with the French government for aid in paving them. Nevertheless the sales were held there and continued to attract a good buying crowd.[42]

Numerous factors determined the date on which the sales should open. It was desirable that all cargos of the year be offered for sale at once, so no date could be set before the return of the major part of the fleet. Then too it was wise not to conflict with other great sales, such as the fair at Bordeaux. Jewish feast days had also to be avoided, else the attendance would be materially diminished. The sales were usually held in the fall, although in war time they might be delayed well on into the winter because of the late arrival of vessels. October was the favorite month. They were of no fixed duration, continuing until all the goods were disposed of, or until the merchants had all that they wanted. This usually required about a dozen sessions, the sales occuring twice daily.[43]

The merchants were informed of a coming sale by notices sent out by the Company to the principal towns of Europe. One copy was sent as soon as the vessels arrived; a later revised one followed a few weeks or even days before the sale. These were in the form of handbills or posters stating the number of ships which had arrived or were expected, their port of lading, their cargo, and the terms of sale. Merchants gathered by the score, sometimes as many as five hundred all told, shortly before the opening day. They came mainly from French towns, but also from several other parts of northern Europe--Amsterdam, Antwerp, Frankfort, and Geneva. Nantes had little difficulty in housing them when the sales were hald there, but at Lorient the problem was troublesome.[44]

When they arrived, the merchants set about inspecting the goods. This preceded the regular sale, for during it there was neither time nor space to allow all who might be interested to inspect them. On one occassion at least, in 1730, the opening of the sale was postponed a day to enable the numerous foreign merchants to examine the commodities offered, and to become acquainted with the system of sale. As may be imagined, a goodly crowd of hangers-on appeared in town at the time of the sales. One could expect to find a travelling troupe of some kind. At Lorient under the Company's control only one such organization was allowed to be present. But with two sales a day, matters of

credit to arrange, and old acquaintanceships to renew, the merchants doubtless found their time well occupied.[45]

The goods offered came from three sources; merchandise purchased by the Company in the East, similar goods called *pacotilles*, purchased by its maritime employees with the Company's permission and offered for sale by it on their behalf, and seizures which might be prized cargos or contraband goods and excess *pacotilles* which an employee had vainly attempted to smuggle into France. This merchandise was divided into two classes, prohibited and permitted goods. The former were those whose introduction into France was banned in the interest of French industry, but in which the Company was allowed to trade provided that the final destination was outside the kingdom. These included the cheaper cottons which the Company used in the African trade, and pure or mixed silks which were banned by royal order in 1728. However, the Company had the right of *entre-pôt* for itself and its customers, so these goods could be included in the auctions. The permitted goods fall into two categories, those which entered the kingdom duty free, and those on which a duty was levied. For all that the Company had a monopoly of Oriental trade it was not exempt from customs on tea, coffee and tin. The tea tax of six livres the hundredweight, and the ten livre per hundredweight duty on coffee were introduced in 1732 and 1736 respectively. Theretofore the duty on coffee had been a straight 25,000 livres per annum. Taxable articles like the prohibited ones enjoyed the right of *entre-pôt* for six months.[46]

For the conduct of the sale the Company usually despatched a trained force. Two directors, at least one of them experienced, attended. Two clerks to record the transactions, a cashier, and two persons to handle the goods were also present. The auction took place in some large building. In the front on a raised platform were the agents of the Company and of the government—customs inspectors and others who safeguarded royal interests, and the auctioneer. In the auditorium the merchants were seated, preferably at the front where they would be sure to have their bids recognized. So desirable were these points of vantage that on one occassion servants were sent at four in the morning to

hold places for their masters. Tactics such as these caused hard feelings so the sales officials ordered that the practice cease.[47]

The merchants felt that the auctions were not satisfactorily handled. In 1730 Orry, the Comptroller General, wrote the director of the sale that complaints had been made to him that the auctioneer did not cry out "Once, Twice," before the director's hammer fell, indicating that the sale was closed. As Orry points out, it seems most remarkable that the Company thus neglected the possibility of increasing the amount bid. He ordered that the abuse be corrected.[48]

Although the order of the sale was not definitely fixed so far as has been determined, the reports of Hardancourt and Godeheu to the Comptroller General enable us to trace the general outlines. Coffee was sold on the first morning of the auction; tea in the afternoon and throughout the next day; then silks, rhubarb and gums. At this point the record breaks off with the note that there was no sale on Monday as it was a fast day, and none on Tuesday as it was the *jour de poste*. Cottons, pepper and redwood brought in as ballast were sold when the auction was resumed. After the major part of the goods had been sold, soiled and damaged items were speedily disposed of in small lots. When it was seen during the course of the auction that there was little demand for any commodity it was put aside and might be disposed of by private bargaining with some of the local merchants at the close of the sale.[49]

Hardancourt and Godeheu make reference to an abuse that the Company must have had frequent occassion to combat—a cabal to keep prices down. In general the prices obtained varied somewhat from year to year. For certain types of cloth there was a fluctuating demand determined by women's fashions. Finding that it had a surplus of any material the Company would order no more purchased until styles changed, when new instructions would be issued. Typical of the price fluctuations are those obtained for pepper, which brought the following returns. In 1726, 16 sol to 16 sol 7 deniers a pound; in 1743, 31s. 11d. to 33s. 2d; and in 1744, 26s. Tea likewise showed a general tendency to increase in price. Hysan tea sold in 1729 for from 6 livres 8 sol to 8 livres 15 sol per pound. In this year the tea was of very poor

quality. In 1730 the price was 6 livres 10 sol; and in 1743, from 10 livres 11 sol to 12 livres 5 sol. Few figures of this nature are available, but the great increase in pepper prices in India is apparently reflected in a corresponding rise in France. Seasonal fluctuations such as that between 1743 and 1744 are perhaps to be accounted for by the presence of a surplus remaining on the merchants' hand from the previous year, or by the Company's desire to dispose of unusually large quantities received. There are few statistics as to the total sales at the auctions, but as practically all goods were sold in this way with the exception of coffee which was at times retailed by the Company throughout France, the total sales figures given elsewhere give an idea of the sums secured at the auctions.[50]

Having bought goods, a merchant had to wait until all that particular commodity had been sold before he could secure his purchase. The Company did not require cash payments, but encouraged them by a liberal discount of ten percent. Letters of exchange were used in other cases. Those payable in one month entitled the purchaser to a discount of nine percent; in two months, to eight percent. These discounts were granted partly in view of the expense the merchants had to undergo to come to the sale. The Company accepted letters of exchange up to 1,000 livres drawn on Paris, La Rochelle, St. Malo, Nantes, Bordeaux, Tours, Cadiz, Amsterdam, London, Antwerp, Hamburg and Genoa. They were received at the same rate of exchange as if they had been presented at a Paris bank. The Company kept the sales directors informed as to the current exchange rates. One could also make deposits with the Company or its agents in several parts of France before coming to the sale. Credit slips would then be furnished, and were accepted as cash at the sale.[51]

When a purchaser came to pay for his goods he found that the sum he had bid was not the only payment to be made. While the sales were at Nantes there was a tax levied by the town amounting to ten sol on each lot of goods bought. Then there was a sum known as the *un pour mille*—one tenth of one percent—which was regularly collected by the Company to be used for such charitable purposes as it wished. On the other hand, certain minor

reductions were allowed on some commodities in addition to the cash discount. A *taire et trait* allowance was made for wrappings on goods sold by weight. In 1728 this was six percent on full sized packages of coffee and seven percent on half packages; and six percent on pepper in sacks. A deduction of twenty-one, twenty-five, or thirty-eight pounds per case was made on tea, and in addition five percent was allowed for dust. These deductions varied but slightly from year to year.[52]

Goods could be examined before they were withdrawn from the Company's storerooms, in the presence of one of the sales officials; but once goods had been taken away a claim for short weight or measure could not be entered. The Company made no allowance for damaged goods unless the samples were misleading. One even had to pay for the samples placed on the outside of the bundles of cloth despite the fact that small pieces were frequently cut off by other merchants, and they were at times soiled. Goods had to be claimed within ten days of the sale. Any duties had to be acquitted by the purchaser before the Company would surrender the goods to him.[53]

Because of the great danger of contraband goods being introduced from Holland and England many varieties of merchandise had to be labeled and sealed by the Company before they were delivered to the purchaser. Little parchment labels attesting its legitimate origin were attached to each bundle of cloth with lead seals. Goods lacking such a seal were subject to confiscation. To place a more effective check on the bootleggers, merchants were required to have their goods marked by the Lieutenant General of Police if they were offered for sale in Paris, or by the Intendent of the province if sold elsewhere. Retail sales were considered fraudulent if this second mark were not affixed to the goods. From time to time the Company requested the King's officials at Paris to visit shops and check up on the goods being sold.[54]

Not all of the Company's goods were disposed of at the auctions.[55] Some were sold at a price fixed by bargaining between the Company and the purchaser. This was the case with slow moving products which had already been offered at auction. Then,

too, the Company occassionally sold goods in advance of their actual arrival in France. At Lorient in 1749 cargos which were not expected for several months were offered, the Company guaranteeing their quality. This was done to relieve the Company of some of its financial problems after the disastrous losses of 1748. A few items were retained by the Company for presents to influencial officials, or for its own use. In 1729, for example, of the goods arriving in Europe 228,000 livres worth were assigned to the Guinea department, 3,000 to that of Canada, and about 500 to the pharmacy at Lorient.

In addition to legitimate trade there was considerable smuggling. The Company itself is not to be accused of any such activities, but they were closely connected with its commerce. Although the royal government had a great interest in the Company, it had to have regard for the cloth industry of France. Therefore the importation of certain materials, including cotton prints (except handkerchiefs), white goods to be dyed, and silks was prohibited. A rigid customs inspection was maintained. Girault asserts that the passage of the act of 1686 prohibiting the importation of printed calicos marks the beginning of a century long struggle between manufacturer and trader. There is little in the records of the Company to indicate that it was agitating for an enlarged market in France. When it brought in such goods, they were sold along with the other commodities with the distinct understanding that they would have to be carried outside the kingdom. Some of the Company's naval officers tried at times to introduce such goods, but they ran the risk of having them seized by the customs officials. They would then be sold for the Company's profit in the usual manner.[58]

There was another type of contraband trade in goods which the Company had the right to introduce. This was carried on by unauthorized persons or by those to whom the Company had granted certain privileges which they exceeded. It permitted its naval employees, both officers and seamen, to import limited quantities of goods. These might be either prohibited or permitted—it mattered little, as in either case they would be sold for the accounts of those interested at the annual auction. Yet these men tried to

bring in for their personal use or for sale more than the authorized amount. The King in Council took the matter under advisement in 1731. A decree was issued, forbidding any and all persons to embark goods on the Company's vessels without its previous consent. This measure of course protected the royal as well as the Company's interests if the goods were of the prohibited or dutiable variety. Contravention of it was to be punished by seizure of the goods of the Company. The Company willingly coöperated with the government in this matter for it had already offered to give royal officials half of the value of the seizures made by them.[57] To prevent excess purchases by employees in the East, it ordered that individuals deposit an amount equal to their port permits in a general fund. The Council or some other delegated group would then make the purchases for them. Thus a check could more readily be kept on surreptitious embarkments.

Inspection was necessary to prevent unathorized goods from being shipped either to India or to Europe. For this purpose there was a four fold system of visit; on leaving Lorient, on arrival in India, on leaving India, and on the return to Lorient. Vessels being laden at Lorient were under strict observance. Three clerks were kept on board night and day. Just before the vessel sailed, one of the Lorient officials had to give it a final inspection. On its return equally strict measures were taken to supervise the discharge of the cargo to see that no fraudulent shipments had been made. Lest the inspector miss anything, the Company warned the Indian councils also to be on the watch, and to take any remedial and punitive steps they might deem necessary. The inspections in India for vessels arriving or leaving were probably not as strict as at Lorient, but must none the less have been a deterrent to those inclined to defraud the Company. The entire vessel was searched before any goods were sent aboard by the Councils. Thereafter a vigilant watch was kept by a clerk who made sure that the goods were coming from the Council and that the pursar was taking note of the embarkations. He left the ship only when it was actually under sail for Europe.[58]

The Company encouraged its employees to make seizures and to give information about fraudulent practices.[59] Informers were

rewarded with a portion of the goods seized, usually one quarter. So that an informer might feel free to come before the Company's agents provision was made for his safety by a promise of inviolable secrecy. In the case of sailors giving information in India, if there were any reason to believe that the guilty party knew or suspected who the informer was, thus rendering the sailor liable to mistreatment on the home voyage, the Council could transfer him to another vessel or keep him at Pondicherry.

That the inspection was by no means futile is evidenced by the seizures which were made. Shortly before 1730 an enormous haul was made at Lorient. Two of the naval officers had 200,000 livres worth of merchandise confiscated. Numerous small seizures, some in India, and some at Lorient were also made. In the case of those made in India it is not always possible to distinguish between those made because persons were trying to smuggle things past the customs authorities, and those made because goods were fraudulently embarked. These confiscated goods were sold by the Company at the regular auction in Europe, and at special ones in India. A commission of two percent was charged for selling the goods, and the balance of the sale price went either wholly or in part to the informer, the seizer, the Company, or some charitable institution. The offender not only lost his goods, but also his salary and port permits if he were entitled to any. Fines were also imposed at times. The frequency with which reference is made to this oft recurring abuse indicates that the regulations were not strictly enforced. This was due in part to the laxness of certain employees. The Company threatened to recall any employees in India found guilty of conniving at fraudulent shipments for Europe. Ships captains were theoretically subject to the same penalty if they allowed any contraband goods to be discharged from their vessel at the ports of call.[60]

One could hardly expect the employees to be wholeheartedly interested in the Company and inclined to subordinate their interests to that of their employer when the directors set them such a bad example. Perhaps if men such as Castanier, who is reputed to have had money invested in the Swedish Company, had been a bit more devoted to the Company's interests, they would have

found time and means of correcting the abuses indulged in by their subordinates.[61]

1. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9367, fols. 76, 90; C.S.P.V., II, fol. 364; Arch. Lorient, IP, 279, fol. 30; Arch. Col., C2, 27, fols, 16-17, Deliberations of the Company, 1736; *Ibid.*, 31, fol. 28 *seq.* Memoir of 1744; Martineau, *Dupleix* I, 35, 99.
2. Arch. Col., C2, 22, fol. 130, Company to the Comptroller General, 1739; *Ibid.*, 32, fol. 199, Agreement between the Powder Company and the *Compagnie des Indes*, 1738, providing that *poudre fine* should be furnished at 21s. a pound; *poudre de guerre*, 70 livres a hundredweight; and *poudre de mine* 60 livres a cwt., all to be furnished in barrels containing a hundredweight each. Arch. Lorient, IP, IV, *passim*, contains some of the contracts made by the Lorient directors.
3. Cf. Arch. Lorient, IP, 279, correspondence of various agents of the Company with Godeheu, 1753.
4. Accounts open and close as follows;
   February 1, 1725 to April 30, 1726.
   April 1, 1726 to April 22, 1727
   April 1, 1727 to April 30, 1728.
   May 1, 1728 to April 30, 1729
   May 1, 1729 to April 30, 1730.
   May 1, 1730 to June 30, 1731
   July 1, 1731 to June 30, 1732. Arch. Col., C2, 30, fol. 221.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8927, fol. 35, Company to the Comptroller General, December 28, 1725; fols. 52-53, Superior Council to Company; *Ibid.*, 8933, fol. 462, Superior Council to Verrier at Surat, January 23, 1742.
7. Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 19, Delib. of Co., 1734; *Ibid.*, 30, fol. 5, Delib. of Co. 1742.
8. Weber, *La Compagnie des Indes*, pp. 490-91 and Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, 214, both reproduce cargo lists; Arch. Col., C2, 23, fol. 109 gives handbills for the auction in 1730. Others of these are to be found, for various years, preserved at Nantes, series HH.
9. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8993, fol. 32, *seq.*
10. *Re.* specialties of different towns, see Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 22; C.S.P.V., III, 29, 30, 70; Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 489; Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 39, 98; II, 114, 140.
11. C.S.P.V., II, 271.
12. Arch. Col., C2, 34, fol. 154, Memoir *re. Chandernagor*, 1748.
13. Local Asiatic commerce was handled by two agencies, natives and Europeans. Trade relations of the latter are denominated *Commerce d'Inde en Inde.* There was naturally no means of stopping Asiatics from trading in their own country. On the other hand, Europeans traded by tolerance of the several European Companies which enjoyed monopoly rights. While it was European capital which financed the trade, the actual transactions were frequently in the hands of native agents.
14. Financial, C.S.P.V., I, 270, 288; III, 61, 161, 216, 250; Arch. Col., C2, 29, fol. 11, Delib. of Co., 1740; Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 348; Vessels; C.S.P.V., I, 289, II, 119, III, 19.
15. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8929, fol. 288, Delib. of Co., 1722.

16. Arch. Col., Inde 2, IX; *Ibid.*, C2, 29, fol. 11, Delib. of Co., 1740; Arch. S. et O., E, 3749, fol. 2, Dupleix to Castanier, August 15, 1751. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9147, fol. 30, Castanier to Dupleix, March 9, 1740; *Ibid.*, 9148, Godeheu to Dupleix, February 18, 1740; C.S.P.V., I, 270-1-2, 284, 308, 313-4.
17. Protection, Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8928, fol. 336, Director at Karikal to Dupleix, June 30, 1751; P. Co., IV, viii; Concessions, Arch. Col., Inde 2, IX; see also chapter on finance; Passports, Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 23, Delib. of Co. 1734; *Ibid.*, 22, fol. 236, Superior Council to Director at Surat, January 30, 1729; C.S.P.V., I, 11, 13.
18. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8980, fol. 19.
19. P. Co., I, 16; IV, xi; Arch. Lorient, IP2, 69, sec. 2, fol. 49; C.S.P.V., II, 119, 154.
20. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8982, fol. 141, Dupleix to the Company, November 12, 1739; C.S.P.V., II, 238.
21. Arch. Col., C2, 34, fol. 151-52, Memoir 1748.
22. *Ibid.*, Inde 2, VII.
23. C.S.P.V., II, 366, III, 25-26; Pillai's *Journal*, I, 39, 45.
24. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9226, fol. 21.
25. Arch. Col., C2, 25, fols. 151-57, 180, 183, Memoir by La Bourdonnais, 1733.
26. Arch. Lorient, IP2, 2, Company to Godeheu, February 19, 1753; P. Co., IV, 11.
27. Arch. Col., C2, 30, fol. 141, Delib. of Co., 1743; *Ibid.*, 37, fol. 153, Company to Council at Mahé, December 4, 1751; C.S.C.C., III, 176.
28. Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 28, Delib. of Co., 1734; Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fol. 102, Dupleix to Le Riche, October 20, 1750; Arch. Col., Inde 2, VII, Memoir of 1753. C.S.P.V., I, 416, II, 391.
29. C.S.P.V., III, 265.
30. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8981, fol. 73, Dupleix to Godeheu, January 7, 1730; C.S.C.C., III, 402, 411; Arch. Col., Inde 2, VII; Arch. S. et O., E, 3755, fol. 20, Dupleix to Barthelmy, May 21, 1753.
31. Arch. Col., Inde 2, VII.
32. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9367, fol. 88, 89.
33. *Ibid.*, 8927, fol. 59, Superior Council to Council of the Isle of Bourbon, October 8, 1730; *Ibid.*, 8928, fol. 258, Company to the Council at Mahé, March 2, 1733. *Ibid.*, 9226, fol. 21; Arch. Col., C2, 25, fol. 197, letter by Beaulieu, April 21, 1733; *Ibid.*, 30, fol. 22, Delib. of Co., 1742; C.S.C.C., II, 176.
34. Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 498-99.
35. Arch. Col., C2, 30, fol. 221.
36. *Ibid.*, 24, fol. 127-28, Lenoir to the Company, October 9, 1730; *Ibid.*, 76, fol. 7, Dumas to Comptroller General, October 1, 1737; C.S.C.C., II, 169, 174; P. Co., IV, 86.
37. C.S.P.V., II, 330.
38. Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, pp. 148-50, Quotation from a Memoir by Dupleix to the Company, October 1753.
40. Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, 152-54; Martineau, *Mahé*, chapter 8.
39. Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 31, Delib. of Co., 1734; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9145, fol. 42, Company to Dupleix, September 30, 1750; Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 283; II, 149-50; Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 490; C.S.C.C., III, 256; C.S.P.V., II, 136; III, 120; Martineau, *Origines de Mahé*, p. 200.
41. Arch. Col., C2, 27, fol. 117, Delib. of Co., 1737. Pillai's *Journal*, III, 283.

42. Arch. Nantes, HH, 218, *passim*, Arch. Morbihan, E, 238, City Govt. of Lorient to Company, June 24, 1739.
43. Arch. Col., C2, 22, fol. 92, letter by Fromaget, August 1729; fol. 204; *Ibid.*, 23, fol. 104, Director of sale, September 12, 1730; *Ibid.*, 30, fol. 30; *Ibid.*, 28, fol. 123.
44. Arch. Nantes, HH, 225; Arch. Col., C2, 23, fol. 109; *Ibid.*, 28, fol. 123—all these contain copies of such notices. Martin, *Nantes et la Compagnie des Indes*, pp. 68, 69; Eight hundred notices for distribution were printed in 1728. Arch. Lorient P2, 48, fol. 3; *Ibid.*, IP, 262, liasse 45 and Arch. Col. C2, 22, fol. 195 show the origins of the merchants; Arch. Marine, B3, 396, fol. 36, De Vincelles to Secretary of the Marine, July 19, 1740. Arthur Young, half a century after the first of these great sales there, still found it difficult to secure accommodations.
45. Arch. Col., C2, 23, fol. 104, Director of Sale to the Company, September 12, 1730; Arch. Lorient, P2, 48, fol. 6.
46. Arch. Col., C2, 23, fol. 105, Director of Sale to Comptroller General September 14, 1730; *Ibid.*, 31, fols. 31, 32. Dernis, *Recueil des titres concernant la Compagnie des Indes*, III, xxviii.
47. Arch. Col., C2, 24, fol. 104, Director of Sale to Company, December 6, 1731; Arch. Nantes, HH, 226.
48. Arch. Col., C2, 23, fol. 101.
49. *Ibid.*, 22, fol. 204-10, Director of Sale to Comptroller General, October, 1729; Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
50. Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 71; Arch. Col., C2, 24, fol. 100; Arch. Nantes, HH, 224; Weber, *op. cit.*, 499; Du Fresne de Francheville, *Histoire de la Compagnie des Indes*, p. 537, Royal edict of 1723 *re.* coffee sales. For prices quoted for pepper see Arch. Nantes, HH, 224; Arch. Col., C2, 30, fol. 204; Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, 174; Martineau, *Origines de Mahé*, 203, for tea, Arch. Col., C2, 22, fol. 204; *Ibid.*, 23, fol. 105; *Ibid.*, 30 fol. 204.
51. *Ibid.*, 23, fol. 109; Arch. Nantes, HH, 226, Mellier to De la Tour, August 18, 1731.
52. See for example Conditions of Sale 1725, Arch. Nantes, HH, 224, and for 1728, *Ibid.*, 225.
53. *Ibid.*,
54. *Ibid.*, 224, Decree of the Council of State June 22, 1725, *re.* labelling of the Company's goods. *Ibid.*, 226 has numerous examples of both parchment and seals, which are scattered thruout the documents preserved at Nantes.
55. Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 106; Arch.. Nantes, HH, 218; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9225, fol. 10; Arch. Col., C2, 22, fol. 217.
56. Girault, *Colonial Tariff Policy*, p. 30; Arch. Nantes, HH, 214, Arch. Lorient, IP, I.
57. Arch. Nantes, HH, 214; Arch. Lorient, IP, I; *Ibid.*, IP2, 70, Delib. of Co., 1726.
58. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8929, fol. 310, December 19, 1729, Company to the Superior Council; Arch. Lorient, IP, I, Naval Regulations of 1733; *Ibid.*, IP, 130, liasse 3; *Ibid.*, IP2, 69, fols. 58-62, Delib. of Co. 1746; Arch. Col., C2, 33, fol. 166, Company to Council at Chandernagor, February 17, 1747; P. Co., I, fols. 4, 5, 129.
59. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8929, fol. 292, Company to Superior Council, December 23, 1726.
60. *Ibid.*, fol. 313, Superior Council to Council at Chandernagor, February 28, 1730; C.S.P.V., II, 120, 121, 290, 291; III, 84; Arch. Col., C2,

24, fol. 102; Arch. Lorient, IP, I, Regulations of 1733; P. Co., I, 7, 60, 271.

61. D'Argenson, *Mémoires,* VIII, 130, Government officials likewise set a bad example for the employees. D'Argenson maintains that de Machault in order to supply the King with money, secretly and independently of the royal treasury, carried on contraband trade for the account of His Majesty, bringing in by the *Compagnie des Indes* various prohibited goods.

CHAPTER VIII

Treatment of Employees.

Satisfied employees, we are told, give the best service. Attention may therefore be given to the question of how the Company dealt with its men with a view to determining whether loyal and efficient service could be expected from them. The good intentions of the Company are evidenced by philanthropic undertakings such as the establishment of schools and hospitals for the employees and their families in India. But the methods used to recruit sailors and the opinions of the employees themselves lead one to the inevitable conclusion that they were none too well treated according to present day standards. Dupleix found the Company rather parsimonious and unappreciative. Posterity, he claimed, would render him justice which the Company refused him, and would praise rather than criticize his achievements in the East. But salary rather than praise is of more material interest to the average individual. Frequently there are indications that the employees, especially the expatriated minor commercial ones, were underpaid. La Bourdonnais refers to Lenoir's administration at Pondicherry as rather unfortunate for all save the governor's friends. Criticism of shipboard conditions are fairly numerous, poor food causing scurvy being the most frequent. Bonnaire, an employee at Pondicherry in 1740, wrote to friends in France that he found the wages small; at the same time he felt that the greater part of the employees were of no great value. Perhaps they were getting all that they deserved. He had found the captain of the vessel on which he made the trip to India very miserly, and had had anything but a good voyage. However, he spoke favorably of conditions at Pondicherry. Dumas, he said, was a man of honor, gentle and honest, to whom all the employees were devoted. This correspondence gives us a good cross section of conditions in the Company; good and bad points were both there. The view presented depended largely on the individual.[1] No general censure of the Company's treatment of its employees is justified. While certain positions in the service were generally distasteful, others were eagerly sought.

The methods used to recruit employees are enlightening. In some fields there was regularly an abundance of applicants anxious to enter the Company's service; in others there had to be recourse to conscription. The commercial and administrative corps were in the service by their own choice or that of their parents. So eager were many families to get their sons into the Company's employ that many of them were sent to work as copyists or clerks without salary. Some of these slowly advanced to posts of considerable importance. Yet among these free will employees as among the soldiers and sailors who were forced into the service, there were some who were unsatisfactory. This is to be explained in part by the fact that the free will was of the employee, rather than of the Company. Powerful family connections might secure one a post although prospects of service from the incumbent were nil or less. Saintard, for example, foisted his nephew on the Company, although by his own confession to Dupleix he had little faith in the youth's ability.[2]

The greater part of those who voluntarily entered the service were engaged by the Paris office. Some few were hired in India, copyists who had little hope of advancement, washers who treated the cloth prior to shipments to Europe, and the courtiers without whom the Company would usually have been unable to do business.

Commercial or administrative employees for service in India were not hired for any definite period, it being expected that they would remain with the Company and be advanced in rank. In some fields where the chances for advancement were slight, as for carpenters, blacksmiths, coopers, millers, locksmiths, cannoners and surgeons, employment was on a contract basis. Here the usual term of engagement was three, five or six years. In many cases several months wages were paid in advance. Free passage was furnished in all cases, although not always at the Captain's table. Occassionally free passage was granted the families of new employees. Sometimes the Company agreed to furnish the tools of the trade, but more often no mention is made of this subject. In one unusual case it was stipulated that no salary was to be paid in India, lest the individual in question engage in commerce. He

could of course on his return collect his salary at Lorient. In another case the salary was to be fixed by Governor Lenoir in India. Fairly typical is the contract[3] of one Jean le Marié, a native of Brest, who arranged with D'Espremenil to act as assistant surgeon in Bengal for a period of three years from the time of his arrival there. His salary was fixed at a thousand livres a year, to be paid in Bengal money at the rate of three livres twelve sol a piastre. Jean was to supply his own needs, but once a year he was to be furnished with a barrel of wine and a quarter of a barrel of *eau de vie* at the same price as it would cost in Europe. *En route* he was to be fed at the Captain's table at the Company's expense. An advance of half a year's salary was given him, that he might make the proper preparations for the journey. If the director at Chandernagor found that Jean was not skilled in his profession, he had the right to send him home at any time. Or if he engaged in commerce, directly or indirectly, on his own account or for others, he was to be punished by the loss of the goods involved and the forfeiture of his salary.

A number of supernumerary ensigns were aboard the Company's vessels, receiving training which would fit them to be officers; they not only received no salary but had to pay for their board. After 1739 a payment equivalent to one year's board at the Captain's table had to be made by them before sailing. Nor were any of their shipboard needs supplied, each ensign being required to bring with him two mattresses, one pillow, four pairs of sheets, a bed spread, two dozen towels, a knife, fork and goblet.[4]

The voyage to the East was long and perilous; the Company paid only moderate wages; so there was usually no great enthusiam on the part of the Breton sailors to enter its service. Consequently it turned to the government for aid. It asked for and frequently secured the privilege of conscripting persons liable for service in the Royal Navy. Usually these sailors came from the naval district of Port Louis; at times, when this supply was exhausted, from that of St. Malo. These "levees," as they were called, were authorized by the Minister of Marine, but the expense involved in effecting them fell on the Company, which was required to pay twenty five percent more to the men than if they were in

royal service. In peace time, men designated by the naval authorities were told to report to the Company and were given an allowance frequently equal to three months pay. Then, if they failed to appear on time the twenty-five percent bonus would be denied them, although the Company still had to pay it to the treasurer of the navy at Port Louis. Panetier, naval commissioner at Le Croisic, indicates some of the problems faced in making the levee. In a letter to the Minister he states that some of those designated for service refused to accept the advance money, and resisted efforts to enlist them. They even went so far as to impede the departure of those who were willing to go. Under circumstances such as these, force had to be used to conduct the conscripts to Lorient, considerable expense being involved therein. In addition the Company had to pay the commissioner and clerks who had charge of the levee. The former received twelve livres a day for his service, the latter, six each. The number of men thus secured in some years reached the nine hundred mark.[5] The military forces, too, were kept up to strength by the use of the "press."

Another form of forced labor was that of slaves who were easily procured in the East in the eighteenth century.[6] In addition, the Company engaged in the African slave trade, but negroes were not imported into its Indian possessions. Here slaves were secured in one of two ways, by purchase, or by condemnation of persons brought before the judge of the *chauderie*. Slaves were more generally secured for use in the Isles of France and Bourbon than in India. It is only occassionally that there is reference to one in the Company's Indian employ. Little better off than the slaves were the natives who worked as paid laborers.[7] Lascars or native sailors reluctantly entered the service, received but little for their pains, and were often so long delayed at the Isles that their friends feared they had been enslaved. The several hundred native employees at Pondicherry and Chandernagor were no better treated; at times they did not make sufficient to buy food alone. Yet the Company, rather than pay them a living wage preferred to give them rice subsidies or in other ways provide for their needs.

In engaging employees preference was given to friends of the directors or influential personages at Versailles. In several in-

stances the younger employees were relatives of the higher officers. In India, although but a few clerks were engaged by the councils, there was a decided preference given to children of the French. Metics or natives, if employed, were not supposed to be advanced beyond the post of copyist. The French, full or half blooded, born in India, were at times capable employees, advancing even to the command of a post.[8]

Paris served as a training school for clerical employees, who, while not actually taught to write, received what in some cases was very necessary practice in the art. Their task of copying documents gave them some appreciation of how business was done. That they did not always profit by their training appears in the complaints made by the directors in India of the clerks sent them. Lorient, too, was a training field for artillery officers and prospective officers of the fleet. Certificates of aptitude had to be presented by the student pilots and ensigns before they were received into the lowest rank for training on shipboard. The shore instruction was in charge of regular naval officers of the Company, temporarily residents at Lorient. This system lacked continuity, and the training received by one group of students would not necessarily be the same as that of any other. Shipboard instruction supplemented the work ashore, the master and first pilot having charge of it, although one of the superior officers was expected to be present in the periods of instruction. Ships' surgeons also sometimes had to serve as teachers for their assistants. However, one must not regard the vessels as training ships, since half a dozen students were all who were to be found aboard at any one time.

In India, there was no provision for training employees, except Ganges pilots. None the less, definite encouragement was given those who fitted themselves to serve the Company in some special way. At Pondicherry and Chandernagor schools were established where French children were educated; preference was given to them over natives when vacancies occurred in the Company's ranks. The training of interpreters was one of the problems which had to be faced. Among the employees there were few if any who could tutor the young, so definite encouragement was offered those who would undertake to learn the native tongues by other

means. In 1729 for example a prize of one thousand livres was offered to the first candidate in Bengal and Mazulipatam who mastered the Persian and Moorish languages. Even this inducement brought slight response, and ordinarily the Company had to have recourse to native interpreters. These were satisfactory, except for the fact that they were rather timid in the presence of native dignitaries.[9]

Opportunities for advancement were negligible for soldiers and sailors of the lowest rank, and for natives. Among the commercial and administrative officials, and the officers of the army and navy, the chances were reasonably good. In the army one seldom advanced beyond the rank of captain, the Company dispensing almost entirely with the higher commands. In the navy there was provision for regular advancement from supernumerary ensign to captain. Among the commercial and administrative employees in India, the stages through which one would pass from lowest to highest office were assistant, second, and first class clerk, merchant, and councillor. One might enter the service with almost any rank, depending largely on one's influence and training in Europe. After being admitted to the Council, rank, under normal circumstances, was determined by length of service, the senior councillor being designated *conseiller avec l'expectative*. It was however not always his lot to succeed to the control of affairs in his own council when the incumbent director was removed or promoted. At one time it was the policy of the Company to shift employees from post to post, a "transmigration" policy, Dupleix called it. Under that plan, whenever a vacancy in one post occurred there was a general shifting of employees, as all in the Indian administrative service were considered as a single unit. Each had his rank in this unit, rather than in a particular post. One could continue at the same post if one desired, forfeiting certain rights of promotion. The constant shifting would give employees a very wide acquaintance with Indian commerce in the course of a few years, but it would force each post to run its affairs with an ever changing personnel. This disadvantage was considered to outweigh the advantages of the system, so a none too clearly defined division of affairs was established, and trans-

fers were confined to regions. Under this plan the highest ranking councillor at Chandernagor should always be in control of affairs at Cassimbazzar, that being considered second in importance of the Bengal posts. Similarly, other employees would hold certain positions by virtue of their rank. But the system was not rigidly adhered to, and the Company always reserved the right to name any employee to any post as it saw fit. In case of vacancies the Superior Council would make an *ad interim* appointment of that employee who would normally be advanced, but the actual promotion was made by the Company. In case its choice coincided with the Council's, the appointee drew pay for his new work from the date of the *ad interim* appointment; but if the Company preferred to name another, the unfortunate individual passed by reverted to his former rank and received no compensation for the extra duties performed.[10] Theoretically, length of service governed advancement in the ranks both of naval officers and civil employees in India. In addition it was provided that ability must accompany seniority. But favoritism might and did allow some of the subordinates to rise rapidly, especially through the non-conciliar ranks.[11]

Tenure of office in the Company's employ was permanent. Many of the higher officials and the majority of the commercial and administrative employees passed their lives in its service. Numerous are the references to the deaths of faithful employees.[12] Only rarely have resignations been noted; removal from office for unsatisfactory service cut short the career of a few, but this too was on comparatively rare occassions.

Certain types of employees, as contract laborers, were engaged for a fixed period. The number of contracts recorded at Lorient leads to the conclusion that they probably did not prolong their stay in India beyond the period of their original engagement. Soldiers usually enlisted for a definite number of years, but with the possibility of reenlistment; sailors, for a single voyage. The Company did not scruple to keep them in India for a year or so, returning them by a later boat.[13] Thus it obtained for a short time the services of some trained craftsmen from among the sailors. Permission had to be obtained from the Minister of Marine to

keep the conscripts in India, since they had signed up simply for the duration of the voyage. The captains of the vessels were held responsible for their return. They would naturally hesitate to allow the councillors to retain the sailors in India unless some steps were taken to safeguard their interests. This system lasted only from 1733 to 1738, when the Company abandoned it. While it was in vogue the following regulations were enforced. The men sent on the vessels as replacements for the artisans taken off, had to be capable of filling the vacant place on shipboard, since the vessels had at all times to be safeguarded. In removing men, the preference was to be given to those desiring to remain in India; if some had to be arbitrarily disembarked, bachelors should be taken off rather than married men. Salary complications could easily develop under this system. It was stipulated that double wages must not be paid, that is, a man could not draw pay as a sailor while serving as an artisan ashore. Then, to prevent dissipation, "which is natural with them," as the Company said, the detained sailors were to be given only such portion of their wages as should be necessary to pay their essential expenses. Even clothing was to be furnished on credit, to discourage needless purchases in India. On returning to Lorient, the accounts were settled.

Among the naval employees, only some of the major officers were permanently assigned to a particular vessel. Theoretically the captain, master and pilot of any ship were permanently attached to it, to be transferred only for indispensable reasons. However, regulations forced the captains to take a lengthy vacation after each voyage, and it might be necessary to use the vessel before this rest period were at an end.[14] Contract laborers had a fixed place at which they were to work. Naturally, soldiers were transferred as occassion required. Even the directors at times were removed from Paris, one of them being at Lorient as director of that Port, and others at Nantes for several weeks of the year, as directors of the sales, until the abandonment of that site in 1732.

When the Company found it necessary to discharge employees in India, it seems to have adopted a rather liberal attitude toward them. Half pay was sometimes given them as a subsistance al-

lowance until they might be returned to France. This was not always the case. For example, Captain de la Gevrie had once refused his pay, so the Superior Council could scarcely be blamed for not giving him half pay thereafter. In this particular case, the Council was hard pressed for funds, and was temporarily foregoing its own wages. The troops were being paid in small change; the Captain objected to accepting this, so, fearing him as a possible leader of mutineers in case the financial shortage continued, the Council thought it best to discharge him. Five months later, no vessel having sailed for Europe, and there being need for an experienced officer, the Captain was reengaged, five payless months being considered sufficient punishment for him. Several such instances of exemplary discharge occurred. All types of employees were affected, military, naval and commercial.[15] Not all employees were dishonorably discharged. Sailors formed the bulk of those who left the service without stigma. These, at the end of a voyage were given discharge papers and passports, along with two months pay to enable them to return to their own district where they received the balance of their wages.[16]

Several factors influenced the Company in determining what wages it should pay. Among the sailors who voluntarily entered its service, regard was had for their physical ability; Godeheu, for example, as director at Lorient, was instructed to engage sailors at "twenty to twenty five livres per month, as is customary, and according to their height and strength." It has been noted too that in India the Company insisted on ability as well as the rights inherent in seniority before advancing an employee to a higher and more remunerative post. The cost of living also influenced the salary scale. Life in Pondicherry at the time of Dumas was expensive, so in 1739 the Company increased by twenty percent the salaries paid there. Special bonuses were granted in war time. The salaries of naval officers were very materially augmented, captains receiving a fifty percent increase after the twentieth month of any particular campaign. Then too, when port permits were abolished due to war conditions, a bonus of 12,000 livres was paid to captains and lesser sums to the officers and sailors.[17]

The Company disapproved of the soldiers receiving gifts from the natives to whom they sometimes gave assistance, as this was contrary to French law. But one wonders whether the Company could have by any means kept the soldiers from accepting money proffered them. The lure of gold was strong and the possibility of returning to France where French law might be enforced more stringently than in India was a remote one.[18]

The actual sums paid the employees were not always equal to their salaries. Sailors had part of their wages turned over to their families during their voyage, and had to contribute to an indigent sailor fund; officers at times were fined or penalized for infration of some rule; and wages sometimes garnisheed. Naval officers objected to being taxed by the City of Lorient, as many of them considered that it was not their home. However, the tax collector was able to induce the Comptroller General to order the Company to pay the taxes, and it of course deducted this from the salaries.[19] Employees in India in 1747[20] received as regular salary sums ranging from 15,000 livres downward. Dupleix as Governor, drew the highest salary; the next ranking officer, the "Second" as he was called, received 4,000 livres. Councillors were given a basic salary of 1,500. Merchants received 1,000 livres, clerks 800, 700, or 600 according to their classification as first, second or assistant. Almoners got 1200 livres, and surgeons 1,000 to 1,500. The captain at arms and the carpenter each drew 700 livres, the harbor master, cooper, cabinet maker, and armorer 600 each, and locksmith 550, the assistant armorer 500, and the assistant carpenter 300. The major general of the garrison was paid on the same basis as the councillors, 1,500 livres; two lieutenants, his aides, received 800 apiece. In contrast to the above salaries, the topaz or Portugese troops got six livres ten sol a month. All native employees received far less than the French. Gardeners, water carriers, and chefs' assistants on the hospital payroll at Chandernagor in 1750 got as little as fifty livres a year; cooks and hospital attendants got twice as much, while clerks received approximately two hundred livres.[21]

Some French employees received commissions instead of, or in addition to their salaries.[22] At Moka—not in India, of course,

but within the bounds of the Indian department of the Company—they worked on a straight commission basis, receiving five per cent on goods sold, and two and a half per cent on the coffee they purchased. Dumas, who was in charge in 1738, received three per cent on sales; his assistant, Courbezarte, got one and one half per cent; and Dernis, a clerk, one half of one per cent. On purchases, they received respectively one and one quarter, one, and one quarter of one per cent. At Pondicherry in the last two years of Dupleix's administration the Company allowed a five per cent commission on European goods sold in India. This was to encourage the Councillors to develop the market and thus lessen the need for bullion shipments from Europe. Dupleix was to get one quarter of this commission, De Leyrit, the director at Chandernagor, one fifth, while the rest went in varying proportions to the other twenty three councillors.

In addition to the salaries and commissions, there were "gratifications" of various kinds. In time of war it was customary to pay a bonus in centers which had been under fire. Such a bonus was paid the Lorient employees for service in the War of the Austrian Succession. Once having established the practice, it was hard to abandon it. Godeheu in 1753 or 1754 divided some 4,640 livres among his subordinates at Lorient, and was thereupon instructed by the Company to cut the bonuses to 4,000 livres per annum in future. Similar bonuses were paid in India to those military officers who had taken part in the defense of Pondicherry in 1748. These amounted to a year's salary. The surgeon and almoners received three hundred livres apiece. Some of the employees who performed special services also received bonuses. The Superior Council awarded 1,000 livres per annum to the Sieur Moran, councillor, for his capable administration of the mint.[23] Gratification did not always take the form of money bonuses. Employees were allowed to bring their servants out with them from France free of charge. They were given a wine and liquor allowance, sometimes free, sometimes at current French prices. Where room was available in the Company's buildings, employees both single and married were given accommodations. Those temporarily at some post where the Company had no quarters of its own,

and where living expenses were known to be unusually high[24] were sometimes given allowances for board and lodging. In their old age, the employees were cared for by pensions, as were their widows and other dependents in some cases.

Naval officers were in the permanent employ of the Company, so were entitled to a salary when on shipboard, on leave at Lorient, or elsewhere on the Company's business. The pay on land was half that on the sea. Regular salaries of officers on campaign were fixed in 1733 at 200 livres a month for the captain, 120 for the first lieutenant, 90 for the second lieutenant, 60 for the first and 50 for the second ensign, 50 for the pursuar, 30 for the almoner, and 45 each for the chief surgeon, the master, and the first pilot. These men were fed at the Company's expense. Prior to 1733 some captains in the "first navigation" received only 150 livres a month. Occassionally an ensign ashore was paid on the same basis as a second ensign. When a voyage was unusually long the officers sometimes drew a higher salary for the last few months of it. But these variations are remarkably few for a period of twenty-five years. If an officer, during the course of a campaign, deserted or resigned he lost both salary and port permits. Strange as it may seem, officers did desert at times, but the reason for this behavior has not been determined.[25]

In addition to his wages, an officer was entitled to port permits, that is, to the privelege of bringing back with him a stipulated quantity of goods for sale in Europe. The amount of the port permits was not as free from fluctuation as the salaries. In 1729 a captain was entitled to 2,500 piastres, a first lieutenant to 1,000, a second lieutenant to 600, a first ensign to 300, second ensign and purser to 200 each, and the almoner and surgeon to 100 apiece. Under the system in vogue prior to that time, each officer had been responsible for his own goods, buying as he saw fit. Now he was required to deposit his funds at Lorient or with the Council in India, and his goods were incorporated in the Company's cargo. On his return to Europe, after the sale, he was given a straight profit of one hundred per cent on his investment. The regulations of 1733 raised the general port permits somewhat. Thereafter a captain was entitled to 3,300 piastres, and a first lieutenant

to 1,100. Corresponding increases were granted the other officers, and the supernumerary and honorary ensigns were now allowed 110 and 55 piastres respectively. Profits were no longer fixed at one hundred per cent, but the officer received a share of the total sale price proportionate to the ratio which his port permit bore to the cost of the cargo. If any discount were allowed the purchaser at the auction, that was deducted before determining the amount to which the officer was entitled, but he bore no part of the expenses of the sale, the Company even assuming all losses from bad money tendered in payment for goods. If by chance the goods were not all sold at the annual auction, the Company placed a valuation on them based on the prices obtained for comparable goods, deducted ten per cent from this, and paid off the officers. Profits were distributed within four months, but if an officer reembarked before his account was settled, he was given back his original investment without profit so that he could participate in the port permit of the second embarkation. Naturally, when the profits of the sale were known, they were placed to his credit.[26] One might think this was an easy way for the major officers to grow rich; a port permit of 2,500 or 3,300 piastres would bring in a profit of over 10,000 livres. Yet there was always the possibility of loss of one's capital, for if the vessel met with some disaster the individual officers lost whatever money or goods they had aboard.

In some cases the port permits were not in money, but in produce.[27] Thus one going to Mahé was entitled to a stipulated number of pounds of pepper; a captain to 1,800, a first lieutenant to 600, and a second lieutenant to 360 pounds. Of course the officers advanced the money for this pepper just as they did for general cargo. The sum involved in the pepper purchase was not equal to a general port permit. It is not clear from the records whether the pepper permit was in place of, a part of, or in addition to the general permit.

The Company adopted the practice in 1740 of loaning the officers money, in order to make it easier for them to take advantage of their permits. The rate of interest, which was for the duration of the voyage, was twenty percent in peace time, and forty percent

in time of war. Captains were now entitled to 16,000 livres, first lieutenants to 5,333, second lieutenants to 3,200, first ensigns to 1,600, and so on down the list. Then in 1745, due to the war, the permits were suspended and the officers were given special bonuses ranging from 12,000 livres for captains to 200 livres for volunteers who were aboard. "C'est la guerre," the reason given by the Company for the change, does not appear to be a very satisfactory one. The desire to prevent fraudulent embarkation of goods likewise seems to be a rhetorical explanation, since the officers, by the regulations of 1733 did not personally buy the goods. After the war the original system of one hundred per cent profit on permits was restored, although the officers were left at liberty to accept a fixed bonus if they preferred.[28]

In addition to the general permit, there was the *petit port permis* which enabled officers to secure table linen, handkerchiefs, and similar articles for personal use. It amounted to a little less than ten per cent of the general permit. Lest the officers try to sell such goods on arrival at Lorient, they were not allowed to have them until after the Company's auction.[29]

Like the officers, the crew enjoyed small port permits.[30] They were worth about two months salary until 1739 when a fixed sum was substituted, forty livres for the sailors, and seventy for the petty officers. In war time, when the permits were used, they were doubled. A list of the goods desired was made up for the entire crew, purchases made by the Council, and the goods distributed on return to Lorient. Sailors who wished it might also have a bit of pepper purchased for them at Mahé. If they cared to pay for it at Lorient out of their wages, it would be sold for their account; or if they felt the need for ready cash, they could abandon their purchase and draw full wages.

Officers were encouraged to bring back their ships full laden. Fifty livres a ton was allowed on goods over and above the largest cargo previously brought back on the same vessel. The captain received thirty livres of this, the first lieutenant fifteen, and the master five. Vessels taken as prizes also added to the officer's income. French ships, privately owned, infringing on the Company's monopoly concessions were subject to seizure as were those

belonging to enemies of the state. One quarter of the value of French interlopers was divided among the officers and crew. Ten per cent of the value of foreign prizes was paid to the French Admiral prior to 1748. After expenses were deducted, the officers and crew shared in the value of the ship and cargo, the captain getting one quarter, the other major officers one half, and the petty officers and crew the remainder. The officers received a definite number of shares in the prize, five parts to the first lieutenant, three to the second lieutenant, and one and one half to the first ensign, one to the second ensign, etc. Likewise the sailors shared their portion according to a fixed standard. The carpenter got three parts, an assistant surgeon two, and soldiers and sailors one part each. In addition to all these money payments and port permits, the officers received their meals while on shipboard at the Company's expense. Then when their days of usefulness were over they, like other employees, were in some cases pensioned.[31]

The wages of the common sailors were never high, twenty five livres a month being the maximum. Many of them received as little as eighteen livres. Frequently, especially if conscripted, they received several months wages in advance. During the voyage, two months pay was given their families every six months, and they themselves received a similar allowance on arriving in India. They did not suffer from the fact that money was held back from them, as clothing was supplied as needed on a credit basis. Their chief grievance was over the manner in which they were paid off on their return. Instead of settling the accounts at Lorient the Company paid the sailors several months wages, and then left them to collect the remainder at some point near their homes. This served a useful purpose in that they could not squander all their money at Lorient; but it meant that they had to go to the chief city of the region in which they were living. To make matters worse, the Company failed to send the money promptly to its agents or the naval commissioners in these cities. Sometimes this may have been the fault of the Lorient office which neglected to send the lists to Paris; at others, the Paris office was at fault. In either case, the sailors were inconvenienced. Continued negli-

gence in this matter led Marias, commissioner of the navy at Port Louis, to write Maurepas to request that the Company be asked to pay off last year's crews before it started spending money preparing for next year's campaign.[32]

Although the sailors might protest about slow pay, no protests have been noted about extra payments accorded them because of short rations during the voyage; nor did they object to the port permits, nor to the bonuses for the loss of effects due to attacks of pirates, or shipwreck, nor to the extra pay received when they were forced to stay in India and work at some trade on land. They also accepted without protest the old age pensions granted them out of the tax collected from merchants at the sales.[33]

It is important to note that the Company provided for the physical well being of its employees. Hospitals were to be found at Lorient, Pondicherry, Chandernagor and Mahé. Surgeons were aboard all ships, in the hospitals, and at some of the other posts. True, medical service was not always free, and was sometimes experimental, for the Company on several occassions sent new preparations to Lorient or to India to be tried out by its surgeons. Dissolute sailors paid for the special care of their ailments on shipboard, and certain of the employees, ships' officers for instance, paid for the supplies given them in the hospitals. Sailors ill of scurvy and wounded soldiers received free hospital treatment. Simple medical attendance was likewise granted free to all employees of the Company in India.[34] Those who were completely incapacitated were maintained in a soldiers' home at Pondicherry. Any who while unfit for further service as soldiers were nevertheless somewhat able to help themselves were sent to the Isles, accompanied by two slaves, to take their place among the colonists there.[35]

Provision made for the spiritual as well as the physical needs of the employees. The Company maintained a goodly number of almoners, and contributed to the erection and upkeep of churches in its Indian possessions. Nor were the employees' families neglected. They received regular allowances while the sailors were at sea; they were given free transportation to India if the head of the house were stationed there; the children in and

about Pondicherry were educated partly at the Company's expense. Pensions were granted dependants if the breadwinner died in the service, and even after the dissolution of the Company the King continued these. Ordinarily they were equivalent to half pay or less. Lest abuse develop in the system, it was required that widows file application within a year of their husband's death and satisfy the Company of their need for a pension.[36] The Company also helped settle the estates of deceased employees. Without its assistance many a person in Europe would never have received any of the legacies of relatives who died in the East. The large number of letters from private individuals to the Company relating to estates indicates that relatives considered the handling of them to be one of the duties of the Company, rather than a favor rendered by it. In the list of favors may be mentioned the repatriation of the children of employees who died in India.[37]

Despite its advanced ideas in regard to free medical treatment, free education, a nebulous form of profit sharing, and the like, the Company made remarkably little provision for leaves of absence or holidays. Naval officers had the right to one year's rest at half pay if they wished it after each trip to India; those who arrived on the last of the vessels in any particular year were for safety's sake required to take it. The military officers in India occassionally took leave with pay, largely, it seems, on their own responsibility. The civil employees did not enjoy such good fortune. Those who sought leave to return to France at times received it, but the voyage to and from the homeland was at their own expense. Occassionally in India a few days or weeks were granted an employee to enable him to visit another post, usually with a view to matrimony. But one drew no salary when absent from one's post.[38]

The Company took an interest in securing honors for its employees and others who rendered it service. Religious favors were sought, in one instance at least. The Marquis de Puysieulex obtained from the King permission for the Company to approach the court at Rome to ask that a Reverand Father who had rendered noteworthy service to Dupleix be granted a bishopric. If the Company would thus intercede with a foreign power for one who, so far as has been determined, was not even one of its al-

moners, how much more would it use its influence to obtain honors from the King of France for its own employees. Frequently the Cross of St. Louis was sought and obtained for its military officers, either on the basis of long service or distinguished action. Higher decorations were at times secured. Dumas was given the Order of St. Michael for his services in securing mint rights for the Company. Dupleix received an even greater honor when he was created Marquis for his defense of Pondicherry and his other achievements in the course of the War of the Austrian Succession. One honor the Company had in its own power to confer—the post of honorary councillor. This was accorded but rarely, and its use was dying out toward the close of Dupleix's administration.[39] The employees came to expect the Company to secure honors for them after the deluge of Crosses of St. Louis which arrived in the late 1740s. Courten, after some exploits in northern India in 1757-58 wrote his wife; "Ought not this, my dear wife, to make me hope that the gentlemen of the Frency Company will do their utmost to procure me some military honor in order to prove to the English that my nation is as ready as theirs to recognize my services?" Fortunately for the Company, its great leaders acted in a more disinterested manner.[40]

No matter where the employees might be they were ever subject to the Company's dictates. At Paris one was told, and by the janitor at that, how much firewood and how many candles one might burn. At Lorient, one could not smoke on pain of dismissal. On shipboard the same restriction was effective, unless one had great foresight, since there was no canteen. Fire hazards might justify this, but the Company seems to have gone a bit far when it told its employees how they should conduct themselves at divine services on board. In India regulations were more numerous. The Company even undertook the control of marriages. True there was the danger that a sailor might bigamously marry some dusky maiden. So far as the regulations prevented such alliances, perhaps they were justified. Soldiers and clerical employees however were in India for indefinite periods, and surely the bachelors among them might have been left free to act as they saw fit. But even they had to secure the permission of the Council before they

could marry. One might not visit his European neighbors other than French if he closely followed the letter of the law. Under Lenoir's benevolent regime, one could not leave the city of Pondicherry after nine P. M., nor re-enter it if one had neglected too long to turn back after strolling in the country. Within the city all should be calm and peaceful after eight; violins could not be played after that hour, even though the custom had once been to dance for two weeks before a wedding. Sometimes too, mail was subject to censorship. Regulations of this extreme nature outlived Lenoir's administration but a short time, if at all. The employees were more fortunate than the native residents in the Company's possessions, in that they could be held under arrest only twenty-four hours pending consideration of the case by the Council.[41]

The enactment of such regulations is not indicative of any special desire on the part of the councils to control the activities of the employees as such. The councils were the legislative bodies for the territories under French control, the employees a part of the inhabitants thereof, and naturally subject to the laws.

Parsimonious at times, generous at others, the Company's general treatment of its employees can neither be condemned nor praised. Good and bad features existed side by side just as in large corporations of the present day. Perhaps the best judgement of the Company's attitude lies in the fact that a large part of the commercial employees passed their lives in its service.

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2. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9150, fols. 141-81, Saintard's correspondence with Dupleix.
3. Arch. Lorient, IP, 74, contains contracts entered into by employees of the Company. That of Le Marié is of October 11, 1736, and is to be found on fol. 160; *Ibid.,* P2, 96 also contains details of some of the contracts 1727-31.
4. Arch. Lorient, P2, 70, fol. 20, Deliberations of Co. 1739.
5. *Ibid.,* IP, 67, fols. 2, 10; 278, *passim,* Correspondence of the Minister of Marine with the Lorient Directors, 1726-46; Arch. Marine, B3, 310, fol. 143; 396, fol. 275, Panetier's letter, February 9, 1740; Weber, *La Compagnie des Indes,* p. 530.
6. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8927, fol. 49, Company to Superior Council, October 14, 1729.
7. C.S.P.V., II, 223-24; III, 88; Arch. Col., C2, 28, fol. 26, Delib. of Co. 1739.

8. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8980, fol. 51, Dupleix to the Co. November 23, 1737; C.S.C.C., I, 66; P. Co., II, 55.
9. Arch. Col., Inde 2, VII; P. Co., I, 165; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9357, fol. 77, Delib. of Superior Council, 1729.
10. Arch. Lorient, IP, I; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8981, fol. 68, Dupleix to Co., January 6, 1739; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 211-12, Delib. of Co., 1735; 28, fol. 28.
11. P. Co., II, 220.
12. P. Co., vol. I to IV, *passim*. C.S.P.V., I, II, III, *passim*.
13. Bib. Nat., N.A.F. 8929, fols. 339-40, Co. to Council at Chandernagor, January 21, 1733; Arch. Marine, B3, 385, fol. 157, Marias to Minister of Marine, July 18, 1738.
14. Arch. Lorient, IP, 1.
15. C.S.P.V., I, 346; Arch. Lorient, P2, 69, sec. 2, fol. 50.
16. *Ibid.*, 68, doc. 3.
17. *Ibid.*, IP, 279, liasse 23; *Ibid.*, P2, 70, fol. 23, Delib. of Co. 1745; fol. 26, Delib. of Co., 1749; Arch. Col., C2, 28. fol. 27, Delib. of Co., 1739; Arch. Marine, B3, 478, fol. 211, Godeheu to Maurepas, August 18, 1748.
18. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9145, fol. 73, Company to Dupleix, February 1, 1752.
19. Arch. Lorient, P2, 66, docs. 29-31 list taxes paid by the Co. for officers in 1753, '54 and '55.
20. Arch. Col., C2, 33, fols. 151-60, General expense accounts 1747. C.S. P.V., II, III, *passim*.
21. Arch. Col., D2D, XI.
22. *Ibid.*, C2, 36, fol. 192; Company to Superior Council, November 21, 1752; C.S.P.V., II, 61, III, 122-123.
23. Arch. Marine, B3, 478, fol. 211, Godeheu to Maurepas, August 18, 1748; Arch. Lorient, P2, 70, fol. 32, Delib. of Co., 1754; Arch. Col., D2D, XI; *Ibid.*, D2C, 191; *Ibid.*, C2, 29, fol. 202; 33, fol. 151-60; C.S.P.V., III, 263.
24. *Ibid.*, C2, 27, fol. 11, Delib. of Co., 1736; fol. 137, Delib. of Co., 1737; Arch. Lorient, IP, 284, fol. 104; C.S.P.V., I, 48; II, 11, 118, 120, 187, 240, 271, 400; III, 272; P. Co., I, 166, 175, 214.
25. Arch. Lorient, IP, I; 164, fol. 10; *Ibid.*, P2, 70, fol. 26, Delib. of Co., 1749.
26. *Ibid.*, IP, I; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8929, fol. 310, Co. to Council Superior, December 19, 1729.
27. Arch. Lorient, IP, I.
28. *Ibid.*, P2, II, Company to M. Roth, September 3, 1755; 69, fols. 10-13; Delib. of Co., 1740; 70, fol. 23, Delib. of Co., 1748; Arch. Col., C2, 40, fol. 235, Memoir of 1755.
29. Arch. Lorient, IP, I; *Ibid.*, P2, 70, fol. 17, Delib. of Co., 1735.
30. *Ibid.*, 70, fol. 28, Delib. *of* Co., 1749; *Ibid.*, IP. I.
31. *Ibid.*, IP, I; 152, fol. 4; *Ibid.*, P2, 65, sec. 3; Bib. Nat., 8929, fol. 310, Co. to Superior Council, December 19, 1729, *re* tonnage bonus; 9144, fol. 190, Co. to Dupleix, April 8, 1748.
32. Arch. Lorient., IP, 129, fol. 13; 133, *liasse* 6; 278, *liasse* 3, fol. 76, Co. to Duvelaer, March 23, 1743; Arch. Marine, B3, 396, fol. 130, Marias to Minister of Marine, December 9, 1740.
33. Arch. Lorient, P2, 70, fol. 22, Delib. of Co., 1743; *Ibid.*, IP, 133, *liasse* 12; Arch. Nat., ADix, 385, doc. 145.

34. Arch. Lorient., IP, 126, *liasse* 7, fol. 38; *Ibid.*, P2, 10, fol. 55, Co. to Godeheu March 1, 1755; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8928, fol. 172, Superior Council to Director at Mahé, February 19, 1726; Arch. Col., C2, 28, fol. 48, Delib. of Co., 1738.
35. C.S.P.V., II, 322.
36. Arch. Lorient, P2, 69, fols. 76-78, Delib. of Co., 1746, 1749; *Ibid.*, IP, 113, contains list of pensions paid at Lorient 1748-53; 246, *liasse* 8; P. Co. II, 46.
37. Arch. Lorient, IP, 16, fol. 61; 278, *passim*, letters received at Lorient 1721-27; P. Co., I, 90, 162-63; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9141, fol. 13, Co. to Dupleix, January 29, 1750.
38. Arch. Lorient, IP, I; *Ibid.*, P2, 65, sec. 3; Arch. Col., C2, 29, fol. 21, Delib. of Co., 1740; Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fol. 69, Dupleix to Le Riche, September 25, 1750; C.S.C.C., II, 215.
39. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9145, fol. 21, Company to Dupleix, July 15, 1750; fols. 33-36, Company to Dupleix, September 30, 1750; Arch. Col., C2, 27, fol. 90, Co. to Maurepas, September 29, 1736; Pillai's *Journal*, I, 42; P. Co., II, 44.
40. Hill, *Three Frenchmen in Bengal*, pp. 166-67.
41. Arch. Col., C2, 25, fol. 177, Memoir by La Bourdonnais; 40, fol. 108, Gilly's Memoir; Arch. Lorient, P2, 69, fol. 22; *Ibid.*, IP, I; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8929, fol. 340; Pillai's *Journal*, I, 148.

CHAPTER IX

Maritime Affairs

Practically all goods imported into or exported from France by the Company were carried in its own ships. Only in exceptional cases, as when war losses deprived it of an adequate number of vessels, did it have occassion to charter privately owned ones Shipments in broken lots on which it paid freight, were confined to goods being accumulated at Lorient for Oriental trade. Naturally then the Company had a goodly number of vessels, well worthy of the term "fleet." They were divided into two categories. Theoretically vessels which had a tonnage range from 450 to 600 were assigned to the "first navigation," and smaller ships of 200 to 350 tons to the "second navigation." Practically all Oriental trade with China, Bengal, and the Coromandel and Malabar coasts, Moka, and the Isles of France and Bourbon came in the first division. The second included voyages to the Guinea coast, Senegal, America, and, in some cases, the Isles. Our interest relates only to the first group.[1]

Very few technical descriptions of the ships have been preserved. Weber describes the *Marquis-de-Castries,* a vessel constructed at Lorient in 1765; at the National Library in Paris in the Journal of one of the Company's captains, Albert, is an account of the *Syrene*; and at the Colonial Archives is the log of the *Lys.* Pictures are quite as scarce as descriptions. An occassional plan of some naval engagement shows us the Company's vessels, but they are drawn on a very small scale. Artists of the eighteenth century apparently failed to find inspiration in the white sail spread of the Company's fleet; in their opinion, more romance and artistic possibilities were perhaps to be found in French war ships. Whatever may have been the reason, the fact remains that no satisfactory picture of one of the Company's vessels has been found.[2]

From the few available records, one learns that the vessels engaged in the India service usually had three masts. The *Marquis-de-Castries,* of 700 tons, was 130 feet long over all, having a

keel of 112 feet. She had a sixteen foot six inch draft, and her main-mast was 85 feet high. Neither these figures nor the small sketches of any of the vessels are indicative of graceful lines. They were sturdily built as they had to serve the dual purpose of merchantmen and war ships, and slow moving in common with most sailing vessels of the day. To add to their clumsiness they were over manned on setting out from Europe, partly for defense and partly because of the heavy mortality which frequently occurred.[3]

Some idea of the size of the fleet is obtained from a memoir[4] drawn up in 1723, when the India Council of King's Commissioners gave up its control of the Company. It comprised seventy six vessels all told, of which seventeen carried over forty cannon; ten carried from thirty to forty; twenty-one, from eighteen to thirty; and eleven, from eight to sixteen. The other seventeen were small vessels. They were distributed as follows: forty-six were in port, and thirty on the seas, nine being *en route* for the East, eleven for Senegal, and five for Louisiana. Twenty-five years later after suffering considerably during the course of the War of the Austrian Succession, the Company had twenty-six vessels and frigates, and in addition was using several royal vessels. At the close of Dupleix's career the figure more nearly approximated that of 1723, being sixty-two vessels and frigates. Despite these numbers, it is doubtful if more than eight ships arrived in India from Europe in any one year. The number sailing from Lorient also gives an idea of the total size of the fleet, bearing in mind that two years normally intervened between sailings of any particular vessel for India, and one or more between sailings to Senegal. The accompanying table (A) comprises only those sailings of which there is now evidence available at Lorient, so is not necessarily complete. The table given in the *Dictionnaire du Commerce de l'Encyclopédie Méthodique* indicates that the sailings from 1725 to 1754 averaged twenty a year.[5]

Individual vessels were appraised in 1732 at sums up to 296,173 livres. (See table B). When the Company lost its privileges in 1769 it had a fleet of thirty vessels which it valued at slightly

TABLE A

NUMBER OF VESSELS SAILING FROM LORIENT

1725	14 vessels	1735	17 vessels	1745	22 vessels
1726	13 vessels	1736	23 vessels	1746	6 vessels
1727	13 vessels	1737	17 vessels	1747	18 vessels
1728	17 vessels	1738	20 vessels	1748	22 vessels
1729	20 vessels	1739	20 vessels	1749	23 vessels
1730	18 vessels	1740	20 vessels	1750	10 vessels
1731	24 vessels	1741	31 vessels	1751	13 vessels
1732	25 vessels	1742	16 vessels	1752	25 vessels
1733	23 vessels	1743	16 vessels	1753	23 vessels
1734	13 vessels	1744	20 vessels	1754	16 vessels
				1755	20 vessels

more than 6,300,000 livres, but which Morellet and Lauraguais believed worth only 4,000,000.[6]

TABLE B

ESTIMATED VALUE OF VESSELS—1732

Vessel	Tonnage	Age (years)	Value (in thousands of livres)
Duchesse	550	0	296
Royal Philippe	300	9	258
Bourbon	300	10	252
Heron	450	1	240
Griffen	450	0	229
Argonaute	600	6	165
Jason	700	13	156
Galatée	275	7	100
Légère	300	2	57
Hirondelle	180	1	37

Lorient was the usual place of construction for the Company's vessels. Between 1728 and 1740 seventeen vessels ranging from 550 to 850 tons, ten frigates of 150 to 380 tons, and four boats of about 35 tons each were built there. St. Malo ranked second, at least in the 1730s. In 1725 there were among the seventy odd vessels three which had been built at St. Malo. Dieppe had contributed one, as had Dunkerque, Nantes and Hamburg; three came from Le Havre, three from England, and four from Holland. Later, under La Bourdonnais, the Isles were added to the places of origin. Several small vessels for local trade in the East were built in Indian ports. The cost of construction averaged about three hundred livres per ton. At times the shipyards of St. Malo turned out less expensive work, as in 1734 when the *Aurore,* of

200 tons, was built for 55,000 livres, this sum including a two per cent commission to one Julian Drake who apparently supervised the construction.[7]

Vessels built for the Company at places other than Lorient were delivered to it there,[8] partly because coming from points on the English Channel, it was safer not to entrust them to the Company's own officers who were not experienced in navigating that body of water. Most of the vessels constructed in Europe were destined to sail to and from Lorient, although a few were destined for the local Indian trade. The Company at times purchased vessels already in use. In war time, purchases were made in Europe. In India, most of the councillors lacked any training in naval matters, making it desirable to buy ships of known worth rather than chance construction under inefficient supervision. Despite this fact, some were built at Pegou. However, in the East new vessels when needed were usually wanted in a hurry, so purchase was the customary means of acquisition.[9]

The Company, like others of the eighteenth century, armed its vessels as men of war. The records usually note the gun strength as well as the tonnage of the ships. Their sides had to be pierced for this artillery. Since the weight of the cannon and ammunition cut heavily into the carrying capacity, in peace time but a small portion of the possible armament was shipped.

The Company took little pains to see that its vessels were properly constructed, so frequent repairs had to be made. Much of this work was done in India, at Pegou, where it was well done at a reasonable price. The Company was somewhat parsimonious in its use of paint. One of the inspectors at Lorient was responsible for determining when ships needed repainting, and was told not to authorize this simply to gratify the whim of a captain. No provision seems to have been made for the need of painting during the course of a long voyage to and from India. The life of a vessel was comparatively short, averaging about six trips to India. This was too many, according to La Bourdonnais, who believed that a vessel could safely be sent into the East a maximum of four times. He claimed that this policy was followed by the English.[10]

The fate of the vessels was varied. Some were wrecked, others condemmed—sometimes in India, thus throwing many European sailors on the councils to be repatriated as best they might. Dupleix, assisting at one such condemnation by the council at Chandernagor, wrote to Godeheu that the vessel was too rotten to return to Europe. "The Sieur Cambuc, shipbuilder at Lorient, merits punishment for thus lightly exposing the King's subjects to death," he said. In a few instances fires broke out, sometimes fortunately extinguished before any great damage was done. In the case of the *Prince,* there was a total loss of ship and cargo, only seven or eight of the crew being saved. Many of the vessels used in local trade in the East were sold at the end of a trip, sometimes because there was no immediate need for them, at others because they were worm eaten or rotten. In war time, some were taken by the English or Spaniards, three in 1744, and eight in 1745. Indeed, more than one third of all the vessels whose fate is noted in the Lorient records fell into the hands of the English.[11]

The crews of these vessels were made up primarily of Breton sailors, many of them conscripted. In addition, a considerable number of Dutchmen were employed, and a scattering of Genoese, Maltese, Portugese, Swedes, and Venetians. So great was the drain on the man power of Brittany that in 1740 Maurepas ordered the Company to employ "novices," one for each ten sailors, that there might in time be trained seamen to replace those who died in the Company's service. In the East the crews were supplemented by Lascars or native sailors. They were frequently used on boats going to the Isles, but only rarely on vessels bound for Europe. They were unwilling servants, save for coasting trade in India. They feared that if they were taken beyond Indian waters it was for the purpose of enslaving them. Therefore it was in the interests of peace and order not to employ them save when absolutely necessary.[12]

The Lascars were about the poorest paid of all the Company's sailors, receiving six roupies or fifteen livres a month; and only half of this was paid them if they were enlisted for service to Europe, the other half going to their wives. Only the *mousses,* or

novices received less, seven livres ten sol a month. French sailors were paid only a little more than the Lascars, the maximum being twenty-five livres a month. Board was of course furnished. Supplies were sold at Lorient and on shipboard at very reasonable rates, usually on credit. Shirts sold for two livres eight sol; blue smocks for one livre, eighteen sol; and trousers for one livre thirteen sol.[13]

The crews were not a particularly well satisfied lot. Hesitancy to enlist in the Company's service is evidence of the fact that life on its vessels was unattractive. Cruelty on the part of some officers is to be noted; mutiny was rare, but occassionally broke out; desertions, while less frequent than from the army, also occurred. Yet efforts were made to safeguard the sailors. Orders relating to the crew had to be permanently posted at the foot of the mainmast; thus an unscrupulous officer would have no pretext for meting out punishment for innocent violation of ordinances. Moreover copies of the naval regulations were supposed to be in the hands of each major officer so that he would know the limits of his jurisdiction. Compared with many a seaman of the day, the sailors of the Company fared well. Pay was small but sure; the family received a regular income during the voyage; clothing was furnished on credit; and port permits gave them a personal interest in the safe return of the vessel to Europe.[14]

A ship's officers included the captain, a first and second lieutenant, a first and second ensign, a purser, a master, a pilot, a surgeon and an almoner. The captain had to report to the Company the conduct of his subalterns. A similar check was kept on his activities and ability by requiring the councillors who had dealings with him to report to the directors in as great detail as possible. The greater part of these officers were capable employees. Many of them were trained by the Company and advanced from subordinate posts. They had a personal interest in the safety of their vessels as the majority of them had on board funds or goods equivalent to several years wages. The fact that the King incorporated them into the Royal Navy when the Company was suppressed, with the same rank that they had held indicates their general capacity.[15] Yet they were not without their defects. Bernardin

de St. Pierre felt that there was too much insubordination among them. Dupleix, too, criticised them. The frequent loss of vessels he attributed to lack of care in the choice of officers, a plaint he was wont to make also of the commercial and administrative officials. Occassionally the morals of the officers gave the Company cause for worry. A little contraband trade was to be expected, and frequently an officer who was suspected of engaging in such practice continued in the service unquestioned. But when their conduct toward passengers was unbecoming the issue was of a different nature. In 1754 Captain Raucourt coming from Bengal was fined 1200 livres for alleged misconduct. Dame Rose had complained that as a passenger she had been overcharged 500 roupies, and in addition she accused the captain of "insults, bad treatment and indecent conduct" toward her. The fine ostensibly was intended as an example to other officers; in point of fact it simply served to recompense the lady for the excess passage money collected from her. Raucourt, in common with many another officer, probably had his friends at court or among the Company's directors.[16]

The number of petty officers varied with the size of the vessel. Among them were the boatswain, second mate, ship's carpenter and his assistant, the assistant pilot and the master mariner. It was the intention of the Company that officers other than the captains, be sent to different ports on successive voyages so that in time they would know all the routes. There were also some "non-marine" officers, the assistant surgeons, the captain-at-arms, the cooper, the armorer, and the *maître valet* or *cambusier*—the latter of the captain's own choosing ordinarily.[17]

Two of the officers one would scarcely expect to find aboard an eighteenth century sailing vessel, the surgeon and the almoner. Yet both are regularly listed in the extant records. Some vessels carried several student assistants to whom the surgeon was to give an hour's instruction daily. He was required to give an exact account of all treatments administered. The students likewise kept case records to be shown to the port doctor. They had also to secure a certificate of conduct from the officers, and a statement from the chief surgeon as to what he had taught them.[18]

The almoners doubtless served a useful purpose, but their usual activities received little or no mention in the records, their shortcomings and lapses alone attracting occassional attention. For example, the Sieur François Blanchard, demoted by the Governor of the Isle of France, had previously held the post of almoner on another of the Company's vessels, and had there so misconducted himself that the Company dared not even repeat the details in writing to the Lorient director about the matter.[19] Missionaries at times laid charges against the almoners. They claimed that some of the priests from vessels calling at the Isles of France and Bourbon comported themselves very badly, staying with all manner of persons, had no fixed abode, and appeared only in secular attire. Governor Lenoir wrote of them, "the Company ought not to embark the almoners on its vessels without at least knowing they are of good morals." He pointed out that among the recent arrivals was one who had caused a continuous scandal by his discourse "sans pudeur et sans religion"—and that among a ship's crew! Pious people, these Breton sailors must have been in the eighteenth century![20]

Regulations of 1747[21] established a definite plan for admission into and promotion within the corps of officers. Thereafter the lowest rank was that of second ensign, a post which could be filled only by one who had had some experience as a sailor. Prior to that time supernumerary ensigns had been in the service, but had served no useful purpose. The number of captains was fixed at twenty six. Death and retirement were to be allowed to reduce them to this number, rather than discharge. Other ranks among the major officers contained thirty-two to forty incumbents.

A military detachment of perhaps eight or ten men in peace time, as large as one hundred when re-enforcements were being despatched to the East in time of war, was to be found aboard practically every India bound vessel. Under normal conditions these men were drawn from the garrison at Lorient. In war time they might be raw recruits who were trained on shipboard. The soldiers enjoyed much the same privileges as the sailors, the only real difference being that they had a tobacco allowance which was denied the crew.[22]

Passengers were to be found on many of the vessels, althoug their number was never very large. *En route* for India these in cluded primarily employees of the Company and missionaries. O the return trip there might be some individuals who were bein sent home as prisoners, and some sailors who, stranded in Indi preferred to return home as passengers rather than await the tim when they might work their way. No one could be taken on boar by the Captain without the Company's consent. A fine of on thousand livres might be imposed for violation of this rule. Having adopted the policy of transporting missionaries free c charge, the Company sometimes found itself beset with numerou demands for passage. De Brisacier, writing in behalf of the *Sem naire des Missions Etrangères* pointed out that the Company ha refused the seminary's request for transportation for two of it members, on the grounds that passage had already been promise many persons, including four Jesuits and two Capucins. He sug gested that two of the places be given the Seminarists, and wa even willing to pay for their passage. Apparently the request wa not granted, as none of the missionaries listed among those give passage in 1725 are Seminarists.[24]

Stowaways were an almost ever present problem.[25] Captain were instructed to make a careful search of their vessels immed ately before leaving Lorient. If any were found after that, the were to be put to work receiving neither pay nor the wine an liquor ration. They were to be left in charge of the Council a the first port of call in the Company's possessions, imprisoned, an returned at the first opportunity to France. On the return tri there was frequently a very large number of stowaways due to th fact that vessels were condemned in the East, and the sailor sought a speedier return home than the councils were willing t grant. Contract laborers or artisians, tiring of India, followed th same tactics. These men, when they returned in large numbers– eighteen of them on one occassion—were allowed to stay i France.

The voyages were long hazardous undertakings, so it was d sirable that careful preparations be made.[26] Almost a comple change of rigging, masts, and sails was carried. Lumber, leath

and iron for replacements and repairs, firewood and charcoal for the kitchen, instruments and tools of many kinds, signals, even paper, pens and ink were all stocked. Much of this material was bought in Europe, but certain commodities were secured in India. Redwood was cheap and plentiful there and could be used for repairs; cables made of kaire or cocoanut fibre were also purchased there. These were considered more durable than hemp, so in 1735 the Company ordered[27] that each returning vessel bring from India one such cable, eighteen to twenty inches in circumference, and at least one hundred and twenty "arms" in length. Sails, for all that much cloth was manufactured in the East, were purchased in Europe, as they could be procured in India only at great expense. Most of the sailcloth was obtained at Locornan.[28] Foodstuffs, in some cases in sufficient quantity for eighteen months consumption were also embarked. D'Albert's journal relating to the voyage of the *Syrene*, 1724-26, lists among the supplies flour, biscuit, salt pork and beef, dried fish, pickled heads and feet, cheese, dried peas, beans, rice, olive oil, vinegar, salt, and wine of several kinds. For the Captain's table and for the use of sick sailors there was in addition beef on the hoof, pigs, sheep, various sorts of fowl, hams, pickled beef and pork tongues, eggs, almonds, sugar, butter, lard, olives, dried fruits, and grain, hay and straw for the beasts and birds. Much of the fresh food was taken on at Cadiz.

It is interesting to note the quantities of supplies taken aboard. The *St. Contest*,[29] with two hundred and twenty-five persons aboard, had among other things 18,000 pounds of flour, 36,300 pounds of biscuit, and 11,568 pints of *eau de vie*. Wine there was in abundance; 35 barrels of Bordeaux, 13 of Agez, 6 of Saintes, 11 of Celte, and 33 of Nantes. Then there was 11,000 pounds of salted beef. Some commodities, every day necessities in the average present day family, appear only in small quantities—eggs, 24 dozen; sugar, 60 pounds; and butter, 63 pounds—and these were for the use of the sick only. A considerable quantity of drugs and chemicals had to be shipped for the surgeons' use.[30] The Company had printed lists of the remedies usually carried, totaling

about 160 different varieties. But the forms as filled out indicat that all were not carried at all times.

Wines had to be inspected by the officers to see that they wer of good quality and properly packed. A check was made at regu lar intervals to see that leakage and evaporation were not excess ive. If this were neglected, the captain, first lieutenant and purse were held share and share alike for the loss. The officers, es pecially the purser, had also to keep a careful watch over the con sumption of foodstuffis. Fifteen days prior to the date of depart ure from India a report was made to the Council so that any nec essary supplies might be secured. It was customary to carry suffi cient supplies for a normal return trip, plus one month. The use o refreshments intended for sick sailors at the Captain's table wa one particular abuse that had to be prevented. Officers foun guilty of tolerating such a practice might have their salary and por permit goods confiscated for the benefit of the crew.[31]

There was considerable trouble keeping food in a useable con dition on shipboard. For all that an extensive list of living bird and beasts appears among the supplies of the *Syrene,* there wa usually a great scarcity of fresh food. Sickness, especially scurvy forced many a vessel to make a call at the Isles, the Cape of Goo Hope, or St. Helena for fresh meat and vegetables, which "gav great pleasure to the sick and served to restore them to health i time."[32] Despite the care taken, complaints were at times mad about the quality of the food. "Our biscuits are very hard an often cause scurvy of the gums. I have seen the English, after a eight months voyage from Europe to India, have their soft biscu which was very good—" wrote one critic of the Company. Win too, was sometimes unsatisfactory, "fit only for vinegar" is th notation made of some of it left over at the end of a trip. Ver little food remained by the time Lorient was sighted, and oddl enough, not infrequently it was the delicacies such as butter an olive oil of which there was a surplus. The foodstuffs obtaine in India seemed to lack body and nourishing qualities, so in 173 the Company ordered that a double meat ration be given the crew when they were in Indian ports.[33]

The cargo on the outward trip was scant. Gold or silver made up the greater part from the standpoint of value. Foodstuffs for the round trip and for the Eastern posts, and ballast took up considerable space; merchandise, only a small fraction. The *Duc de Bourbon* in 1744 carried a cargo apportioned thus; ballast merchandise, including lead, anchors, nails, and coal, 179 tons; foodstuffs for India, 244 tons; merchandise for sale, 33 tons; and foodstuffs, beverages, etc., for the crew, 270 tons. Water usually made up nearly half the tonnage of supplies for the crew. Iron, rather than sand or rock was used as ballast in the local trade in the East when any was available. Old cannon and scrap iron for which there was no market at Pondicherry could be sold in some quarters such as Manilla.[34]

The placing of the cargo was entrusted to the ship's master. The crew was limited as to baggage. Officers were allowed a trunk 42″ x 16″ x 16″ as maximum size. Two sailors had to share one such box. The presence of one of the directors of the Company at Lorient was a reasonable safeguard that a vessel would carry the cargo it should, and the smallness of the merchandise shipments to the East obviated any particular worry about there being insufficient space. On the return trip it was otherwise. The captains felt that they need not subordinate themselves to the Indian councillors; that they, not landsmen, should determine the amount of cargo to be carried. It was much easier to reserve space for illicit embarkations under such circumstances! To correct abuses of this nature the Company issued the following instructions in 1735. The council was to demand a statement from the captain that the vessel was filled to capacity if there proved to be more goods than it would apparently hold. On the other hand the council was to give the captain a statement that it could furnish no more goods in case the vessel were not completely filled up for the return trip. Despite these precautions there were times when the councils and the Company alike had occassion to complain of the state of the cargo when it arrived in India or Europe.[35]

Elaborate sailing instructions were issued to the captains including extracts from the journals of earlier navigators with reference to currents, winds, and best routes. If several vessels were

sailing together, there was provision made for the conduct o each in case of separation, together with signals to be used at sea Special orders had to be issued to vessels bound direct for Bengal as they had the troublesome Ganges to navigate. In war time th Comptroller General also issued instructions, more particularly with regard to conduct toward foreigners than to actual problem of navigation. The captain was duty bound to follow all thes orders. If some unforseen circumstance forced him to deviat from them, he could do so only on the advice of the other officers Later the Company would decide if the motive for the change wer valid, and if not, what punishment should be meted out.[36]

In some instances the vessels sailed from Europe as a squadron but usually this was not the case, especially in peace time. Squad ron sailings were not very satisfactory, for the slowest ship set th speed for all, and there was the not unusual occurrence of being separated by storms, or in rounding the Cape of Good Hope The sailing season governed the time of departure. Eastbound the Cape could not be rounded in January, February or March and it was only in these three months that westward passage wa feasible. Consequently departures were made primarily in Decem ber, January, February and March, that ships might reach th Cape at the most favorable time for eastward sailing—June, Jul or August. Westbound vessels were obliged to leave Pondicherr before February tenth, and it was desirable that they sail earlie lest they be delayed and fail to round the Cape, thereby bein forced to the Isles of France and Bourbon for an unprofitabl winter. A check made of a considerable number of sailings fro Lorient gave the following results; 19 departures in January, 2 in February, 29 in March, 7 in April, 7 in May, 4 in June, 1 i July, 3 in August, 2 in September, 13 in October, 16 in Novembe and 23 in December. Sailing in season the trip could be mad in six to eight months; out of season it might take as long as fou teen months, so there was little to be gained by summer departure There was no regularity as to the length of the voyage. The *Ly* and the *Triton* sailing together from Lorient January 15, 173 arrived at Pondicherry the one in July and the other in Septembe Nor did the same vessel make the trip in the same time on diffe

ent occassions. The record for the *Lys* for three different voyages is as follows:

Date	Leave Lorient	Arrive Pondicherry	Leave Pondicherry	Arrive Lorient
1737	15 January	10 September	15 February	3 September
1739	12 December	26 July	17 October	5 May
1742	4 January	26 June	26 January	24 July

This gives us a record trip east and west of slightly under six months. In a cursory check of the records the quickest trip eastbound which was noted was that of the *Neptune* which sailed from Lorient to Pondicherry in four months twenty seven days in 1743-44. The *Philibert,* which left Chandernagor November 30, 1737 and reached Lorient May 23 following made the quickest home voyage.[37]

Navigation guides which were of value were few and inadequate. The French at first used Portugese maps, but they were none too accurate, and were available only in manuscript form. In time the English and Dutch improved on them and had them engraved. It was these which were chiefly used in the middle eighteenth century. Numerous corrections were made by the French navigators engaged in local Asiatic trade, but these appeared only on individual maps or were noted only in individual journals. Mannevillette by 1742 had made a study of these corrected maps and journal notes and drew up a memoir on navigation which he presented to the Company.[38] Just what use was made of it has not been determined, but in any event shipwrecks occurred with approximately the same frequency thereafter.

One of the most treacherous pieces of water to navigate was the Ganges, with its constantly shifting channel. The French and English both maintained a number of river pilots. The former had an outpost in the vicinity of Balassor where the pilots awaited vessels from Europe, sometimes for a month or more, exposed to the wind and many inconveniences. Either Company might use the pilots of the other, taking on one of its own men if in the course of the trip one were encountered. The foreign pilot was guaranteed full pay even if relieved. Dupleix in his correspon-

dence refers to a payment of eight hundred roupies to an English pilot. This we may assume to be the fee for one trip. Considering that it usually lasted well over a week (in one instance forty days were required for the down trip) and that a pilot ordinarily brought along some assistant pilots and native sailors, this fee appears to be reasonable.[39] At times some of the pilots tried to simplify their work by declaring the river unnavigable for ocean going vessels, and demanding that goods be trans-shipped in river boats. This met with the approval of neither the Company nor the councils. In 1734 the Company insisted[40] that the council see to it that boats were brought right up to Chandernagor as that was the only way a check could be kept on the crew to safeguard their health and prevent desertion. Moreover, to leave the vessels at Coulpy, Folta or Salica in the lower reaches of the river would occassion additional expense, and expose their goods to the mercies of river boats and boatmen. A school for pilots was maintained at Chandernagor, and about 1740 the council began the practice of marking the channel with buoys. Toward the close of his administration at Chandernagor Dupleix ordered an investigation into ways and means of safeguarding the Ganges navigation, but it met with no success.[41]

The routes[42] followed by vessels in the trip from Europe to India usually took them some fifty leagues west of Cape Finistere, close to the Madeiras, and to the west of or between the Canaries. Cape Blanc was passed by thirty leagues off shore. Thence they bore southward between the Verdes and the mainland to 7° N., thence S.S.E. to the Equator which was crossed about 15° west of Greenwich (although in the records of the day Cape Tenerife is the standard meridian). If the winds were favorable they passed via Ascension Island to the Cape; if unfavorable, they might be forced over to the Brazilian coast before being able to head south east. Once the Cape had been rounded there were sevral routes which might be followed. A fairly direct course for the southern tip of Ceylon might be tried, but ordinarily this was not attempted. More usual was it to go via. the Mozambique channel to the Comoros, thence N.N.E. to 65° E. longitude, crossing the Equator almost due north of the Seychelles. North of the Equator there

were favorable winds only from April to September. If they could be utilized the passage was fairly easy, due east from about 14° N. to the Malabar coast. Another much used route was that which lay from the Cape to the Isles of France and Bourbon. From there India could be reached by one of three ways. The shortest of these, called "Boscawen," carried a bit to the north of the Isles and then directly across the Indian Ocean. The other two, called respectively "Grand" and "Petit" were used each in its own season, the former from September to May, the latter from May to August. Both of them passed clase to Madagascar, the "Grand" bearing a bit further to the west than did the "Petit," but avoiding all the islands of the archipelago north of Madagascar. Either route gave a deviation of at least three hundred and twenty leagues from a beeline course.

On the routes regularly used the French had a number of ports of call where fresh meat, vegetables and water could be secured. Cadiz was frequently visited, primarily to get bullion. One of the ports of the Isle of France or Bourbon was the next regular stop, although many a vessel got supplies at one point or another before reaching there. The Isle of France, the pride and glory of La Bourdonnais, was extensively developed by him in the 1730s. All things necessary for assisting a vessel were made ready by him, even to an hotel for the ship's officers. Wood and water were there in abundance, and especial means were provided so that they could be transferred to the waiting vessels in the minimum of time. A survey of fifty two voyages from France to India shows the following stops to have been made; at Tenerife, L'Ile Grande, All Saints Bay, Senegal, and St. Croix, one; two at Bordeaux; five at the Cape of Good Hope; seven at Goree; ten at Cadiz; seventeen at St. Yago; and practically all vessels stopped at the Isles of France and Bourbon. St. Helena was at times used as a port of call on the outward trip, but more frequently on the return voyage. Westbound vessels regularly called at the Isles, the Cape, L'Ascension, and St. Paul de Loande.[43]

The Company naturally encouraged the use of the Isles and discouraged the use of foreign ports such as St. Helena in view of possible war. But the captains liked to call at the latter as the

passage around the Cape was nearly always strenuous. La Bourdonnais complained that some of them purposely took on few supplies at Port Louis that they might have a good pretext for stopping at St. Helena. In 1737 he required that henceforth the captains sign a statement that they had been furnished with all the foodstuffs they needed.[44] At times the Isles were the winter quarters of the Company's vessels, for unless the Cape were rounded in season it was necessary to put back to them. The loss of the ship's service interest on the investment in the cargo and wages would all tend to add considerably to the expenses of that particular voyage. So vessels despatched from India late in January or in February were usually ordered not to call at the Isles. Even this precaution did not always result in their clearing the Cape. Indeed, five vessels spent the winter of 1752-53 at the Isles. Their failure to return in 1753 was the final cause for Godeheu's journey to India, and the recall of Dupleix. Combined with other circumstances, this led the Company to believe that Dupleix's military policy had resulted in some great disaster in India.[45]

Detailed accounts were kept of a vessel's activities. Many of the records of loading and unloading the cargo, the rolls of the crew, and the payments made to them are preserved at Lorient; but information as to what happened during the voyages is scarce.[46] There are a few papers relating to purchases made *en route,* the death of sailors, and the disposition of their goods, but the logs have almost entirely disappeared. Scarce as are some types of records, we can nevertheless determine fairly accurately what documents were prepared for any particular voyage. There were records of the conscription or enlistment of the crew; a log was kept; the purser made up a detailed report of the consumption of supplies; on the return to Lorient, record of the disembarkation was made; the captain sent an account of the voyage to the Company, and the arrival of the vessel was reported to the Minister of Marine by officials of both the Company and the royal navy. The records of the crew were very elaborate. Five provisional rolls were compiled before the vessel sailed, for the purser, the naval officials at Port Louis in whose district many of the sailors were

recruited or conscripted, the admiralty officials, the treasurer of the fund for invalid sailors, and lastly, the Lorient office. By 1759 the number of rolls had increased to eleven. Three additional ones, for Lorient, Paris, and the agent of the Company who made payments to the families of sailors had to be compiled every six months during the course of the voyage. The discharge of the crew occassioned eight more. These records were comprehensive, having columns for the sailor's name, residence, rank, time of service, wages, deductions for advances made before sailing, for the fund for invalids, for payments to his family, for pay received during the voyage, for supplies furnished either by the Company or from the belongings of deceased sailors, and for funds sent into the department to which he was destined. Other records of a composite nature were kept, such as the year by year accounts of arrivals and departures at Lorient. In the Marine Library at Paris there is a manuscript volume containing a record of practically all the voyages made to India by vessels in the service of Law's Company. From its brief entries one may learn the number of vessels going to India in any given period, the duration of their voyages, their calls *en route,* and the number of campaigns in which any one ship was engaged.

Little is known of life on shipboard. It is a subject about which even the verbose Dupleix and La Bourdonnais make little comment, nor have officers of the day left accounts of life as they found it. The description which follows is based on the most fragmentary materials. What the quarters of the crew were like we do not know, except for Bernardin de St. Pierre's statement that they were a "prison ténébreuse où l'on ne voit goutte." Officers had their quarters on a higher level than the crew, in the superstructure characteristic of naval architecture of the day. From here they could watch the crew as they worked on the deck. Here too was the *grande chambre* which served to accommodate passengers and was at the same time used as a dining saloon.[47]

Meals were of three varieties, technically known as *a la table, a l'office* and *ration.* The first class passengers and major officers ate at the Captain's table which he furnished at his own expense. Passengers traveling in the Company's service and officers

had their board paid by the Company, while others made their own arrangements with the Captain until 1751. Then, due to complaints made of excessive charges, the Company fixed the price at thirty five sol per diem per capita for its employees, and forty sol for other passengers. Children under ten of employees paid half price. The Company's allowance for the board of its naval officers was not an unvarying one. For a long time prior to 1751 it had been twenty five sol. In 1740 it was raised to forty sol, but reduced to thirty five in 1743. Due to the high cost of living, the rate was again established at forty in 1755.[48] At the Captain's table fresh meat was served, and since flour was used in preparation of the meals we may assume that fresh biscuit or bread, rather than the product of the Lorient bakery was provided. Naturally there was a tendency for the Captain to be parsimonious. If he could save a bit of the forty sol per capita allowed him, he was in pocket just that amount. Nor did the officers care to complain to the Company for they knew that the Captain was required to make a report about each of them and would probably denounce any who criticized his table. Nevertheless[49] some complaints were made. In 1754 one of the Captains who, contrary to the Company's regulations, sold at the Isle of France some 7,000 livres worth of supplies which should have been used at his table was suspended from the service for three years.

The petty officers had a table of their own. At it were to be found at times some passengers and non commissioned officers attached to the Company's military forces. This table was run at the expense of the Company. Passengers eating here, *à l'office*, paid considerably less than *à la table*, the rate being ewenty or twenty five sol in 1751. The fare was less pretentious; there was no fresh bread, save at ports of call, but one did receive pickled feet, delicacies not accorded the crew. These latter ate at the *ration*, along with troops and an occassional passenger who was traveling in the equivalent of present day steerage.[50] Even the humblest sailor received his daily wine and liquor allowance, although there were no delicacies unless one were ill, and even then there was no assurance of fresh food, for it is recorded that the

beasts and birds taken along frequently died before they found their sea legs.[51]

Spoilage of food was to be expected. In fact the Company figured on losing ten per cent on the outward trip, although for some unknown reason it allowed for only six per cent on the return from Pondicherry.[52] Food which was spoiling was to be used in preference to good were it at all edible and not dangerous to health. As the officers were held responsible for loss above a certain amount, it can well be imagined that little was wasted. When it was necessary to throw overboard some decayed matter, careful record was kept. Such depletion of supplies and unusual delays en route might force a reduction in the rations. Then entries appear in the records of sums due the officers and crew as additional pay on this account. Water as well as food often ran short or was polluted. An unusual number of sick meant that much water would be used. The Company consistantly placed reliance in wooden barrels which at times leaked. Suggestions for the use of lead containers were made, but nothing came of these. A little water in addition to that taken on board was secured by gathering rain as it fell in torrential storms.[53]

No provision was made for the entertainment of the crew. The French sailor of today whiles away his spare time gambling over a game of dominoes. Such simple pastimes doubtless held their attention in the eighteenth century also. Divine service was probably the only regular break in the week's routine. Crossing the Line was the high spot of the trip. Then the sailors and passengers on their first voyage to India were "baptized" after an elaborate ceremony. There was little or no opportunity for recreation in the evening as lights, save in the Captain's quarters and as signals, were forbidden after half past seven. The sale of tobacco was specifically forbidden lest it pave the way for the introduction of the sale of wine and liquor.[54]

On arrival in India the crew had shore leave, and turned it to very bad account. A memoir written in 1751 refers to the sailors as very libertine, drinking native beverages to excess and then consorting with women "empoissonées de verole et de lepre." The crews thus weakened suffered a heavy mortality *en route* for

Europe. At times their inability to round the Cape was due to this fact. Doubtless some did suffer from debauchery, but at Pondicherry at least a fairly careful check was kept on the sale of intoxicants. Moreover, sailors found wandering about after a given hour were subject to imprisonment for the night, and in the morning was sent aboard ship where their own officers dealt with the case. Anyone who left the limits of the Company's territory was regarded as a deserter and was subject to severe punishment. Those who took unauthorized shore leave lost a month's pay. The officers spent some time ashore; those guilty of taking illegal leave were subject to suspension. At all times two thirds of the officers had to be aboard ship. Dupleix while at Chandernagor wrote the Company that officers from a dozen vessels came annually to partake of his hospitality, a circumstance which rendered his 4,000 livres salary quite insufficient.[55]

The health of the crew was seldom very good, due largely to the lack of fresh food causing scurvy. Venereal disease was also prevalent as a result of the loose living in India. These two were the most usual diseases, plus a certain amount of seasickness. Scurvy was certainly the most costly ill. The *Lys* lost fifty two men from its attack during the course of a single voyage to India and back in 1727-28. In addition, over eighty of the crew were ill at the time of their arrival at Lorient. The record of the *Jupiter* ten years later is even worse, sixty deaths, fifty seven of them caused by scurvy. This led the Minister of Marine to suggest that the Company was not furnishing sufficient fresh food for the sailors. D'Espremenil in a reply to the minister stated that the intemperance of the sailors coupled with the hardships of a long campaign were more probably the cause.[56]

The personal effects of dead sailors were not kept to be turned over to their families, but were disposed of by the purser to such members of the crew as cared to buy them. The resulting funds were of course regarded as part of the sailor's estate. Some of the men made wills on their death beds, the almoner usually acting as witness. Ordinarily the bequests were to some religious foundation in Brittany, and occassionally to the almoner himself who would be invited to pray for the soul of the testator.[57]

1. IP, I, Regulations of the Company 1733 governing its fleet. This is in printed form, of which however but a single example has been seen, at Lorient. A manuscript copy exists at the Bib. Nat. A.F.F., 7799.
2. Weber, *La Compagnie des Indes,* p. 517; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 9090, D'Albert's Journal; this document, and the Regulations of 1733 (cf. note 1) have been of particular value in the preparation of this chapter; Arch. Col., C2, 74, fol. 176, 177, a description of the Lys; plans on a very small scale showing some of the vessels of the French Co. are found in Crepin, *Mahé de La Bourdonnais,* p. 304, and Martineau, *Dupleix,* II, 288.
3. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8993, Godeheu's Journal of his trip to India gives a little idea of the sailing practices of the 18th century.
4. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9354, fol. 237 *seq.*
5. Arch. Col., C2, 34, fols. 39, 40, of Montaran's Memoir of 1748; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9359, fol. 390, Deliberations of Co., 1755; Arch. Lorient, IP, 70, fols. 1-21; *Ibid.*, series IP, MSS. Catalogue; Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 498 gives the table from the *Dictionary of Commerce.*
6. Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 520-25.
7. Arch. Col., C2, 40, fol. 41 *re.* privelege of cutting crown reserve timber for vessels; Arch. Lorient, IP2, 72, fol. 3, *re.* construction at St. Malo; *Ibid.*, 94, fol. 181-205 indicates place of construction of the company's vessels, 1725; Arch Col., C2, 28, fol. 288, Delib. of Co. 1739 *re.* construction in the East; for origin of vessels, see Arch. Col., C2, 23, fol. 54; 24, fol. 84, 88; and Arch. Lorient, IP, 72, fol. 8, 170, fol. 169.
8. Arch. Lorient, P2, 10, Co. to Godeheu, February 3, 1755, *re.* delivery of vessels.
9. *Ibid.*, 72, fol. 11; C.S.P.V., I, 259, 276, II, 13, 44, 67, 236, 267; III, 75, 165; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 218, Delib. of Co., 1735.
10. C.S.P.V., II, 76-77; Arch. Col., C2, 25, fol. 182 of La Bourdonnais' Memoir.
11. Arch. Marine, B3, 391, fol. 188; Arch. S. et O., E, 3755, Dupleix to Barthelmy, March 10, 1753; C.S.P.V., I, 379, 396; II, 138, 163, 164; III, 46, 176; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8982, fol. 13, Dupleix to Godeheu, January 12, 1739; Arch. Col., C2, 31, fol. 314; Arch. Lorient, Catalogue Series IP.
12. Arch. Lorient, IP, 120, *liasse* 10; 127, pc. 10; 135, *liasse* 10; 140, *liasse* 9; 191, fol. 594; 278, *liasse* 3; 296, *liasse* 3; C.S.C.C., III, 368; P. Co., IV, 334.
13. Arch. Lorient, IP, 140, *liasse* 3, 9; Arch. Nat., ADix 385, fol. 145, Royal Ordinance of November, 1744 *re.* novices; Arch. Lorient, IP, 101, 40; *Ibid.*, 123, *liasse* 5; Arch. Col., C2, 28, fol. 28, order by Maurepas *re.* sailor's pay.
14. Arch. Marine, B3, 337, Bigot de la Mothe to Minister of Marine, February 24, 1724; *Ibid.*, 330, fol. 90, Comte du Voliver to Minister of Marine, October 14, 1729, *re.* treatment of sailors; Arch. Col., C2, 73, fol. 38, Superior Council to the Co., October 15, 1724; Arch. Lorient, IP, I.
15. Arch. Lorient, IP, I; Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 532.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 533; Arch. Lorient, P2, 70, fol. 34, Delib. of Co., 1754.
17. Arch. Lorient, IP, I; 188, fol. 526, typical crew; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9228, fol. 190 *seq.*, Memoir of 1741.
18. Arch. Lorient, P2, 71, Instructions to surgeons.
19. *Ibid.*, IP, 32, fol. I, Co. to Godeheu, August 22, 1755.

20. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9341, fol. 181, Missionary at the Isles of France and Bourbon to Archbishop of Paris, 1750; Arch. Col., F5A, 19, letter by Lenoir July 25, 1728.
21. *Ibid.*, C2, 33, fol. 224 *seq.*
22. Arch. Lorient, IP, 138, fol. 2; 140, *liasse* 4.
23. *Ibid.*, IP, I; 131, *liasse* 7, fol. 33; *Ibid.*, IP2, 69, *liasse* 2, fols. 87-88, Delib. of Co., 1751; Arch. Col., F3, 238, fol. 507, Marine regulations, 1729; *Ibid.*, C2, 27, fol. 20, Delib. of Co., 1736; C.S.P.V., III, 23. As an example of the number of passengers carried by the Company, the records of 1748-49 show that the *Montaran,* China bound, carried 7 to the Isle of France, 5 being employees of the Co.; the *Duc de Bethune,* likewise bound for China, carried 3 all the way, and dropped 6 at the Isles; *La Paix,* Pondicherry, carried 4 there, and 3 to Bengal; the *Comte D'Argenson,* destination the Isle of France, carried 9 there, 7 more for the Isle of Bourbon, and 1 for Pondicherry; the *Dauphin,* for Bengal, brought 5 to the Isle of Bourbon; and the *Triton* carried 7 to India. Arch. Lorient, IP2, 60.
24. Arch. Col., Inde 2, IV, De Brisacier to the Co., November, 1725.
25. Arch. Lorient, IP, 70, fol. 43, Company's orders *re.* stoaways; *Ibid.*, 278, *liasse* 3, doc. 65, Co. to Duvelaer, August 21, 1741; Arch. Col., C2, 28, fol. 283, Delib. of Co., 1739; Arch. Marine, B3, 396, fol. 75, Marias to Minister of Marine, May 23, 1740; *Ibid.*, B2, 305, fol. 84, Minister of Marine to D'Espremenil, July 17, 1738.
26. Arch. Lorient, IP, 245, *liasse* 27; Arch. Marine, B3, 391, fol. 135, Marias to Minister of Marine, January 12, 1739; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 9090.
27. Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 220, Delib. of Co. 1735.
28. *Ibid.*, 82, fol. 386, Council at Chandernagor, to the Co., September 30, 1750; Arch Lorient., P2, 69, fol. 68.
29. Arch. Lorient, IP, 144, *liasse* 6.
30. *Ibid.*, P2, 72, fol. 9.
31. *Ibid.*, IP, I; Arch. Col., C2, 81, fol. 348, accounts of inspection of wine in India. P. Co., I, 158.
32. Arch. Lorient, IP, 130, *liasse* 2, fol. 8, 25; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 143.
33. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9344, fol. 171 article 6 of the Co's. regulations *re.* the Isles of France and Bourbon; Arch. Lorient, IP, 123, *liasse* 11; *Ibid.*, P2, 71, fol. 36; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 217, Delib. of Co., 1735.
34. Martineau, *Dupleix,* II, 212, gives typical cargo list with the tonnage for each commodity; C.S.P.V., I, 321; III, 142.
35. Arch. Lorient, IP, I; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 223, Delib. of Co., 1735; Lest damage be done the cargo, the Company at the same time ordered the Captains to see to it that the holds of the ships be made water tight, Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 218, Delib. of Co., 1735.
36. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 9090, fol. 197, 243; Arch. Col., C2, 31, fol. 320, Orry to La Bourdonnais, April 13, 1745; *Ibid.*, 74, fol. 7-16, Instructions to Desboisclairs, 1724; Arch. Lorient, IP, I.
37. For squadron sailings, see Arch. Col., C2, 22, fol. 93; 31, fol. 319; 33, fol. 286; 74, fol. 7-16; For seasons, see Bib. Marine, MSS. vol. 230; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9145, fol. 263; Length of voyage, Bib. Marine, MSS., vol. 230; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9357, fol. 141, letter by Captain de la Salle of the *Philibert,* May 23, 1738.
38. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9345, fol. 294, Memoir by Mannevillette, 1742; *Ibid.*, 9228, fol. 177-187, *Instructions abrégées concernant la navigation d'Europe aux Indes et le retour des Indes en Europe.*

39. *Ibid.*, A.F.F., 8979, fol. 60-61, Dupleix to Stackhouse October 20, 1732; 8982, Dupleix to Dumas, March 6, 1739; Arch. Col., C2, 37, fol. 47, Memoir of 1751.
40. Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 31, Delib. of Co., 1734.
41. *Ibid.*, 29, fol. 199, Delib. of Co., 1741; 30, fol. 30, Delib. of Co., 1742; The Company also sent out pilots from France. C.S.C.C., I, 149.
42. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8933, fol. 300-01; 9345, fol. 203, 290.
43. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9344, fol. 212, 213, La Bourdonnais' Memoir to Orry, 1740; *Quarterly Review*, V, 236; Bib. Marine, MSS, vol. 230.
44. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9344, fol. 213, La Bourdonnais' Memoir, 1740.
45. Martineau, *Dupleix*, IV, 406-07.
46. Arch. Lorient, IP, *passim; Ibid.*, P2, 68, doc. 3, 4; 78, fol. 4-6; Bib. Marine, MSS vol. 230; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9228, fol. 188, Memoir by an ex-purser of the Co., 1747.
47. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 534 quotes St. Pierre; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8993, Godeheu's *Journal*.
48. Arch. Lorient, P2, 69, *liasse* I, fol. 34, Delib. of Co., 1740; *Ibid.*, *liasse* 2, fol. 87-88, Delib. of Co., 1751; 70, fol. 36, Delib. of Co., 1755; *Ibid.*, IP, 278, *liasse* 3, fol. 119, 128.
49. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9228, fol. 197, Memoir of 1747; Arch. Lorient, P2, 70, fol. 33, Delib. of Co., 1754.
50. Arch| Lorient, P2, 69, *liasse* 2, fol. 87-88; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 9090, fol. 12-13, D'Albert's Journal.
51. *Ibid.;* Arch. Col., C2, 74, fol. 150; Arch. Marine, B3, 391, fol. 75, De Vincelles to Minister of Marine, August 19, 1738.
52. Arch. Lorient, IP, I; 144, *liasse* 8.
53. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 9090.
54. *Ibid.*, 8993, fol. 7, *re.* Divine service. It would appear from a discharge certificte issued by the bureau at Lorient to the Abbé Drean that there were portable altars on at least some of the vessels, Arch. Lorient, IP, 140, *liasse* 3; Log of the *Jason*, Bib. Marine, MSS vol. 5106; Activities of crew, Arch. Col., F3, 238, fol. 506, Regulations of 1729; tobacco sale, Arch. Lorient, IP, 278, *liasse* 2, fol. 7, Maurepas to D'Espremenil, January 31, 1736.
55. Arch. Col., C2, 37, fol. 47, 48, Memoir of 1751; *Ibid.*, F3, 238, fol. 500; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8979, fol. 22, Dupleix to the Co., January 14, 1732; Arch. Lorient, IP, I.
56. *Ibid.*, 131, *liasse* 6, fol. 35; *Ibid.*, 137, *liasse* 13; Arch. Marine, B3, 322, fol. 141, De Voliure to Minister of Marine, April 23, 1728; *Ibid.*, B2, 305, fol. 71, 84, Correspondence of the Minister of Marine with D'Espremenil, 1738.
57. Arch. Lorient, IP, 83, fol. 8, 91.

CHAPTER X

Physical and Social Organization in India

A fairly good picture of the life of the European agents of an eighteenth century commercial company in India has been preserved for us in the few scattered records relating to the *Compagnie des Indes*. Pondicherry, its capital in India, located on the Coromandel coast in a region subject to frequent famine, appears as a city of contrasts. Dingy native quarters are found side by side with the finer European districts; unfortified in 1719 when it passed into the control of Law's Company, the town had become by the close of Dupleix's administration completely walled, with a garrison comparing favorably with any other maintained by Europeans in the East; at times destitute of merchants, and without political powers, it was transformed in the course of a quarter century into one of the great commercial capitals of the East, and one of the chief political centers of India.

The city was fortified on the land side by walls, built during the administration of Lenoir and Dumas. It remained for Dupleix to finish the work begun in 1724 by similarly safeguarding it on the seafront.[1] These walls were strengthened by bastions and pierced by several gates leading to routes into the interior, to adjacent seacoast territories, and to the port. A moat surrounded the city, and several redouts were to be found on the outskirts. Within the walls, lying close to the sea, was a fort or citadel, fitted out for defense purposes, but also designed to serve as the commercial and political headquarters of the Company. Developments in both these fields accompanied by neglect of its own property forced the Council to build, rent or buy numerous buildings in other parts of the town.[2] The fortifications were erected at no great expense to the Company, since they were paid for partly by taxes and fines. Dupleix wished to hurry matters along, in view of the menace of war with the English in the early 1740s. Funds sent out for commerce were diverted to this purpose. The Company opposed any such practice until 1748, when because of war conditions, permission was granted the Council to appropriate these funds for the completion of defense works.[3]

Pondicherry was divided into two quarters. The Europeans lived in close proximity to the fort, the natives in districts adjacent to the walls on the land side, or in little villages near the city. Their homes were very small, more often of baked mud than of brick. Passing beyond the low doorway, one found one's self in an overcrowded disintegrating poverty stricken hovel. Their little gardens were the only thing on which a European could look with favor. Since they had apparently been constructed at random, the Council, when it undertook to straighten and widen the streets found the task slow and difficult.[4] Besides, many of the roads were ankle deep in dust and sand.[5] Even in the European quarters with the exception of some of the Company's buildings erected in Dupleix's administration there was little that could be called pretentious. The houses were of a light open nature suited to the climate, but so small that three or four, had they been thrown into one, would have produced only a good sized home. They too had their gardens, cut off from each other by low walls.

For many years the governor had his residence within the limits of the citadel, until it fell into such disrepair that it had to be abandoned. A new one was erected nearby, and the *Palais des Indes* built for administrative purposes. Care was taken to make it pleasing to look upon; it had fine imitation marble colums; the rooms were large and airy, each with its special type floor and ceiling of colored plaster, inlaid wood, or mosaics. Gold and silver ornaments and fine pictures were scattered about to good effect. A porch running all around it gave a certain air of coolness.[6]

Near the governor's residence, facing a park, was a commodious building where princes and ambassadors might make their homes while at Pondicherry. Little the natives appreciated the facilities provided them. White walls soon gave place to grimy smoke blackened ones, after a Moor had spent a few days in the place, for the women had the habit of cooking their meals in their rooms. It might have passed for a kitchen we are told, if care had not been taken to whiten the walls after their departure.[7]

Most of the administrative and commercial quarters were located in the fort. The council chamber, the clerical department and the notary's office were in one building. Adjoining it were bar-

racks and warehouses. These proved inadequate in time, so several houses were rented in the city to care for the Company's purchases.[8]

Dupleix's administration witnessed the erection of several new buildings, notably the *Palais des Indes,* a customs house, a warehouse and salesroom. The walls facing the sea were completed, several of the gates were strengthend, and the fortifications, damaged in the siege in 1748 were repaired.[9] At the close of his administration, there was at Pondicherry in addition to the usual equipment of a commercial Company, numerous other buildings belonging to it.[10] There was a mint, established in Dumas' time, which had been built well away from the citadel because of the odors produced in its operation. There were two hospitals, one in the city itself, the other a few miles distant at Oulgaret. This latter was intended primarily for convalescent cases. The other, in the city, served the Company's civil employees, soldiers and sailors. It seems to have been used by the latter as an emergency hotel when they were on shore leave. The upkeep of these hospitals was one of the heaviest non-commercial expenses. In 1747 40,000 livres plus the salaries of three doctors, or, all told, about one seventh of the estimates for Pondicherry were appropriations for them.

Workshops, called *blanchisseries* were supplied for the use of the natives engaged in finishing cloth for the Company.[11] Prisons were erected. Churches outside the fort received financial aid from the Company. A few of them, chapels in the citadels at Pondicherry and Chandernagor, were the property of the Company, so it had to supply them with priests.[12] The Company had to care for the harbor equipment.[13] Since vessels anchored half a league off shore, great wharves or quays were not required. Small boats were used for loading and unloading cargo. Several other boats for local trade and communication between the posts were also necessary, 150,000 livres being destined for their upkeep. Several parks were maintained in and around Pondicherry. These were virtual necessities, but the Paris administration here, as in connection with several other misunderstood projects of the

Council, ordered their abandonment. The Council however, pursued its own course just as it had with the fortifications.

The more immediate needs of the people—water and sanitary conveniences—were also supplied by the Company. A constant water supply could be ensured only by the establishment of reservoirs, and these were to be found in considerable number about Pondicherry.[14]. The sewage system was unsatisfactory.[15] The outlets were so placed that in rainy weather the refuse was carried back into low lying parts of the city instead of being deposited beyond the walls. Canals traversing parts of the city were filled with stagnant water, as was the moat around the citadel. The latrines in the fort in some instances had not been properly attended to for fifteen to eighteen years! The natives in their own quarters threw refuse everywhere. Little wonder that the hospital bit so deeply into the Company's funds. There was some criticism of conditions at the time. Cossigny, while in charge of the construction of fortifications in 1740 produced a memoir in which he claims that the Company was not getting value for its money in recent building projects. He goes on to decry the unsanitary conditions in the city. Godeheu, fifteen years later, found things still in very bad shape. Dupleix, it would seem, was no sanitary engineer.

In many details Chandernagor resembled Pondicherry. It too was fortified by a citadel, but lacked walls. There were barracks, a lodge for the civil employees, a hospital, a chapel, warehouses, inspection rooms, a bakery, a naval store house, a reservoir and an artificial harbor for river boats. The citadel contained the administative buildings, and as in the early days at Pondicherry, the governor's residence. The inhabitants of the town were allowed to build houses higher than the walls of the fort, so that they could command a view of the interior. That this was tolerated indicates the sense of security the French felt from attack.[16]

Quarters for the civil employees were in one of the Company's buildings. Its construction was authorized in 1733. Heretofore they had had a special lodge which proved a bit damp on the ground floor. Each man was provided now with a bedroom fifteen by sixteen feet, and an antechamber half this size.[17]

As a result of a fire in the naval stores early in the 1730s unusual care was taken to make fireproof the buildings erected after this, and to similarly safeguard the old ones.[18] It was particularly desirable that the bakery be fireproof, as much of the ships' biscuit was baked and stored there. The destruction of this building might involve great loss to the Company, if a ship's departure for Europe were thereby delayed beyond the regular sailing season.

Although in some cases a few soldiers might be attached to the other posts, Mahé and Karikal were the only ones efficiently guarded by means of a fort. At some of the others, strong hedges were planted about the Company's property, or walls built which might deter cattle or thieves.[19] These smaller posts were none too well equipped. Moracin, on going to Mazulipatam as director, found that even a copy of the ordinance relating to the defense of the post was lacking.[20]

The welfare of the posts depended in no small measure on their relations with each other.[21] All the principal ones contributed to the needs of Pondicherry—foodstuffs, araque, lumber, wrapping materials and other supplies. The Ganges basin was richer in cereals than the Coromandel coast, so Chandernagor was often able to furnish wheat or rice to the Superior Council on advantageous terms, when local famine or war caused a shortage at Pondicherry. When similar conditions prevailed at Chandernagor, supplies were brought in from Karikal, Mazulipatam, Mahé, Surat, or the Isles. Pondicherry in turn sent money, troops and supplies to the subordinate posts, and on occassion, to the Isles of France and Bourbon. The relatively undeveloped state of commerce and the inadequacy of means of transportation in India is clearly evidenced in the way that the posts, even in peace time, sought the necessities of life—wheat, rice, butter and candles—at distant factories rather than at nearby productive centers in the interior.

The social organization of the Company's employees makes an interesting study. Europeans were few;[22] Chandernagor had five hundred out of a population totaling over 20,000 in the 1720s. Pondicherry had twelve hundred in 1741. All were not employees of the Company, but the majority owed their livelihood to it. Over four hundred and forty European employees, civil and military,

appear in the Pondicherry estimates for 1747. At some of the smaller posts there were only two or three, and there is no reason to believe that there were many other Europeans in the neighborhood.

These people especially the civil employees and military officers, came from good families, and were accustomed to comforts, substantial homes, good foods and good wines. In India they enjoyed few luxuries, and these cost them dear. Their living quarters were supplied by the Company. When old lodgings or barracks had to be dismantled to make place for new ones, the local authorities at Pondicherry instead of renting houses for its employees, gave them a small monthly allowance, and left them to shift for themselves. At the principal posts the Company generally supplied a special residence such as that at Chandernagor. At the minor posts a house was rented from the natives, and someone in the locality was appointed to care for it.[23]

In rare instances the Company maintained a table for its employees.[24] When Karikal was established in 1739 the country was temporarily devastated due to invasions by the Moors, so the Company boarded the staff. Since this was an expensive project, the Council at Pondicherry soon had recourse to a more usual expedient, that of subsidizing them. The food[25] was not very satisfactory from the European viewpoint. At Pondicherry much of it was imported from Bengal where it was cheaper than elsewhere in India; but only the governor and the councillors could afford delicacies. The ordinary resident had to satisfy himself with mutton or fowl raised in the vicinity. The meat was of poor quality, and the chickens and pigeons only passable. Cattle were seldom butchered, and then only after they had served their time as beasts of burden. Some fruit was available, but was not highly esteemed by the Europeans. Native beverages[26] were no better. Araque was used, especially by the troops, and European wines were regularly sent out by the Company. The purchasing power of the community appears at times to have been overestimated, for one reads of the wine spoiling or turning to vinegar before it could be sold. With araque, which was much cheaper than wine, the problem was one of regulation, as the soldiers and natives consumed

it in immoderate quantities. Military officers in India and administrative authorities in France pointed out its deleterious effects,[27] but the abolition of its sale was out of the question. The loss of revenue would have been slight, but more important was the fact that it would have been unfair to deprive the soldiers of all forms of drink. They could not afford wine, and to have been denied the less expensive liquor might have led to desertions—numerous enough in any case.

The health of the employees and troops was safeguarded by hospitals at Pondicherry, Chandernagor and Karikal. Adequate appropriations were made for their maintenance; there were for example over twenty-five native employees attached to the one at Chandernagor. Reference is also made to a hospital at Mahé, of so little importance that only fifty-six livres was appropriated for it in 1747. Skilled surgeons were attached to each hospital, three at Pondicherry, two each at Mahé and Chandernagor, and one at Karikal.[28] When Godeheu arrived in India he found numerous abuses prevailing in the hospital at Pondicherry. Supplies of all kinds, food, linen, medicine, even furniture were taken away from it. Drugs were being given away free, not only to employees, but to other persons as well.[29] India was not a healthy country for Europeans, so remedies of all kinds were constantly sent out by the Company, although not always in sufficient quantities; then the Council had to make purchases from its rivals. Among the remedies asked for by the Council at Pondicherry in 1746, one finds opiates, 200 pounds; unguents of various kinds, as much as 240 pounds of one variety; medicinal plants, including gentian root; oils, sweet almond, camomile, and absinthe; and numerous chemical substances. Strangely unfamiliar are *yeux d'écrevisse preparée, corne de cerf preparée,* and *Eau de la Reine de Hongrie.* The Company at times sent out new products for trial. A fever remedy was tried out at Mahé, without effect, although the victim had been given twenty doses. *Pillules anti-veneriennes* also figure among the experimental remedies.[30]

The Company contributed liberally to the upkeep of religious institutions in the several posts. Almoners were to be found at Pondicherry, Karikal, Mahé, Chandernagor and Cassimbazard.

Chapels were built, in part with contributions from the Company, and maintained with funds regularly appropriated for this purpose. Favors were accorded the priests, who were given free passage to and from India, and church ornaments were transported gratis. Persons of non-Catholic faith were tolerated, especially among the natives, and allowed to have their temples and to worship freely. At times the Company deviated from this general policy. At Pondicherry on one occassion it imprisoned some natives who had repaired their pagoda without asking permission. When they explained that they believed they had the right to do this by virtue of the religious freedom theretofore accorded them, they were released, but a public reprimand was given the directors of the work. Shortly after this the Council granted a native request that they be allowed to build a wall around the pagoda, because of the presence of drunken soldiers and sailors who might enter when the native women were assembled there and cause disorder which could not easily be corrected. The employees under ordinary circumstances seem to have made little use of the religious facilities provided. Vesper services were tried out at Chandernagor without success; even the Sunday services there were none too well attended, for the Sabbath was not necessarily a day of rest, since the Bengalese regularly worked on that day, and required some European overseers. The Council forbade Sunday work at Pondicherry in 1746 as there had been numerous complaints. It was only on some special occassion such as the announcement of a victory when a special *Te Deum* would be chanted, that the minds of the employees seem to have turned to religious exercises.[31] Jesuits and Capucins both ministered to the French, but they did not always get along well together. The priests and the Company at times came into conflict over the frequency of services, the question of whether priests were almoners (for on this point hinged the question of the Company's jurisdiction over the frocked brethren), the publication of ecclesiastical bulls, especially those relating to public order, and whether the priests should live in the lodges as the council at Chandernagor desired. So bitter were the disputes at times that they could not be settled on the spot but had to be referred to European authorities.[32]

Three different attempts appear to have been made to provide for the educational needs of the employees. As early as 1725 there was a Jesuit school at Pondicherry, at which about thirty students were in attendance. These were drawn from French settlements in several parts of India, and instruction was given them in elementary subjects, navigation, and astronomy. It appears to have been run independently of the Company's control.[33] In 1737 and 1738 provision was made for a second school. This one, for girls, was organized along monastic lines and run by a group of Ursulines assisted by a board of administration named by the Superior Council. The Company provided buildings and financial assistance. Instruction was free, although residents paid for board. This school failed. The nuns were more interested in establishing a convent than an educational institution; their conduct was not such as to inspire confidence, so parents hesitated to entrust children to their care. General dissatisfaction with them led the Company to instruct the Council at Pondicherry to send the sisters home if they were serving no good purpose, but before such action could be taken, the Ursulines had left the colony.[34] Finally, provision was made by the Company for the maintenance of a school teacher at Chandernagor at such salary as Dupleix should determine.[35] Special provision was made as early as 1729 for the training of Ganges pilots.[36] Here the Company is seen acting in its own interests rather than in those of its employees. One might be inclined to say that for a group of several hundred Frenchmen, many of whom had families with children needing instructions, these facilities were quite inadequate. One must remember, however, that education was not free and public in those days. The amazing thing is not that the facilities were so meagre, but that the Company should have interested itself at all in such matters.

The social activities of the employees seem to have been decidedly limited.[37] Some of them at Chandernagor might hunt if the season proved favorable. Occassionally some enterprising spirit would undertake to produce a play, but on the whole there was little in the line of diversion. The Feast of St. Louis, after whom the fort at Pondicherry was named, or some great European event

such as the birth of a prince, or the marriage of one of the employees were occassions for celebration. The birth of the *Duc de Bourgoyne* resulted in a magnificant festival at Pondicherry.[38] The ringing of bells in the fort and the churches of the town heralded the commencement of the festivities. Dupleix and his wife took part in a state procession to the chapel in the citadel, attended by an imposing retinue of sepoys and caffres, and a bodyguard of twenty-four cavalrymen. Even elephants and lions were paraded on this occasion. A native band furnished the music. "Il n'y a point de souverain aux Indes qui marche avec plus de faste" it is recorded. The *Te Deum* was chanted at the chapel, after which thanksgiving gave way to less spiritual matters. A great *feu d'artifice,* to which three month preparation had been devoted, was staged. Dupleix then entertained the French and leading natives at a great ball where men and women alike displayed their finery. Delicacies and expensive wines were supplied in abundance at the midnight supper where the healths of the King, the Royal Family, and Governor and Madame Dupleix were all drunk as the cannons of the fort and of the vessels in the harbor boomed forth a royal salute. It was not until seven o'clock the following morning that the party finally came to an end. Such celebrations could not be daily occurrences, however, not at a cost of 25,000 roupies!

Several clubs were established at Chandernagor among the employees.[39] Dupleix was at the head of one of them, a bachelors' club, while he was director in Bengal. He also organized a sort of chivalric order among some of his friends for their mutual diversion. This order included both men and women; it had its own statutes and insignia, and membership was strictly limited to those whose *"humeur convient à la societé."*

Where two or more Companies had their posts in the same vicinity there was some intercourse between the directors. Certain social customs were adhered to rigidly in visits one to another. A new director could not visit his foreign associates until they had first called on him. Reference to such visits are rare, although one naturally suspects that they were fairly frequent.[40]

One of the drawbacks to life in India was the small number of European women in the colonies. Some were sent out from

France, but these were mostly absorbed by Pondicherry. "No European women come here to us, except those not wanted at Pondicherry" wrote Dupleix from Chandernagor in 1739. At an earlier date he had asked his brother to send out some girl whom he might marry. Shortly afterwards he changed his mind, and countermanded the order although he does state that if one were on the way he would marry her.[41]

One would not expect the standard of morality to be high in communities so lacking in means of diversion, and the regulations adopted by the company bear out this supposition. Conditions at Patna were so bad in 1735 that Dupleix found it necessary to issue special orders[42] that no *coureuse* be admitted to the lodge, either by day or night, as their presence proved too much of a distraction for the garrison; he moreover regretted that the civil employees did not set a better example for the soldiers. Even those who would marry the Portugese or native women were discouraged from so doing, sailors temporarily resident in India because they would thereby be prevented from returning home, a condition which would not be in the interests of the French navy; the residents because French law required the consent of the parents to marriage if contracted before the age or thirty. Of course an employee might slip outside the Company's territory and marry; but by so doing he rendered himself liable to immediate dismissal. Marriage, even to French women, was dependent on the consent of the local councils. Restrictions of this nature, while not wholly without merit, were perhaps a bit strict, considering the temptations to libertime pastimes.[43] The Company also passed regulations concerning the employees conduct in less momentous affairs. Lenoir's administration in particular appears to have been an unfortunate one for the employees. Violins, for example, were not to be played after eight o'clock; the gates of the city were closed at nine, although in a warm country such as India the evening would be the natural time for strolling in the country. Lenoir's favorites were not affected by this regulation, for they had the privilege of using a special gate at night. Even the use of lights at night other than in sick rooms was forbidden. This however was not designed as a restriction on employees, but as a safeguard

against fire; there was supposed to be a patrol to see that this regulation was observed. War time brought another type of restriction, censorship of letters; but this is more normal and logical than some of the restrictions held against Lenoir.[44]

Viewing the matter as a whole, it seems that the Company took a reasonable interest in the welfare of its employees. It at times gave them lodging; it helped them secure food and drink; it maintained or subsidized hospitals, schools and churches. These things were perhaps essential were it to secure and hold its employees. There were many ways in which it might have been more helpful, even in those matters in which we have shown it to have busied itself; but our purpose is not to show how it might have been more philanthropic or paternal. That is a problem for the sociologist; ours is that of the historian, to present the facts in the case.

1. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8971, fol. 9; P. Co., I, 155, 174.
2. C.S.P.V., I, 319, 351; III, 205; P. Co., IV, 232; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9357, fol. 40.
3. P. Co., IV, 449.
4. Arch. Col., C2, 116, 20, Memoir by a missionary coming from China about 1726; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9364, fol. 163, Memoir by Cossigny, 1740; C.S.P.V., II, 171.
5. *Ibid.*, fol. 164; C.S.P.V., III, 10-11.
6. C.S.P.V., III, 115; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8971, p. 115; Arch. Col., C2, 80, 72-74, Cossigny to Monseigneur, January 25, 1740.
7. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8971, 9; C.S.P.V., III, 267.
8. C.S.P.V., III, 115.
9. A. Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, 86, 87; P. Co., IV, xx, xxi.
10. C.S.P.V., III, 69; Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, 85-87; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8993, fol. 158, Godeheu to de Leyrit, February 12, 1755; Arch. Col., C2, 28, fol. 17, Deliberation of Company, 1738; *Ibid.*, 33, fol. 153, Company to Superior Council, February 17, 1747, in regard to the Budget; Arch. Nat., F12, 644, *liasse* 13.
11. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 9145, II; C.S.P.V., III, 205.
12. Arch. Col., C2, 33, fols. 151-60.
13. *Ibid.*, 33, fols. 153-60; 116, fol. 20; P. Co., IV, xiv; Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, 85; C.S.P.V., II, 181.
14. See Map in P. de Vaissière, *Dupleix*, p. 112.
15. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9364, fols. 163, 164, Cossigny's memoir; C.S.P.V., III, 10-11; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8993, fol. 158, Godeheu to de Leyrit, February 12, 1755; Pillai's *Journal* I, 98.
16. S. C. Hill, *Three Frenchmen in Bengal*, pp. 18, 19, 46; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 33; 27, fol. 17-18; 29, fol. 210.
17. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8933, fols. 53-54, Company to Council at Chandernagor, January 21, 1733.
18. *Ibid.*, fol. 58; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 33.

19. P. Co., IV, 229; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8926, fol. 41; Arch. Col., C2, 29, fol. 18; Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 64; C.S.P.V., III, 216.
20. Arch. Col., C2, 84, fol. 123, Letter by Moracin, January 9, 1753.
21. C.S.C.C., II, III, *passim;* C.S.P.V., I, 312, 315; P. Co., IV, 203-04, 230, 346, 446; Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fol. 25.
22. Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 14; *Madras Rec. Cal.* 1740-44, p. 182; Arch. Col., C2, 33, fols. 151-60; The Chandernagor census of December, 1752, indicates that the European population included 32 civil employees of the Company—a director, councillors, and clerks,—a port officer, seven military and twenty-six naval officers, 150 soldiers of the garrison, nine artillery men, five surgeons, an architect, five European craftsmen, 44 European born residents, and twenty resident Portugese (probably born in India). The total population, European and native, was approximately 25,000. Arch. Col., GI, 481, Census of 1752.
23. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8971, fol. 9; *Ibid.*, N.A.F., 9357, fol 40.
24. C.S.P.V., I, 55; II, 3, 271; III, 272.
25. Arch. Col., Inde 2, VII; Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fol. 88; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8971, fol. 9; C.S.P.V., III, 272; Arch. Col., C2, 116, fol. 18.
26. *Ibid.*, 116, fol. 18; Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fols. 45, 89; C.S.C.C., II, fol. 154; C.S.P.V., I, 266, 267; III, 162-63.
27. Arch. Col., C2, 37, fol. 103, Minute of a letter by St. Priest, 1751; *Ibid.*, 80, fol. 108, de Bausset to Monseigneur (Comptroller General?) October 1, 1740.
28. *Ibid.*, 33, fols. 151-60; 28, fol. 48; *Ibid.*, D2D, XI, List of employees in India in 1749; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8928, fol. 171-72; Arch. Lorient, IP, 137, fol. 17.
29. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8993, fol. 158, Godeheu to De Leyrit, February 12, 1755.
30. Arch. Col., C2, 27, fol. 117; 76, fol. 73, Council at Mahé to the Company, December 21, 1737; 81, fol. 339, Requisition list, Council at Pondicherry, 1746; 82, fol. 387.
31. A. Launay, *Histoire des Missions des Indes,* I, 462-64; Arch. Col., C2, 27, fols. 113-14; 28, fol. 266; 33, fols. 151-60; 76, fol. 62; *Ibid.*, F5A, 19, Delib. of Co., 1725; *Ibid.*, F3, 238, fol. 523; Deliberations of the Superior Council, November 14, 1746; C.S.C.C., II, 134; Arch. Nat., M., 240, *liasse* 5, Company to Dupleix, April 11, 1740; Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fol. 66; C.S.P.V., I, 5, 55, II, 356-358, 370.
32. Launay, *op. cit.*, I, xxxiv, Company's edict, February, 1733, xli and 461, 464; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8979, fol. 44; Arch. Col., C2, 37, fol. 103; 76, fol. 62, Jesuits at Chandernagor to the Company, about 1737; 80, fol. 7.
33. Arch. Col., F5A, 19, Bouchet to Monseigneur, October 12, 1725.
34. Launay, *op. cit.*, I, xxxvii, and 457, 458; Arch. Col., F5A, 17, Company to the Bishop of Vannes, July 28, 1737; C.S.P.V., II, 397; III, 33, 176; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8981, fols. 43, 48; Arch. Col., C2, 28, fol. 15, 16; 29, fol. 194; 31, fol. 149; P. Co., IV, 21.
35. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9144, fol. 3, Company to Dupleix, September 22, 1742.
36. C.S.C.C., I, 43.
37. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8971, fol. 110; 8980, fol. 101; 8981, Dupleix to Elliot, January 4, 1739; 8982, fol. 11; 12087, fol. 133; Pillai's *Journal* III, 18, 87, 362.
38. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8971, fol. 115.
39. *Ibid.*, 8982, fol. 11; M. I. Guet, *Origines de l'Inde Française,* pp. 50-51.
40. Arch. S. et O., E, 3755, fol. 10; Pillai's *Journal,* I, 247.

41. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8981, fol. 69, Dupleix to Hardincourt, January 7, 1739; *Ibid.*, N.A.F., 9357, fol. 86, Dupleix to his brother, January 10, 1732.
42. Bib. Arsenal, 4743, fol. 17, Dupleix to Groiselle, June 25, 1735.
43. C.S.C.C., I, 107, 178; Arch. Lorient, IP2, 69, fol. 55; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8929, fol. 340; 9375, fol. 98.
44. Arch. Col., C2, 25, fol. 177, Memoir by La Bourdonnais, 1733; C.S. P.V., II, 169-70; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8928, fol. 212, Superior Council to Tremisot, September 8, 1727; *Madras Rec. Cal.*, 1740-44, p. 135, doc. 27.

CHAPTER XI

The Army.

The charter of 1664, establishing Colbert's Company permitted it to maintain garrisons and declare war. Law's Company took over these privileges in 1719. The King, in 1721, further provided that the Company might maintain a force of one hundred fusiliers at Lorient, and in 1723 gave it the right to raise four companies of infantry for service in its possessions. It was with these troops that it undertook to protect its concessions, and under Dupleix, to develop an empire in India.[1]

The King and the French government had some interest in these troops although they were in no sense a part of the royal army.[2] Edicts relating to matters of discipline strengthened the Company's hand in dealing with its men. In 1723 the King aided it by providing that a detachment of royal troops serve with the Company's forces to train them. Since the King issued commissions to the Company's officers, they regarded themselves as royal appointees, and therefore not subservient to the administrative officials. In the 1750s officers from the French army were even assigned to serve with the Company's troops in India. Occassionally the King saw fit to reward some of the Company's officers with military decorations, usually the cross of the Order of St. Louis. In the matter of tactics too, the Company showed a certain dependence on the government, for its troops both at Lorient and in India were trained according to royal drill manuals.

The composition of the army may be considered from various standpoints. It was divided into three sections; the garrison at Lorient; detachments were drawn from this to serve on the ships; and the forces stationed in the East. It is almost impossible to divide the army into present day categories such as artillery, infantry, or engineers. Practically all were infantrymen. Occassionally there is reference to some of them acting as engineers, but it would be inaccurate to refer to an engineering corps. There were artillerymen, but they were also too few in number to constitute a corps. Dragoons are rarely mentioned. There was an

intelligence service which was not formally organized. The Catholic priests at Madras rendered valuable aid to the French in cases of trouble with the English. At other times it was persons serving with the troops who performed espionage duty.[3]

The troops might also be classified along racial lines. The European element always provided the officers, and for a long time, most of the troops. The greater portion of the latter came from Brittany. Foreigners however were taken into the Company's service. Holland, Portugal, Germany, Switzerland, Friesland, Flanders, Riga, Palermo, Cochin, all figure as the home of some of the recruits. Then the practice developed of training and using native troops. These were of three kinds, topas, sepoys, and caffres. Topas was the name applied to half-breed Portugese soldiers; sepoys were the famous native troops developed by Dupleix; and caffres were principally drawn from among Madagascar slaves by La Bourdonnais for use in the war of the Austrian Succession.[4]

These three classifications, geographical, military and racial, seem to have been taken into consideration by the Company in providing for the organization of the army. European troops were recruited wherever they could be obtained. Sometimes they were enlisted at Paris and sent to Lorient; at others, in Brittany, where a recruiting officer, who frequently made use of the "press" was stationed.[5] Creoles were enlisted in the Isles of France and Bourbon.[6] Lastly, in India itself,[7] topas and sepoys were secured, along with some Europeans, recruited from among French ex-service men, and the deserters of other nations. In times of stress the colonists themselves joined the forces. The men were ordinarily engaged for six or more years, at twelve livres a month. The Company encouraged re-enlistment. Discharge was secured in a variety of ways. Some served out the terms of their engagement; others fell ill; some furnished substitutes; and some paid twenty-four livres to the Company to secure release. One who had served his term in India was not likely to return home rich. Indeed, the Company had to instruct the director at Lorient to give returning Germans enough to pay their way home.[8]

There could have been nothing very imposing about these European troops. Physically they were no giants. The greater part ranged in height from five feet to five feet three inches. Not one in a hundred reached five feet eight, and numerous instances exist of soldiers as short as four feet nine. They were accepted at almost any age. Those who enlisted in 1750 were from sixteen to forty-four, the greater part being in their twenties.[9] They seem to have been given pretty generally to debauchery and drinkin, and were rather hard to discipline. Desertions were frequent.

At Lorient a garrison of from one hundred to three hundred men was maintained. From it a detachment, varying from ten to fifty, was assigned to each vessel. In war time, when troops were in demand in India, this might be increased to two hundred or more. As they disembarked in India, their places on the vessels were taken, if at all, by men who had served their term.[10] It has been estimated that the Company about 1740 had over six thousand troops, many of them in the Isles of France and Bourbon. Weber states that eight companies of three hundred men were then stationed in India.[11] Martineau[12] places the figure for that date at ten companies of one hundred and ten men each in principle, but many less in practice. Discrepancies in the two figures are to be accounted for in part by the fact that in 1740 and 1741 the army was expanding rapidly due to the Mahratte war near Pondicherry and trouble with the natives at Mahé. Troops were then coming to India by the hundreds.[13] Pondicherry, Chandernagor, Mahé and Karikal were the posts at which the Company maintained garrisons. In time the troops were increased, especially by the creation of several companies of sepoys, but the effective force at the disposal of Dupleix probably was not in excess of ten thousand.

The maintenance of these troops was a considerable burden to the Company. A full strength company, one hundred and sixty-six men and officers, cost in 1747, over 25,000 livres in wages alone.[14] In addition there were the expenses of barracks, tents, arms, ammunition and transportation. The Company was spared some expense ordinarily associated with an army, namely that of food and clothing. Although the initial issue was probably free,

the soldiers had to pay for their own uniforms, usually on the installment basis, and for at least a part of their food which the Company supplied. In some cases, by serving as laborers, they became entitled to receive their pay without the customary deductions.[15]

The non-European troops made up the greater part of the army in India after 1740. There was a company of topas which in time came to resemble a foreign legion, as adventurers of various nationalities drifted into its ranks. From it were frequently chosen the guards who accompanied bullion shipments. They were paid only about half as much as the Europeans.[16] The sepoys formed the largest branch of the service. Dumas enjoyed the right to recruit natives, by virtue of the fact that he was Nabab of Pondicherry.[17] His successors in the post of governor inherited this title and privilege. The sepoys were of special value in two connections, as infantrymen, and as porters and despatch runners. They were given uniforms of various kinds of which they were very proud. Their training was under European officers who disciplined them in a manner unknown in the native armies. They were encouraged to give efficient service by the example of the Europeans, and they were properly armed. Their wages, usually six roupies a month, out of which they had to pay for their food, were higher than those given by the Moors.. Consequently, they usually could be chosen with some care. The Company had considerable faith in them, and did not hesitate to employ them in difficult positions. In the 1750s when more and more sepoys had to be employed, Dupleix adopted the practice of contracting with some native for the service of a company of five hundred men. These large groups did not have the benefit of training under the camparatively careful supervision of European officers. They proved less reliable than their predecessors, were underpaid by their native officers, and on several occassions, places garrisoned by them fell an easy prey to the enemy.[18]

Discipline was difficult. The European forces in particular were drawn in large part from the lower ranks of society. Drinking, debauchery and desertion were the chief problems. Garrison life at Lorient did not appeal to them, and in order to force them to

sleep in the barracks it became necessary to give exemplary punishment to the absentees. Once they were in India, many of them took to drinking. In 1725 it was found necessary to close the garrison canteen as many of the soldiers were drunk even when they should have been on guard. Love affairs caused trouble too. The soldiers might want to marry, but the Company discouraged the practice, lest a wife back home be aggrieved, or an Indian maid be on the Company's hands when her warrior lover returned to France. Worse yet, perchance the soldier, becoming attached to his Eastern *ménage,* might remain in the Company's service to become eventually a burdensome pensioner in his old age. Marriage of European troops consequently could be contracted only at the larger posts, and then only by special permission. Topas, on the other hand, were frequently married on enlistment, and the Company tried to attach them to its service by making timely provision for the erection of homes where they might live with their families.[19]

Desertion was probably the most frequently recurring sin. The penalty for it had been fixed by royal ordinance as the same as that prevailing in the King's forces—death. However, it proved impractical to enforce this. So numerous were desertions at Lorient and the vicinity in 1752 that a fixed reward of thirty livres for the capture of a deserter was established. It was further stipulated that, to prevent the needless shedding of blood, lots should be drawn to determine who among a number of deserters should pay the penalty. In India no regular practice was followed. Treaties with other companies provided for mutual rendition of deserters, but on condition that they be pardoned. Usually nothing but a fine was imposed. That leniency was the general rule is seen in the fact that second desertions were common, and even thereafter men at times returned to seek service under the same colors. This leniency is to be explained partly on the grounds that the authorities in India were not always sure of the term for which a soldier had been engaged, and so felt that they could be tolerant. However, the supreme penalty sometimes was paid. In the military records a small picture of a gibbet after a person's name makes it easy to tell when a council of war

had met and passed judgment on a deserter. The death penalty was seldom inflicted except for desertion, although reference to a soldier who was hanged for murder of one of the Company's surgeons is made in a letter to Maurepas. Dupleix therein admits that he was at a loss to understand this clemency! He was absent from the council of war, else the sentence would probably have been different, since death on the wheel was the prisoner's just fate.[20]

Minor offenses might be punished by the officers. They indulged in the good old fashioned practice of caning, although Dupleix protested that loyalty would not be engendered by such treatment.[21]

Although some natives served as subordinate officers for the sepoys, practically all the army officers were French. They were recruited in France almost exclusively until the 1750s when openings were made for persons of French blood in India and the Isles. Like the troops they were drawn largely from among the lower and less desirable element—from a higher social group it is true, but from the libertines and fortune hunters. They received much better treatment than the privates, the salaries of captains being ninety livres a month in contrast to a private's twelve; lieutenants received sixty livres, and second lieutenants about fifty. In addition they received a quantity of wine and liquor. They had to furnish their own equipment and, in war time, transfer their baggage at their own expense. A few of them were rewarded by the Company which secured military decorations for them. Bussy even received a Portugese decoration for services rendered that nation in 1752. In securing this honor, the Company naturally played no part.[22]

Mediocrity characterized the army. Yet there were a few exceptions. Dupleix, as commander in chief proved a capable leader, and went to infinite pains to advise his subordinates. Capable associates were Bussy, conqueror of the Decan, and Paradis, foremost in the ranks of the Company's engineers. The brilliancy of these men was counterbalanced by the incapacity of many of their associates. Several owed their appointments to political favoritism and were generally considered ne'er-do-wells. Others did not ap-

ply themselves as well as they might. And of course, very few knew the language of the country. Certain of them, such as surgeons, were at times dismissed because of their inability.[23] Private quarrels and jealousies, sometimes settled by duels, seemed more in their line than military affairs. There was a long standing dispute between the military officers, and the councillors and administrative officers. The King and the Company intervened in the quarrel several times, always in favor of the non-military element, without bringing it to an end. Then among the army officers there was constant quarreling over the matter of precedence; should one's rank depend on the date of one's commission, or on one's service in India? The Company might deliberate on the matter, but it could not end the quarrel by its simple dictum in favor of the latter view. Personal grievances also had a chance to develop where men were thrown together for such long periods. Then blows would be exchanged, and for the good of the service someone would be sent home.[24]

Yet the army was far from being valueless; in comparison with the troops with whom it came in contact it showed up well. Dupleix might protest almost unceasingly that better troops must be sent out; the fact remains that they won battles against great odds. Their successes have been explained on the grounds that they had an advantage over the natives in discipline and tactics, undisciplined as they may have seemed judged by western standards, that their artillery was superior, and that their rifles were lighter and could be more easily handled.[25]

Interesting details have come to light as to the way in which many affairs in the army were handled. The governor was nominally commander in chief, the real power being placed in the hands of a major general. Dupleix proved to be both nominal and actual commander. Much of his success, especially with native troops, has been attributed to his wife, to whom they were devoted. But to Dupleix himself much credit must be given. No commander operated in central India without receiving regular, often daily instructions from him. Seven separate despatches were sent from Pondicherry to D'Auteil in the course of a single day, to be followed by one at five thirty the next morning. Moreover, these

letters had to be put into code, a tedious performance. Certainly Dupleix and his staff could not be charged with inactivity. These despatches were carried by special couriers who were well paid for their services if they made the trip speedily. Dupleix showed no mercy to the sluggard. Ten lashes instead of the promised ten roupies was the recompense of some.[26]

Dupleix's knowledge of the Indian situation enabled him to allay rumors which worried his commanders in the field, or to give advice on how to conduct a campaign, or where and how to secure supplies.[27] Only when he had to deal with his equals, with a man such as La Bourdonnais in the Madras episode, or Bussy when he was operating hundreds of miles afield, is his influence overshadowed by the man in actual charge of the operations.

The more important decisions were made by a council of war. In the field this was composed of such number as the commander saw to fit to admit. Dupleix thought seven quite sufficient, and did not consider that the will of the majority need be followed. Responsibility rested with the commander, and the council was regarded as an advisory body only. For disciplinary matters, the number of officers was fixed by royal ordinance at seven, some of whom might be administrative officers if there were not enough military ones available.[28]

To finance a campaign[29] money was taken from the funds available at Pondicherry or other posts, and sent with or to the campaigning forces. More was secured from native rulers in whose interest many of the later campaigns were waged. Frequently the natives were slow pay, and although they might cede territories as guarantees of eventual payment, ready cash had to be sought elsewhere. Dupleix furnished much of this himself, both in the form of direct loans, and by honoring bills of exchange drawn on him by his field officers. Some of these officers also had recourse to loans, Mainville paying as high as five percent a month on one occassion. When other means failed, if the campaign were against natives, there was pillage. The sums thus secured went into wages, supplies or transportation charges.

Feeding and clothing the army whether in peace or war was a considerable undertaking. Troops at Lorient in 1725 were fur-

nished with a great coat, jacket, two pairs of breeches, a hat, two shirts and collars, a pair of stockings, shoes, and leggings, and, on embarking for India, two more shirts, a jacket, a pair of shoes and a pair of breeches. As equipment they carried a gun, bayonet, military belt, and cartridge case.[30]

In India the European troops when they needed new uniforms were supplied according to a unique system.[31] Citron colored cloth was moving slowly in the early 1720s; the troops were ill clad; what then was more logical than to turn the cloth into uniforms? When a few years later blue cloth moved slowly, it too would have been foisted on the troops had experiment not shown it to be altogether too heavy for the purpose. Eventually blue "gingham" with red serge decorations was adopted by the Superior Council and then by the Company as the regular uniform. The Council would have preferred serge, but the Company did not see fit to send out such cloth from Europe. It however did authorize the Council to have suitable cloth made in India were the gingham not satisfactory.

European troops were housed in barracks at the Company's posts. On campaigns they slept in tents which were made at Pondicherry. In war time, the demand regularly exceeded the supply, partly because officers allowed the sepoys, who were not entitled to shelter at the Company's expense, to use them.[32]

Feeding the army[33] should have been a comparatively easy matter in Dupleix's day, in peace time, had it not been for the frequent famines. The greater part of the European troops were located in towns where there were many bazaars and markets. The Company then supplied them with food, but made a deduction from their wages for it. In rare instances this deduction was not made, apparently because with the high prices then prevailing it would have been unfair to so tax the soldiers. Sepoys were required to feed themselves; they bought supplies at the bazaars and were not above pillaging the country in war time. The few caffres or slave troops were of necessity fed and equipped by the Company. On campaigns, rice and biscuit were the regular foodstuffs. Flour might be supplied, but in places the lack of wood made cooking difficult, so frequently it was made into biscuit before being

sent out. Fresh meat was apparently a luxury reserved for the sick. Araque was distributed to the soldiers when they were unusually fatigued. Water was blamed for much of the illness from which the troops suffered; the officers avoided it whenever they could secure wine, but the troops could not afford this luxury. Some heated bullets placed in the water was Dupleix's suggestion for purifying it.[34]

The soldiers were armed with rifles and bayonets. The rifles were purchased from the manufacturers at Charleville and St. Etienne, who furnished various types of arms, similar to models supplied by the Company. Those made by one Pierre Girard were favored by the authorities in India. The artillery had cannons of many varieties. Some were from European foundaries, some from Indian. They ranged in size from forty-eight pounders down to those using only half pound balls. Use was also made of mortars, bombs and grenades. A popular type cannon was the so-called "Swedish Gun" adopted by the French in 1743. It was light, a four pounder, with improved loading and firing devices, so that it could fire several shots a minute. Powder was secured partly in Europe, partly in India. Saltpetre was to be had in abundance in the East, but when made into powder locally was not always satisfactory. In 1734 the Company ordered that native powder be used for salutes, while the European was kept for possible warfare. When war did break out, the European supply proved inadequate, and more had to be secured on the spot or from the Isle of France. Cannon balls also had to be made on the spot at times. Law, in his campaign against the Jats in 1760, found that even "clay moulded round a pebble" could serve in a pinch.[35]

To transport food, cannon and equipment required the use of a considerable force. Men as well as beasts of burden were employed in this work. Lascars or *coulis,* in sufficient numbers could move cannon quite as well as elephants or oxen, and were often easier to secure. Oxen, when used to carry packs, could bear up to 250 pounds; elephants, up to 900 pounds. When wagons were to be had they were drawn by elephants, camels or oxen, sometimes with the aid of *coulis.* Dupleix's correspondence indicates

that it was quite as hard to get the officers to use their *coulis* and beasts efficiently as it was to secure them in the first place. Where circumstances were favorable, river boats might be used to send supplies inland, but such occassions were rare.[36]

Even when the soldiers fell into the hands of the enemy they were still a burden on their former masters. Mahamet Aly Kan treated his prisoners in what he chose to call the European style. This consisted of forcing the French to feed their own men, or let them go hungry. Dupleix blamed this practice on Lawrence and the English, but whoever may have been responsible for it, the burden falling on the French in 1752 after a series of setbacks must have been grievous.[37]

The Company did its best to keep accurate records of the Europeans in its army. There are lists[38] of recruits, apparently compiled at the end of the year, since they are arranged alphabetically, from which one can learn the names, parentage, home, age, height, and physical characteristics of many of the troops. The date of their enlistment, embarkation, destination, transfer, discharge or death are also recorded in many instances. Had as great care been taken in choosing men and officers as in designing record books, there would surely have been fewer references to the "scum" or "riff-raff" to be found in the army.

1. P. Kaeppelin, *La Compagnie des Indes Orientales*, p. 7; Dernis, *Recueil des titres concernant la Compagnie des Indes*, III, 462, 518.
2. H. Weber, *La Compagnie des Indes*, pp. 458, 459; Dernis, *op. cit.*, III, 462, 518, Royal ordinance March 16, 1723; IV, 52, Royal Ordinance January 26, 1727; Arch. Marine, B2, 305, fols. 507, 538, List of commissions issued 1738; P. Co., I, 33; C.S.C.C., III, fol. 205; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9145, fol. 42.
3. Dernis, *op. cit.*, IV, 433, Royal ordinance October 20, 1740; Arch. Col., C2, 33, fol. 153, Budget of 1747; *Ibid.*, D2C, 187; P. Co., IV, 378; Madras Rec. Cal. 1740-44, p. 98; Madras Despatches 1744-55, fols. 85, 141, Saunders, at Fort St. David, Madras, to English Company, August 15, 1751, requesting orders regarding treatment of priests, who gave aid to the French. Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fol. 3, 9; Pillai's *Journal*, III.
4. Arch. Col., D2C, 187, *passim;* A. Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, 436; H. H. Dodwell, The War of the Austrian Succession, in *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, IV, 120.
5. Arch. Lorient, IP, 279, fol. 20; 16, fol. 7, 204.
6. Arch. Nat., F50, IV; C.S.C.C., II, 171.
7. C.S.P.V., I, 376-77, 413; P. Co., IV, xii; S. C. Hill, *Three Frenchmen in Bengal*, p. 23; Pillai's *Journal*, I, 215.

8. C.S.C.C., II, 17, 68, 103; P. Co., I, 310; Bib. Arsenal, 4743, fol. 30; Arch. Col., D2A, X; *Ibid.*, C2, 29, fol. 264; Arch. Lorient, IP, 279, fol. 19.
9. Arch. Col., D2C, 187 *passim*.
10. *Ibid.*; Arch. Col., C2, 29, fol. 264; Arch. Lorient, IP, 296, fol. 3; C.S.C.C., II, 103.
11. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 459. If this statement is accurate, one wonders why the Company was maintaining troops in Louisiana, which had been retroceded in 1731.
12. Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, 75.
13. C.S.C.C., II, 171, 195.
14. A company at Chandernagor in 1739 was supposed to contain 160 men. C.S.C.C., II, 68; Arch. Col., C2, 33, fols. 152-53.
15. C.S.P.V., I, 279; II, 165; C.S.C.C., III, 401; Arch. Col., Inde 2, IV; Arch. S. et O. E, 3746, fol. 100.
16. De Fréville, *Une Armée Coloniale au XVIIIe siècle*, p. 16; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8971, fol. 109; C.S.C.C., III, *passim;* Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, 58; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8928, fol. 144.
17. De Fréville, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
18. Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, 83-84; Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 114; Arch. S. et O. E, 3747, fol. 155; 3751, fol. 14; C.S.C.C., III, 252; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 12087, fol. 126.
19. Arch. Lorient, IP2, 69, fol. 3; P. Co., I, 354; C.S.P.V., I, 266-67; II, 46; Bib. Arsenal, 4743, fol. 3; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8928, fol. 248. Pillai's *Journal*, I, 180.
20. Dernis, *op. cit.*, IV, 52, Royal Ordinance, January 26, 1727; Arch. Lorient, IP2, II; *Ibid.*, IP, 279, fol. 20; De Fréville, *op. cit.*, p. 7; C.S.C.C. I, 100; III, 14; P. Co., I, 310; Arch. Col. D2A; Bib. Arsenal, 4744, fol. 45-46, Dupleix to Maurepas, January 20, 1737. C.S.P.V., II, 419; III, 10.
21. De Fréville, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 19; Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, 58, 76-78; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9156, fol. 59; Arch. S. et O., E, 3749, fol. 218; Bib. Arsenal, 5769, fol. 194, De Bussy to D'Argenson, January 20, 1757.
23. Martineau, *Dupleix*, II, 78-79; C.S.C.C., I, 100; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9153, fol. 57.
24. Dernis, *op. cit.*, III, 462, Royal Ordinance, February 5, 1722; P. Co., IV, 149; C.S.P.V., III, 86; Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fol. 36; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fols. 28, 167, 168. The deliberations of the Company 1735 required that army officers subscribe to a written statement recognizing their subordination to the councillors.
25. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 12087, fols. 74-75.
26. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 459; Arch. Col., C2, 30, fol. 153; Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fols. 3-10, 39. In the course of one week—24-30 March, 1750—nineteen letters were sent to D'Auteil; *Ibid.*, 3747, fol. 7; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 12087, fol. 126.
27. Arch. S. et O., E, 3746; 3747; 3748; 3749; Dupleix sometimes expressed himself rather strongly. "Charade ce que l'on vous dit du Nabab dadong ou Diable voulez- vous que l'on puisse dans ce pays-là rassembler, quatre mil cavaliers et quel Diable peuvent-ils vous faire." *Ibid.*, 3748, Dupleix to Bussy, February 4, 1751.
28. *Ibid.*, 3747, fol. 41; Dernis, *op. cit.*, IV, 52. Pillia's *Journal*, III, 434.
29. Arch. Col., Inde 2, IX; Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 370; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9156, fol. 137, Mainville to Dupleix, September 17, 1754; Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fol. 3.

30. Arch. Col., D2C, 187.
31. C.S.P.V., I, 306-07; II, 160; Arch. Col., C2, 27, fol. 115; 28, fol. 267.
32. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9156, fol. 62.
33. *Ibid.*, 8928, fols. 131, 144; Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fol. 100; Arch. Nat., F50, iv.
34. Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fols. 33, 82, Dupleix to D'Auteil, September 20, 1750. "Dites au gouverneur de Gingy de faire chauffer des boulets pour mettre dans l'eau de sa garnison à fin d'en tirer la cruditée et évitter les fièvres." Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9153, fol. 243.
35. Arch. Lorient, IP2, 69, fols. 87-89; Hill, *op. cit.*, pp. 117, 144; C.S.P.V., I, 259; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9152, fol. 127; 9155, fol. 177-78; Arch. Seine et Oise, E, 3748, fol. 8; Arch. Col., C2, 80, fols. 321, 322; 82, fol. 387. P. Co., I, 172-3.
36. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8925, fol. 123; 9153, fol. 35; 9156, fol. 59; Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fol. 41.
37. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9156, fols. 73-77.
38. Arch. Col., Series D2A, *Troupes des Colonies Recrues.*. Some of these records are preserved in Series D2A, D2C, and D2D.

CHAPTER XII

Relations with Native Rulers

In its relations with native rulers, the Company had many problems to solve. It is our purpose to show how negotiations were carried on, the nature of the concessions granted to the Company, and to draw attention to some of the problems, rather than to give a detailed account of the Company's relations with each of the rulers.

Negotiations were carried on by means of correspondence, by personal visits of the rulers with the Company's directors, by envoys, and by resident agents of the Company, European or native, at native courts. Negotiations were impracticable unless one came bearing gifts. No Indian prince feared that he might be the dupe of a philanthropically inclined suppliant; he simply pocketed the gift if he felt that there was anything tricky about the bearer's mission, and sent him on his way. Correspondence, then was rather futile. Written record of any agreement was of course desirable, but one could scarcely expect a response to a letter addressed to a native. Compliments on the part of the French, requests of one kind or another on the part of the natives make up the bulk of the rather fragmentary correspondence, until one gets down into the late 1740s and 1750s when orders and suggestions as to how the native allies should conduct themselves figure prominently. Theoretically only the governor of Pondicherry as representative of the French nation in India could correspond with the native rulers; but at times circumstances forced local directors to assume the initiative. They were obliged in such cases to send copies of their correspondence to Pondicherry.[1]

Direct negotiation was resorted to when some important object was in view. Sometimes diplomatic envoys came to the French, even when it was the Company which sought favors. In 1739 the Superior Council purchased a residence which it placed at the disposal of its native guests.[2] When an envoy arrived in Pondicherry the treatment accorded him was uniformly respectful. At times very elaborate receptions were held. On one occassion,

when an envoy from the court of Delhi arrived, the reception was of such magnificence that the whole native population turned out to see the parade of the governor and the envoy from the Madras gate to the fort. So great was the throng that several persons were trampled by the horses, camels and elephants. On this occasion however the Emperor was conferring great honors on Dupleix, and this magnificance, described in detail in contemporary records, must not be taken as typical. Usually a native would arrive, enter into communication with the governor, come to terms about the matter in question, and be on his way in a day or two. The idea that diplomacy in the East in the eighteenth century was a slow tedious process is none the less true. It usually required considerable negotiation on the part of the French before an envoy would be sent to Pondicherry, and then more weeks or even months of negotiation before the tentative agreement received the approval of the ruler.[3]

The French had only a very few employees who spoke Persian, the language of the court, or other Asiatic tongues. So, while these employees might serve on some of the French missions, more often it was a native who had to present the case. The Company's native interpreters were known as *Wakils* or *Vaquils*. In a few cases resident Europeans at some political center could handle the Company's affairs in a very satisfactory manner, but aroused the jealousy of would-be native agents.[4]

An interesting description of the meeting between a French envoy and the King of Travencore has been preserved. The King was anxious to have a French post in his territory. A representative of the Company came to visit him after the King had sent agents to both Mahé and Pondicherry. Asiatic suaveness is well illustrated in his remarks. He stated that he wanted Europeans to help him civilize his people, and he felt that the French were best suited to that purpose, being brave, generous, sincere, honorable, and polite, and knowing the arts and sciences. What the King really wanted was aid against the Dutch with whom he was at war. But the way he approched the question, and his ability to break down arguments against the granting of supplies by the French shows him to have been no novice in the field of dialectics.

One is also struck with his familiarity with the French envoy; frequently he held the Frenchman's hand as he talked with him. Although no satisfactory settlement was reached there was the inevitable exchange of presents, a pair of heavy Spanish pistols for the King, and two large golden chains for the envoy, together with lesser gifts for his associates.[5]

European and Asiatic procedure are contrasted by Lally Tollendal in a letter to the Duc de Choiseul.[6]. The gist of it may be translated thus.

> "You, M.le Duc, govern Europe; I, Asia. You have, I admit, the finest share, but all things considered you must admit that the difference is only that between black and white. The people with whom you have dealings call themselves ambassadors; those with whom I deal are named Vaquils; yours speak to you shod, but with empty hands; mine approach me bare footed, but with their hands full. You mislead those whom you can, and I catch whom I can in their falsehoods."

Gifts to the natives were of great variety. Money was the customary gift if some favor were being sought; but at other times it might be of almost any nature. Wine and liquors were among those highly prized by the natives; biscuits and jam were at times presented them. Whenever possible European goods, knives, scissors, mirrors, etc. were taken from the storehouses to be used for this purpose.[7] In many cases the gifts were obligatory,[8] according to the usages in vogue in India. Firmans were issued only after a generous present had been received. A death in the family of a ruler called for a gift of condolence. Victory over his enemies entitled a ruler to a gift. On the accession of a new ruler, not only did presents have to be given to him, but to his principal courtiers and statesmen as well. The best form was for a deputation of one or more European employees to deliver the gift, but if the Company happened to have a faithful native friend at court who could be trusted, recourse was had to this more economical means. Some presents were given from time to time to humor influential natives. Once in a while a grant to a native religious institution was made. Occassionally too, a service would be proffered the natives, such as medical treatment; but they were not

very enthusiastic over this. It is recorded that "Iman Sahib's wife died because she would not permit the French doctors to come near her."[9] At times the natives went to extremes to force the French to give them presents. Goods destined for Mazulipatam in 1745 were seized by a local official and held with just such a purpose in mind. But the Superior Council ordered Boyelleau, its representative at Mazulipatam to make no effort for awhile to recover the goods. It would rather do without them for that year than give the natives ground to think them indespensable to the French. An air of tranquility, the Council believed, would lead the natives in time to grow tired of the attempt at coercion, and result in the release of the goods, without the necessity for giving a present.[10]

Natives at times reciprocated the French generosity, it being customary to exchange presents when a diplomatic parley occurred. The Company saw no harm in accepting territorial cessions in its own name, but disapproved of the acceptance of gifts by its employees.[11] However, Dupleix received large gifts from natives whom he aided in the course of his last four years as governor. Mouzafersingue gave him a pension of 240,000 livres and many *aldees*. The soldiers too were generously treated by various native rulers in whose service they sometimes found themselves.

The agreements entered into by the Company and natives were manifold. They were recorded in treaties or paravanas. The original was frequently in Tamoul, but translations were of course made into French, and of these a considerable number have been recently published.[12] Many however have disappeared, as the councils in India took little care prior to 1730 to safeguard their records. Due to the feudalistic nature of the government practically all agreements except those of a purely local nature required many documents to make them effective. It was desirable to get the approval of the local ruler and of his immediate superior, and it was advisable also to get a signed document from the chief minister of the Nabab granting the paravana. On the death of a native signatory, it was necessary to have the document confirmed or renewed by his successor. At times the natives arbitrarily changed the terms of paravanas. The King of Tanjore was the

star offender in this regard. In the paravana confirming the cession of Karikal, he inserted two clauses not agreed to by the French, namely, that they should give him an annual present of 3,000 pagodas, and that they assist him against his enemies. The Superior Council wanted Karikal, so it went ahead with its occupation of the site. At the same time it renewed negotations to have the recorded terms conform with the verbal agreement which the paravana supposedly embodied. The annual payment was abolished after ten years, but the clause respecting military aid seems to have remained permanently in the terms of the cession.[13]

After a treaty was made, the French took steps to safeguard their rights, partly by the use of troops. Dupleix claimed that this was the only means of protection especially against the Mahrattes. In addition there was also the possibility of securing the coöperation of a native's feudal overlord in upholding treatise.[14]

The matters about which French and natives disputed and negotiated were legion. First of all, by what right did the Company exercise political jurisdiction, and constantly extend its influence? Darrac[15] puts forth the thesis that the French power in India was based on usurpation and sanctioned by time. This usurpation dates back to the late seventeenth century when turbulence in Bengal led the three commercial companies operating there, French, English and Dutch, to build forts and administer affairs within their bounds. In periods of peace the companies, by cultivating the good will of the nabab, were able to maintain these rights. Treaties with local rulers, confirmed in some instances by the nababs and even the Mogul, justified their control over their trading posts and the territory surrounding them. Then, as Dupleix's expansionist policy developed, territory quite apart from the posts was also brought under French jurisdiction, likewise by treaty. Much of that acquired after 1748 technically was not the property of the Company, but of its individual servants. However, such regions were not generally regarded as private possessions either by the grantees, the Company, or the French government. The sphere of the French jurisdiction was constantly increasing although native law, customs, and justice continued to be administered in the later acquisitions. The only advantage the French

derived from them was income from taxes which were collected by the natives. These taxes, like the laws and customs, were not French innovations, but of long standing. Possessions of this kind may be regarded as protectorates. But in the older possessions, those acquired before 1749, the Company did exercise control.[16]

The Company did not content itself with governing its own territories, but took an interest in native politics as well. It frequently interevened in native quarrels after Dumas set the example in 1738. Before this time it had made treaties of alliances with some of the lesser Indian rulers, but these had been mere gestures. It is doubtful if the French expected to become involved in any conflicts although they were prepared to furnish arms and ammunition to their allies. In two instances the Company agreed to act as arbitrator between certain rulers on the Malabar coast in case they had differences with one another or with their neighbors. It should also be noted that both governors Dumas and Dupleix had native titles which gave them considerable influence not enjoyed by the directors of other European companies. Dupleix, indeed, was one of the most powerful rulers in all India.[17]

Just as the Company at times interfered in native quarrels to set up a prince whom it felt would be favorable to it, so too the natives intervened, or more usually threatened to intervene in quarrels between the rival companies to safeguard their friends' interests or to preserve peace. Anaverdikan, when he learned in 1746 that the French and English were preparing for possible war with one another which would be detrimental to native merchants, ordered the French to maintain peace and continue their commerce. He pointed out that their factory at Pondicherry was on native territory, and implied that failure to observe peace would result in their expulsion. The French who were at the time on the point of besieging Madras went ahead with their plans, won Anaverdikan over to their point of view, and attacked the English without thereby incurring the threatened penalty.[18]

In time of war native flags were sometimes used by the French to protect their vessels. The English had little scruple about attacking French ships, no matter what flag they flew. However,

the device was not entirely useless, for while a vessel itself might not thus be safeguarded, there was always the possibility that insult to a native flag might result in native retaliation. While the Company thus sought protection it at times had occassion to complain of treatment accorded French subjects by the natives. Unjust arrests are an example. The threat of appeal to force or to some higher political authority in India was usually effective, and no actual physical conflict developing out of such cases has been noted.[19]

Territorial cessions and the grant of economic privileges bulk large in the relations of French and natives prior to the late 1740s when military matters became the leading issue. There are several reasons why the natives were willing to grant the Company territory on which it could establish trading posts. Some rulers were broadminded enough to see the advantages to commerce which would result. Sometimes it was financial need which led to a cession. A ruler knowing that the Company had an interest in some region, or because a rival company was already established there, thus giving ground for presumption that other companies might also like a post, would offer the site and perhaps a bit of dependent territory all for some insignificant sum. A grant might be made provisionally as security for a loan made by the Company. In rare instances when these loans were not repaid at maturity the Company acquired permanent title. At other times it was to enjoy the revenue from the land until the loan was liquidated. In the late 1740s and thereafter, many of the grants were made to secure French military aid or to reward the Company and private individuals for service. Grants made after 1748 and prior to Dupleix's return to France were the towns of Bahour and Vilnour with eighty dependent villages; eighty-one more aldees in the vicinity of Karikal, which itself was already French territory; Mazulipatam, where the French had long been traders; Narsapour; Divi, claimed by the English; Nizampatam, Devracotta and Condavir; and four rather important provinces, Rajamandry, Chicacol, Ellore, and Moustafanagar. Dupleix had in addition been granted the revenue from Arcate in his own name.[20]

Fairly typical of the grants made to the Company as a commercial corporation is the cession of Karikal in 1738.[21] The Company was to pay a fixed sum, 40,000 chacras, to the King of Tanjore for a fortress, a town, and five dependent villages. It also had to give an annual present to the King, just as did the Dutch and Danish. In return it received the right to send men and vessels to Karikal to take possession. It was granted the right to collect revenues, administer justice, mint money, use the produce of the soil, keep hidden treasures if any were found, and in all ways treat the site as its domain. Reciprocal protection in case of need was provided for, and especial mention is made of the fact that the Company would be protected against Dutch or Danish molestation, even to the extent of giving it a different town for the post if rivalry with other Europeans made Karikal unsuited to its needs. Vagueness in the grants was frequent. The King of Travencore was at one time prepared to make a grant to the Company of the town of Colchepatam, extending "deux heures de chemin malabares" from north to south. Provision is at times made for surrender by the natives of the merchants who failed to settle their debts with the French, but more frequently this is not the case. The mutual defense clause is a customary one, with or without provision for payment for assistance rendered.[22]

The authorities ceding territory addressed a paravana to the local administrators ordering them to turn the region over to a representative of the Company. A councillor would then go to the spot, and formally take possession of it in the name of the King of France and of the Company. Then he would hoist the flag over the fortress. Later the inhabitants appeared before him and took the oath of fidelity.[23]

Closely associated with the territorial cessions were economic concessions of various kinds. These might be granted even though no definite bit of territory were ceded to the French for a post. In that case the Company would simply have a small establishment an office, warehouse, etc., in the region where it received trade privileges. The disadvantage of this system was that lacking sovereignty over the region one was subject to arbitrary exactions by the natives, and increased commerce might well mean increased

presents for the ruler. When Renault was sent out to establish Daka,[24] the Nabab asked for a present equal to that paid him by the English. Renault protested that the French paid customs taxes from which the English were free, and that these should take the place of at least a part of the demand present. This, however, was not satisfactory to the Nabab, who caused his commerce to be interrupted. A few well placed gifts to those in authority locally brought about a temporary settlement. Then a change in the government caused new troubles. Laborers needed to furnish merchants for the Company were removed on the pretext that they were needed elsewhere. Again a present had to be given; but the French figured that it was better to give several presents under protest than acknowledge the Nabab's right to an annual one. Sometimes native merchants requested that privileges granted the Europeans be rescinded. Aliverdi Khan the far sighted ruler in Bengal made an apt reply to one such suggestion by comparing the Europeans to bees; left alone they produced honey, but molested they would attack furiously.[25]

The commercial privileges which the Company enjoyed varied at the different posts. In some cases a minimum amount of goods had to be purchased. At Mahé it had a monopoly of the pepper trade of the surrounding country; if there were more than it desired, the surplus would be sold only to those who secured its approval. In some places it was free to carry on such commerce as it saw fit without paying any customs duties. Yanaon and Mazulipatam are cases in point. Neither monopoly or free trade were customary concessions. Only isolated examples of each occur.[26] More usual was the placing of a low tax or duty on the commerce of the Company. These taxes were levied on both imports and exports, and varied with both time and place. Typical are the following; Surat, five and a half percent; Bengal three and a half percent until 1732, and two and a half percent after that date; Bassora, three and a half percent; and Mazulipatam free. The King of Nelisseram was to receive from the Company five fanon for a candil of pepper, eight fanon for a candil of cardamon, and one fanon for a candil of araque. These were slight duties, as a fanon was equivalent to about one livre, whereas a

candil was over five hundred pounds. These rates were in some instances more favorable than those imposed on the natives. Goods intended for the use of the Company's employees and not for sale might be introduced at some places duty free. A very strange regulation was in vogue in the Ganges basin above Chandernagor. Goods destined for Patna passed by Ougly where they were subject to a two and a half percent tax which entitled them to free passage up the river. If on arrival at Patna it was found that the duty had not been paid, the goods were subject to a four and a half percent tax. Goods exported from this post paid but four percent. At Surat, the Company was bound to turn over to the ruler such commodities as he desired, but he had to pay the market price.[27]

Despite the concessions granted them the Europeans were sometimes forced to take vigorous steps to protect themselves. An example of one such instance occurred at Patna. In 1738 the Nabab tried to prevent Europeans from trading in saltpetre with a view to forcing them to buy from his own representative. But a coalition of three European companies was able to frustrate the Nabab's plans.[28]

For certain territorial concessions payments had to be made which amounted to tribute. These were only a few thousand pagodas, and were distributed among several rulers. At times controversy arose over them. When Bhonsla with a force of Mahrattes reached the vicinity of Pondicherry in 1740 he wrote to Dumas,

"Our sovereign . . . made over to you a considerable territory. You agreed to pay an annual tribute which you never have paid. At last after a considerable time, (forty years) the army of the Mahrattes has appeared in these districts . . . We have . . . orders to collect tribute due from the European towns on the seacoast . . . You know how we have treated the town of Bassein. My army is very numerous, and it wants money for its expenses. If you do not act in conformity with my demands, I shall know how to draw from you wherewith to pay my whole army."

Dumas' reply is an interesting one.

"You tell me" (he writes,) "that we have owed for forty years past a tribute to your king. Never has the French nation been subject to any

tribute. It would cost me my head if the King of France, my master, were informed that I had consented to pay tribute to anyone . . . I have heard what has happened at Bassein, but that place was not defended by Frenchmen."

A study of the records of 1690 shows that his position was justified, for sovereign rights had been virtually purchased by a loan of 6,000 chacras to the native ruler.[29] Dumas may have hesitated to use the term "tribute," but the fact remains that at Karikal at least such payments were made. Here in the course of time the French were able to secure a substantial reduction on the original sum. Even so they were negligent in making payments, whereupon the natives tried to coerce them by circulating a rumor that the Dutch and English were to occupy the territory. This caused the inhabitants who feared conflict to desert one of the aldees.[30]

A concession which was considered as a mark of great favor was that of the right to operate a mint at Pondicherry. This was granted only in return for munificient gifts, and was the climax to long drawn out negotations. Dumas secured this right for the Company in 1736 from the Grand Mogul at Delhi. As early as 1724 the Superior Council had entertained hopes of it. St. Hilaire, a European with some influence over the Nabab of Arcate in that year had given the Council assurance that in the course of three months he would have for it the privilege it desired. The Nabab, he stated, had already asked for the necessary firman from the court at Delhi. So confident were the French of securing the grant that they were even then holding a present in readiness. But things did not break right for the Company, then, nor for a dozen years to come. Dupleix, at the time only a subordinate official, prepared a memoir, pointing out the special value of mint rights, and advocating generous expenditures to secure them. Lenoir actively supported negotiations toward this end, and to him as much as to Dumas credit is probably due for the final success. But Dumas, being governor at the time, was the one on whom honors were showered. He was made a Knight of the Order of St. Michael.[31]

The privilege was indeed an important one, the estimated profits being 200,000 roupies per year. Moreover the Company was not

hereafter troubled by having to carry its bullion to a mint outside of Pondicherry, thus being subjected to expense and delay in converting European funds into Indian money. However, it was not sufficient that it mint coins; it had to be able to circulate them. In the province of Arcate, roupies of Pondicherry circulated freely, but in other parts of India this was not always the case. The Mogul allowed each province to mint its own money, and the various rulers wanted their own coins used, that the mint rights accruing to them be so much the greater. Indeed, a representative of a European company might consider himself fortunate if he could carry his funds directly to a native mint, rather than having to present them through some intermediary who collected a commission for the service.[32]

Dupleix in Bengal was willing to pay 40,000 roupies for even this moderate privilege. Seven years of waiting were necessary, however, before a paravana granting it was forthcoming, and then at a higher figure. In the meantime the Company had secured the right to mint money which technically could circulate in all parts of Hindustan. Fatachem, who had long enjoyed the privilege of presenting funds to the mint in Bengal, feared his interests would thereby be injured, for he believed that the French would now use their own roupies instead of those of Bengal, known as roupies *sicca*. He circulated rumors that the French roupies were short weight, and thereby caused much embarrassment for the Company. It was under these circumstances that Dupleix finally came to an agreement with the Nabab, whereby the Company could carry its funds direct to Bengal mints. This privilege cost 50,000 roupies, but it carried with it a definite recognition of the right to make use of the concession granted Dumas in 1736 of circulating roupies minted at Pondicherry[33]

It may be wondered why under these circumstances the Company would use the Bengal mints, having to pay a fee. By considering two facts the reason becomes apparent. Fatechem's influence over the Bengal money changers might be used to discourage the circulation of the Company's coins; secondly, it was natural that many Bengal merchants would prefer payment in coin of the province rather than in that of Pondicherry or Arcate, despite

the fact that the Grand Mogul had made these coins current in all parts of his realm.

In order to keep on good terms with the natives and to protect French interests from molestation by rulers allied with rival companies the Council at times found it expedient to place its military forces at the disposal of some native ruler. The Company had no general policy governing the form such aid should take, or the conditions under which it should be given. Indeed, it tended to discourage the use of its troops for such purposes, but it was hard for a governor with a visible force at his disposal, and with material gain to tempt him, to turn a deaf ear to pleas for help.[34]

The natives had good reason for requesting French aid. The Company's forces were better trained than native troops, had better equipment, and better leaders. Time and again they proved their worth, rabble though they might be according to Dupleix. To cite instances of their use would be somewhat apart from our subject. Let it suffice to say that after 1748 the practice of loaning troops was a very general one, but one which was discountenanced by the Paris directors.[35] Being largely divorced from the commercial interests of the Company, it is mentioned here simply as one of the means employed to maintain the good will of the natives and to safeguard existing interests.

Before the Company became involved in Indian wars by what the directors considered to be the ill judged actions of its governor, the Council had on occassion granted military supplies or sent technical advisers to the natives. Some of the treaties ceding territory had stipulated that it do so. Supplies were sold by the councils for whatever sums they could get from the natives. Protests on the part of the latter about prices charged were likely to result in a reduction, for the councils preferred to sacrifice a few roupies rather than the goodwill of their friends. Free gifts of old cannon were also made at times, the councils stating that they preferred to give them away rather than establish the practice of selling them to the natives.[36]

It was seemingly only fair that the Company should give some military aid in the form of troops, ammunition or supplies, in return for the privileges granted it by the natives. The right to

raise sepoy troops was an important concession which had been granted to Dumas, of which the Company took full advantage. Yet it is a question whether the loan of European troops was the proper way for the governors to show their appreciation.[37]

The final point to be considered in dealing with the relations of the Company with the natives is religion. Jesuits in the Company's employ were not wont to be tolerant; yet if the Company were to remain on good terms with the natives, their religious practices had to be respected. Some of the natives realized this, and one consequently finds terms in the treaties to the effect that Brahmins should not be molested; that the usual dues might be collected, in in a region granted to the Company, by the native religious authorities; even the cow, sacred to the Hindus, was safeguarded. In a treaty with Bayanor, in 1721 it is stated that the Company was not to slaughter cows in his territory. Elsewhere one reads that the whites were not to resort to the pools where the Brahmins bathed.[38]

Even if not specifically provided for by treaty in all cases, religious toleration was a practical prerequisite to success. On one occassion the Superior Council had to guarantee to the natives under its jurisdiction that they would not suffer from certain religious restrictions. Otherwise it was feared that there would be a wholesale exodus from Pondicherry, which would have caused great embarrassment to the Company. In rare instances the councils had also to take steps to safeguard persecuted Christians who fled to them from native oppressors.[39]

From the foregoing pages it should be evident that not a little of the Company's money and its employees time was given to problems not purely commercial. Nevertheless, viewed in their broader aspects, the acquisition of territory in reasonable amounts, of mint rights, of customs concessions, or the establishment of friendly relations with the natives can all be shown to have had a distinct bearing on the Company's commercial welfare.

1. Arch. Col., C2, 29, fol. 27, Deliberations of Company 1740.
2. C.S.P.V., III, 267.
3. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8971, fol. 113; Pillai's *Journal* III, 365.
4. *Lettres et conventions des Gouverneurs de Pondichéry*, p. 107.
5. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 12087, fols. 5-7.

6. Aff. Etr., Asie, 15, fol. 120.
7. C.S.P.V., II, 409; Arch. Col., C2, 82, fol. 386; Council at Chandernagor to the Company, September 30, 1750; Arch. S. et O., E, 3746, fol. 22, Letter by Dupleix, April 27, 1750; Pillai's *Journal,* III, 265.
8. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8929, fol. 71, Director at Yanaon to Superior Council, January 31, 1744; 9146, fol. 97, Dupleix to Co., February 16, 1753; C.S.P.V., I, 1; II, 409; III, 90, 199, 254; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fols. 19, 32, Delib. of Co., 1734.
9. *Madras Record Cal.,* 1740-44, p. 82.
10. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8929, fol. 27, Superior Council to Boyelleau, October 11, 1746.
11. *Ibid.,* 9145, fol. 13, Co. to Dupleix, February 1, 1752.
12. *Lettres et conventions.*
13. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8925, fol. 149-50; Arch. Col., Inde 457, fol. 32; *Lettres et conventions,* p. 107 *seq.; C.S.P.V.,* III, 191-93, 199.
14. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8929, fol. 74, Superior Council to Boyelleau, March 10, 1745; 9146, fol. 94, Dupleix to Co., February 16, 1753.
15. Arch. Aff. Etr., Asie, I, 143.
16. *Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix,* 1759, p. 213. See chapter IV.
17. Malleson, *History of the French in India,* p. 76; Arch. Col., Inde 457, fol. 19-22.
18. *Lettres et conventions,* p. 5; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8931, fol. 131, Anaverdekan to Dupleix; Martineau, *Dupleix,* II, 282-84.
19. Dodwell, The War of the Austrian Succession, in *Cambridge History of the British Empire,* IV, 121; Martineau, *Dupleix,* II, 282-84; Arch. Col., C2, 22, fol. 238, Letter by Lenoir, June 30, 1729.
20. Arch. Col., C2, 38, fol. 68, Memoir of 1752 lists possessions of Co. Martineau, Dupleix, III, 6, gives a similar list; Arch. Col., C2, 80, fol. 176, Treaty between Dumas and the King of Tanjore; C.S.P.V., II, 103, III, 151; Arch. Col., Inde 457, fol. 15, Treaty with Bayanor, 1726; *Lettres et conventions,* p. 23, 83, 90; Bib. Nat., A.F.F. 8971, fol. 122, Chandasahib to Dupleix.
21. *Lettres et conventions,;* p. 60-69; C.S.P.V., III, 151.
22. *Lettres et conventions, passim;* Arch. Col., Inde 457, *passim; Ibid.,* C2, 80, fol. 176.
23. *Lettres et conventions,* p. 66, 71, 94; Pillai's *Journal,* I, 82.
24. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8933, fol. 124-25; Superior Council to Co., September 20, 1750.
25. Hill, *Three Frenchmen in Bengal,* p. 3.
26. Martineau, *Origines de Mahé.* p. 284, 291, 297 *re.* pepper; *Lettres et conventions,* 37; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8929, fol. 45, 55, being firemans of 1725 and 1735 respectively.
27. *Lettres et conventions,* pp. 1, 2, 19, 20, 23, 25; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9355, fol. 221; 9226, fol. 8; 8925, fol. 5; Martineau, *Dupleix,* III, 425; C.S.P.V., III, 153.
28. Martineau, *Dupleix,* I, 389.
29. Malleson, *op. cit.,* p. 86; *Lettres et conventions,* p. 7.
30. *Ibid.,* pp. 69, 70, 87, 254; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8926, fol. 89, Director at Karikal to the Superior Council, April 17, 1747.
31. Arch. Col., C2, 73, fols. 35-36, Superior Council to Company, October 15, 1724; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9352, fol. 66, 67, Dupleix's memoir 1727; Pillai's *Journal,* I, 4, 42. C.S.P.V. III, 48.
32. Malleson, *op. cit.,* p. 73.
33. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8979, fol. 6, Dupleix to Forestier, November 11, 1731; Arch. Col., C2, 76, fol. 150, Paravana of 1738; *Ibid,* Inde 457,

fol. 25; Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, ch. X. The whole chapter is devoted to this trouble with Fatechem.

34. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8971, *passim*, letters from Saladalkan, Mouzafersingue, Chandasahib, and others requesting military aid from the Company.
35. *Ibid.*, N.A.F., 9145, fol. 75-76, Company to Dupleix, February 1, 1752.
36. C.S.P.V., I, 412; II, 296-97; III, 16, 271.
37. Evolution Coloniale de la France, in *Revue des colonies françaises*, 1897, pp. 114-19.
38. C.S.P.V., III, 200; Arch. Col., Inde 457, fol. 13.
39. C.S.P.V., I, 25; Arch. S. et O., E, 3755, fol. 21, Dupleix to Barthelmy, May 27, 1753.

CHAPTER XIII.

Relations with Rival Companies

Force of circumstances, a common desire to maintain European prestige in the eyes of the natives and to promote projects of mutual value, coupled with commercial and territorial rivalries, brought the various India companies into frequent contact with one another. In Dupleix's day there were many India companies,[1] English, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Prussian, and Imperial, as well as independent Portugese traders. Some of these the French regarded as legitimate traders, others as interlopers. The English and Dutch were recognized as having legitimate interests in the East. Reasons of state, dictated[2] to Dupleix by the Company, led him to regard the Danes in the same light. The others, although an occassional favor might be rendered them, were quite generally regarded as interlopers. In considering the Companies which the French regarded as legitimate rivals, the problem of their interrelationship will be dealt with topically. But first let us dispose of the interlopers.

The Ostend Company—most famous of the interlopers—was a short lived organization. Chartered in 1722, its privileges were suspended in 1727 and abolished in 1731, as a part of the Pragmatic Sanction. Relations with the French are confined to the short period between the establishment in 1722, and its disappearance subsequent to the Anglo-Imperial treaty of 1731. The Ostenders had two posts, Bankebazzar in Bengal, and Covelong in the vicinity of Madras. In view of the concerted opposition of the English, Dutch and French, it is rather surprising to find any such permanent posts established.[3] Direct action against the Ostenders was at first out of the question, since they had wisely sought the friendship of the Nabab of Bengal. He forbade the other Europeans to attack them on penalty of the payment of five lacs of roupies. This protection was withdrawn when the English and Dutch bribed the new Nabab, Sujah Khan, with a present of 130,000 roupies, and proceeded to seize an Ostend vessel.[4]

The English and Dutch took the initative in trying to curb the Ostenders' activities by visiting and searching vessels passing up

and down the Ganges. The Congresses of Aix la Chapelle and Cambray in 1727 led to the nominal suspension of sending out ships by the Ostend Company, which evaded the issue by sailing its vessels under the Polish flag. The French at Chandernagor hesitated to join in the visit and search, lest foreign relations in Europe be jeopardized, so found themselves subject to it. Upon receipt of further instructions from Europe they joined with the English and Dutch in opposing the interlopers until the disappearance of the Ostend Company in 1731. Thus a cause of trouble between the French and the English and Dutch Companies over the right of search, as well as a competitor for native trade was removed.[5]

Profiting by this experience the French were better prepared to face another interloper, the Swedes, who with reason were suspected of attracting ex-Ostenders to their service.[6] When a Swedish ship arrived at Porto Novo in 1733, almost immediately the Superior Council forbade the inhabitants and merchants of Pondicherry to have any commercial relations with the officers and crew. The English cooperated to make things unpleasant for the newcomers. The two companies wisely decided to handle the matter in their own way, and "not to solicit the Nabab to prohibit these strangers from carrying on their trade, appreciating thereby that our importunities might open the eyes of the Moors on this side and be excited to follow the example of those at Bengal, by making our companies pay dear in the end."[7] As the Dutch had gone ahead and secured permission to expel the Swedes, the French and English decided to participate in the movement. An armed detachment was despatched to take over the supplies which the Swedes had left at Porto Novo while they continued their voyage into the Bengal region. This was followed by a joint move on the part of the French and English to capture the Swedish vessel as its commission gave it the right of reprisal, which it was felt, it would surely use on returning to Porto Novo. Plans to capture it failed, and the ship returned to Europe without being guilty of the feared reprisals. There the matter became a diplomatic issue, the French government deciding that reparations were quite in order when the Swedish ambassador brought the matter

to its attention. Pitt and Lenoir both went out of office soon after this, and some persons adopted the view that they were dismissed as a sop to the Swedes. Whether action such as this discouraged the Swedes from again attempting to participate in the trade of India, or whether they found trade in the farther East more profitable, the fact remains that they do not again seem to have tread on the French toes.[8]

Another company, the Prussian, deserves only passing mention. The Council at Chandernagor, on hearing of its establishment in 1751, decided to do all possible to impede its success by forbidding their rivermen to assist the vessels of the Prussians to ascend the river. The company proved to be one for trade in China. The activities of the Bengal Company, chartered three years later, fall outside our period.[9]

The Portugese interlopers had no commercial company controlling their interests in the East, but entrusted them to a viceroy. Their power had already declined practically to the vanishing point by the eighteenth century, so the French viewed them in a friendly light as long as their interests centered in their established posts.[10] In 1739 when their possession of Goa was menaced by the natives the Superior Council readily granted them aid in the form of ammunition. This friendship continued under the governership of Dupleix, and was of especial value to the French. On several occassions, particularly after war with the English broke out, the French Company used Portugese vessels for both communication and freight purposes.[11] Toward the close of his administration, Dupleix pointed out that the viceroy was anxious to establish an alliance with the French. This would be favorable to their interests, as the post of Goa would thus be permanently open to the French Company. Although they held Mahé on the Malabar coast, the French had no good harbor where vessels could winter or seek refuge from the Angrias pirates. However such an alliance might result in the French being involved in a Portugese effort to reestablish their influence at St. Thomé and Bassein, so the Company counselled Dupleix that it would be satisfied if only he contiued to live on peaceful terms with them.[12]

Of the companies having what the French recognized as legitimate interests in the East, the Danish was least powerful. Throughout the period under consideration, Danes and French were usually on friendly terms. Danish vessels were at times used for communication purposes, and there was an agreement for the mutual rendition of fugitives from justice, and deserters.[13] The Danes received the friendly aid of the French in Bengal in 1753 when they decided to reestablish their post which they had abandoned in 1714. Contemporary trouble with the English may explain this friendly attitude on the part of the French. Moreover, the Company in 1752 instructed Dupleix to grant such favors as he could to the Danes, "because the courts desired, to establish reciprocal privileges between the two companies."[14] This idea was quite in line with Dupleix's policy; anything which would tend to facilitate the destruction of the English Company, even the possible development of another rival, was not foreign to his views. Yet while the Danes were indebted to the French, at the time of Godeheu's arrival they were regarded as being better disposed toward the English. They even had the presumption to encroach on French territory in Bengal, after the French had aided them to establish themselves there. But the Danes were not formidable rivals, and their one attempt to rise to power by absorbing the interests of the ex-shareholders of the Ostend Company had been cut short by the united action of the French, English, and Dutch.[15]

The French had more extensive relations with the English than with any of their other rivals. The long conflict of the 1740s and 1750s has led many to think of the two companies as sworn and bitter enemies. Rivals they were at all times, enemies often; but when their rivalry did not assume a belligerent form, they found it both possible and profitable to cooperate in some matters. The Dutch in India tended to confine their attention to commerce, and maintained a peaceful policy, so they naturally came much less in conflict with the French than did the English. Linguistic difficulties[16] played their part in complicating relations, for it appears to have been more difficul to find a French-Dutch interpreter than a French-English one.

The three companies had many mutual contacts and problems. In the absence of a regular postal system, they made use of each other's facilities for communication[17] both in India, and with Europe. English aid was of particular value to the French in keeping Pondicherry and Chandernagor in touch with each other. Care naturally had to be taken as to the type of correspondence thus entrusted to one's rival. The two companies along with the Dutch temporarily maintained a courier system[18] between Bassora and Aleppo, despatches being sent off every two months. The French made occassional use of English vessels to transport troops and supplies, but in the latter case it is not clear whether they were dealing with individuals or with the English Company.[19] English ports of call were also used by the French, St. Helena being a favorite, while the English used the Isle of Bourbon. Ganges pilots maintained by the two Companies were exchanged when necessary.[20]

In the field of commerce there is one outstanding instance of French cooperation with the English and Dutch. This was the attempt to control the price paid for saltpetre.[21] The first attempt in 1736 proved ineffective because of native threats to cancel concessions made for trade at Patna. In 1744 however, the companies agreed by treaty that only one of them should purchase saltpetre from the natives, and then divide it with the others. The English ceased to cooperate regularly in this matter after 1747, but the French and Dutch despite some arguments over the amounts to which each was entitled, continued to purchase their supplies jointly. The advantages of this system were obvious to the officials in India; yet the Paris directors wrote to De Leyrit at Chandernagor in 1750, expressing the hope that saltpetre could be obtained without seeking Dutch or English cooperation.

Efforts were made by the French and English to control pepper prices[22] in and about Mahé and Talichery. Two ineffective treaties were made in 1728 and 1737. A third, in 1742, provided that if merchants of either company failed to observe the price agreement, which was subject to annual change, a suitable remedy should be adopted. Failure to observe the treaty terms may be explained by the fact that pepper was almost the sole article export-

ed from this region, and that unusual efforts had to be made to secure suitable supplies if a cargo for a vessel had to be made up hurriedly. English perfidy is also offered by the French as an explanation for the violation of the treaties. Because of their well established position on the Malabar Coast, the Dutch served a useful purpose in furnishing the French with a ready source of pepper when the regions around Mahé could not supply the demand.

In 1752 the French, English and Dutch in Bengal formed an alliance to keep the roupies of Arcate circulating.[23] The local Nabab, anxious to increase the circulation of his own currency, had forbidden the use of roupies of Arcate. This was contrary to the concessions granted the companies, which had the right to make contracts in whatever currency they chose. The French suggested a suspension of commerce to bring the Nabab to his senses, but this measure proved not to be necessary, the threat alone sufficing.

Extradition of criminals and deserters furnished another problem which the companies had to solve.[24] Desertion was quite common. It was to the advantage of each company that its troops should not find harbor among its rivals. Consequently, the local councils arranged with their nearby English, Dutch or Danish neighbors for the surrender of deserters. It was a customay practice that pardon be granted to those surrendered. This provision was temporarily suspended in so far as it related to Chandernagor and Calcutta about 1729, when many of the Chandernagor garrison were deserting to the Ostend Company, with whom there was no treaty agreement. It was thought that the exemplary execution of a few who might be returned by the English would deter others from the practice.[25] The early Anglo-French treaties contained no provision for the extradition of criminals, so a deserter would occassionally commit some crime in order to ensure his freedom from his former employer. Abuses of this kind led to a modification of the agreements. Madras and Pondicherry came to an understanding to the effect that deserters, although at the same time criminals, should be surrendered. No arrangement was made between these two posts respecting criminals in general. Mahé

and Talichery on the other hand had a more far reaching agreement, which stipulated that not only sould deserters be returned, but that slaves, servants and employees of the companies, guilty of assassination, murder or theft, be also subject to extradition.

Further evidence of their cooperation is to be found in the agreements relative to their mutual rivals, the interlopers, in India. The Ostend Company's trade was hampered by the visit and search of vessels. By a cooperative effort the three companies were able to establish a boycott against the Portugese traders in the Ganges region. Their attitude toward the Swedes has already been mentioned.

The French were anxious to cooperate with the English in checking up on their employees. Fromaget, for example, writing from Paris to Cavalier, agent for the Company in London, told him he might inform the English of the price paid for tea in China. It was suggested that he transmit similar information if he could secure it from the English. Thus the Company could determine whether its agents were honest and efficient. What happened to the French suggestion is not known.[26]

In their relations with the natives the English and French companies sometimes aided each other in case of quarrels. On one occassion the French were asked to serve as arbitrators when the English got into trouble at Surat. On the Malabar Coast there was a treaty agreement for reciprocal arbitration. In case the natives refused the award, there was provision for mutual aid in the form of supplies and troops. If it were one of the European companies which rejected the decision and war developed, that company which had served as arbitrator was sworn to neutrality.[27]

There are a few instances of the two companies combining their naval resources.[28] When special precautions had to be taken to safeguard shipping due to the presence of pirates about 1752, English and French vessels sailed together with unusually large escorts to guard them against attack by the "Mogues." The military forces of the two companies were also prepared to act together on the west coast to discourage the Malabars if they took any aggressive action to interfere with commerce.

Finally in the field of friendly relations may be mentioned social intercourse between the employees of the three companies.[29] Dupleix frequently visited his neighbors partly for social and partly for business reasons. While at Chandernagor he was a frequent visitor at the home of Sichterman, director of Chinsura, who witnessed his marriage in 1741. Dupleix allowed the French to visit the Dutch, although interpost visits on the part of subordinate employees were discountenanced by the Company, lest arguments develop in view of the unfriendly feeling between the two peoples in Europe. Dupleix continued to maintain this friendly attitude toward the Dutch after he was transferred to Pondicherry.[30] An occassional example of intermarriage occurred. Dumas married the daughter of the Governor of Negapatam; Mlle. Vincent, daughter of a French employee, married Mr. Barnaval in the English service at Madras; and the sister of this man was in turn married to one of the French councillors.

One must not, on the basis of these peaceful relations, assume that the companies went out of their way to cooperate, or that altruism ever motivated their actions. Rivalry, rather than cooperation is characteristic of their relations. Naturally it was to a large extent commercial, but included conflicting claims to territory, customs privileges, labor troubles, and the question of visit and search of vessels. In commerce, the companies were ever watchful of each other, since a monopoly of certain types of trade in a given region did not preclude the possibility of a rival establishing himself on the borders. Pondicherry and Madras, or Chandernagor and Calcutta were not so far removed from one another that they could not influence each other's trade. The London directors warned the Madras Council in 1740 that it could not be too watchful of the French. A detailed description of both inbound and outgoing cargos was asked for.[31] In the early 1740s the Madras Council and the subordinate posts appear to have been especially resentful of French competition. At that time the French offered more for cloth, and accepted a shorter measure than did the English. "Unless the French investment decline the Company's trade will be ruined" wrote Prince, one of the English agents, to the Madras Council. Relief came to the English in 1744

when they were permitted by the company to pay a bit more for cloth of the ordinary variety. This, it was believed, would disappoint the French, "who plunge themselves into all manner of expenses to ruin our trade."[32] When the English flooded the Indian market with cloth, the Superior Council resorted to price cutting[33] to meet competition and to dispose of perishable goods. When Dupleix visited the director at Calcutta, he saw copper goods which the French were not then offering for sale. On his return home he had some of the goods purchased by his agents and sent as samples to France. When the English procured finer goods than the French, the Paris directors were not slow to inform Dupleix. He was instructed to make a special effort to acquire some very fine pieces of cloth and embroidered goods, since the English were fraudulently introducing theirs into France, to the detriment of the national exchequer, and the great humiliation of the Company![34] The Dutch appear to have enjoyed a slight commercial advantage over the French. In the coffee market, for example, they had Batavian or Java coffee, while the French were trying to develop plantations in the Isles with a view to increasing the local trade in India. They regarded island coffee as better than that of Java. But price meant more than quality, and so the Dutch were able to undersell them. French coffee moved slowly, although it sold for what Dupleix considered a very low price, fifteen roupies for a "man" of seventy five pounds. A somewhat similar condition existed at Surat where there was quite a market for steel. Here quality does seem to have been a consideration. La Verrier reported to Dupleix that Dutch steel, which he suspected was Swedish, was highly esteemed, and sold for ten or twelve percent more than the French product. The English were also offering a better grade than the French. However, steel, unlike coffee, was not a drug on the market.[35]

In the purchasing field the Dutch found the French to be an important rival. At one time "Cardamom of the Cabessa type," was being bought up by the French and English at such high prices on the Malabar Coast that the Dutch felt they could not compete. They contemplated the possibility of blocking the roads with many forts and thus cutting off their competitors' supplies. They were

accused of adopting this policy in the vicinity of Karikal in the Kingdom of Travancore. The plot, if there were any, failed of fruition.[36] That the Dutch should have wished to harm the French at Karikal is quite natural, for at an early date they had had possession of the city, only to surrender it to the native ruler who felt that there was no need of a Dutch post at both Karikal and Negapatam. When negotations were under way in 1738 for the French acquisition of the post, the Dutch had done their best to prevent it, and after that whenever occassion proved favorable, they made requests for the expulsion of the French and their own reestablishment.[37] Then in 1740 they got in trouble with the King of Travancore and feared French intervention. However they were assured that because of a treaty between the King of France and the Estates General of Holland the French would remain netral; but the latter specifically denied the Dutch claims to monopoly rights in Travancore or any other state in the East where there was a native ruler. If they obtained title to a region and became sovereign over it, then only might they be considered as having a right to monopolize trade.[38]

The English and French also had territorial difficulties, often developing out of the fact that one company had some unexploited concession. Its rival in time might receive an overlapping concession. The French were the invaders in most cases. Their endeavor to acquire the island of Diu furnishes an example of the tactics used by the English.[39] This island had been granted at an early date to the English Company. It had not been developed when the French began to interest themselves in the region. The English informed Iman Sahib of what was occurring, and requested him to do what he could to block the French. "It is no time to settle new factories" wrote the Madras Council to its superiors, "but if the French claim Divy Island, the English claim must be pressed so as to embarrass them." Soon the English came to realize that their original grant had not been as full and authentic as they had pretended, so they discontinued their representations to the native authorities. In the 1740s, when the French were about to establish a post at Pegou, the English hastened to develop their interests in that long neglected establishment, "to

prevent as much as we are able the French from encroaching upon our trade."[40] At the same time the councils at Mahé and Talichery were quarreling over the French post of Nelisseram on the Malabar Coast. Here we see reflected the unstable political conditions in India, for the quarrel centered around conflicting grants by two native princes. The French disputed the English claim that Nelisseram was in a region where the English and Dutch had monopoly privileges by virtue of an earlier grant. The French maintained that the prince who had granted the land had the right to do with it as he saw fit. Matters were not in the least simplified by the fact that to go overland from Mahé to Nelisseram French troops had to pass through territory of a prince friendly to the English.[41] The final outcome of this quarrel has not been determined.

As a result of Dupleix's alliances and his political influence in native circles, he was able, by 1750, to exercise considerable authority over a large part of the Deccan. He enjoyed sovereign rights over posts occupied by both Dutch and English. Here then was the germ of possible trouble between the companies, but Dupleix, wisely or through inattention, made no effort to demand of the Dutch the annual tribute they had paid to the native authorities for their posts at Palicatte and Sadras.[42] This easy going conciliatory policy was not followed when the Company established a post at Mazulipatam giving the French command of the mouth of the Kistna river. They were then enabled to collect customs on goods in transit, a practice against which the Dutch and English protested.[43]

Much more acrimonious were the relations between the French and their two principal European rivals in Bengal about 1730.[44] At this time due to the presence of the Ostend interlopers the question of visit and search arose. In 1726 the French had shown mild opposition to the Ostend Company. However it was not until 1729 when the Ostenders, now organized as the Polish Company, aroused any real concern in India. Then two Polish vessels appeared in the Ganges. One was captured by the Dutch and English. The other reached Chandernagor. As the French instructions didn't cover Polish vessels, the local council afforded it

the protection of the French flag. Thereupon the English and Dutch established a patrol at Coulpy at the mouth of the Ganges. Passports were required of all foreign vessels passing that point. At first the Council at Chandernagor submitted; but realizing the humiliating position in which this placed the French, and doubtless aroused by the unconventional garb of one of the Dutch officers, who boarded a French vessel in his dressing gown, it decided to offer resistance. A detachment of troops was put on board vessels bound down stream, which were then allowed to pass unmolested. Presently representatives of the three companies came together in a conference at Chandernagor, but failed to settle the matter. Meanwhile it had been drawn to the attention of the Paris directors, who solicited the aid of the ministry in effecting a settlement. Orders were given to captains of French ships not to show passports at Coulpy. But at the same time the council at Chandernagor was instructed to obstruct the activities of the Ostenders in any way possible, and from then on the interlopers were unable to carry on any business at Chandernagor. The Convention of Vienna in 1731 led to the disestablishment of the Ostend Company. The patrol at Coulpy was naturally discontinued. French pride had been injured, but their interests had been safeguarded against the Ostenders without their having contributed to the expense of the patrol.

The right of visit was not entirely a one sided matter, however, for during the conflict 1744 to 1748 the French had recourse to it.[45] A Dutch vessel on the west coast not having a passport was boarded by a French officer, M. Dordelin, who, after a careful inquiry, satisfied himself as to the true status of the vessel. But the Dutch at Cochin protested just as had the French in the Ganges a dozen years earlier.

About this time another vital problem arose. During the war with the English three French vessels were seized. These passed into the hands of the Dutch by purchase although such action was contrary to a treaty between France and Holland. Saladin, one of the French syndics, journeyed to Amsterdam to confer with the Dutch directors. They arranged a settlement which was not adhered to by the Dutch. The French Company seized some goods

in retaliation, and there the matter rested when St. Contest, the French ambassador, left for Holland to settle outstanding matters between the two companies, and to arrange if possible, some basis for the settlement of future disputes.[46]

Labor problems were also a possible cause of trouble. Each company had to purchase sufficient cloth to keep the native washers busy; otherwise they might desert to the rival company. For the same reason the native merchants had to be kept busy and friendly, so both companies followed the policy of giving them presents in addition to paying them.[47]

Certain petty grievances tend to show the ill feeling and suspicion that the companies had for one another.[48] There were occasions when the English questioned the good faith of the French and accused them of using forged documents, purporting to be concessions made by the natives, to support their cause. English suspicion that the French were making use of priests at Madras as spies was not likely to foster good relations. That the suspicions were proven in part groundless did not save Father Rene, one of the French priests, from being deported from India to England. This action, it can well be imagined, was not viewed with any favor by the French at Pondicherry. In 1749 another dispute developed. English troops had pursued deserters into French territory, and without the least respect for the French King, had seized their prey. Self respect on the part of the French required that they demand redress. The Superior Council so informed the English council at Fort St. David. Self defense on the part of the English led them to quibble over the territory on which the seizure had been made, and demand that the matter be referred to Europe if further explanations were required. At Calcutta, the English governor complained to the French Company when *La Sirenne* failed to salute the fort. The French in their turn demanded that the English show them due respect. In attempting to negotiate peace with the English toward the close of Dupleix's administration, it was required by the French government as a preliminary to all further action that he be recognized as Nabab. The English refused, whereupon all negotiations were broken off.

Out of grievances, real and imaginary, out of long standing com-

mercial and territorial rivalries, and out of alliances with belligerent natives, strife inevitably resulted, despite the pacific efforts of various directors. General conflict was avoided until the War of the Austrian Succession; at that time the storm broke, and came to an end only after Dupleix was removed from office. This is not the place for a detailed study of the armed conflict between the English and French companies. Our purpose is simply to show what was the nature of their relations. Attention may again be called to the fact that the possibility of war was almost ever present. Efforts were made, it is true, to prevent European conflicts having a repercussion in the East.[49] Mahé and Talichery were the most successful of the posts in establishing local neutrality. Dupleix endeavored to establish a more general neutrality, to be effective east of the Cape of Good Hope. He however had no power to bind royal ships which might be sent out; so the Madras council decided not to enter formally into any such agreement, and the Calcutta council adopted the same attitude. Consequently Dupleix's administration came to be marred by a protracted struggle with his English rivals—a struggle which not even peace in Europe was to terminate—a struggle which eventually aroused the antagonism of the Company's directors and the French government, led to the recall of Dupleix, the collapse of his plans, the abandonment of his policy, and the loss of French influence in India.

Fortunately for the French there were among the native princes some who objected to the Europeans making a battle ground of their domains. When the Nabab of Bengal learned that the French and English were at war in Europe, he issued a proclamation[50] addressed to the French, English and Dutch in the Ganges region, ordering them to commit no hostilities in his territory. This safeguarded Chandernagor. The English might blockade the entrance to the river and prevent vessels from ascending the Hoogly, but the post itself was comparatively safe. In peninsular India matters were otherwise; an English and a French war fleet presently arrived from Europe and the natives sought European alliances. Thus the French and English had an unfortunate opportunity to carry on a struggle natural enough, perhaps, in time of

a European conflict, but not easily justified after 1748 in times of nominal peace. It was this protracted and costly struggle, unnecessary and unwarranted from the Parisian standpoint, which led the Paris directorate to intervene, when reverses began to overtake French arms. They overrode Dupleix's wishes and started a twofold peace move. Negotiations were opened with London. It was seven months before even a draft of a treaty was formulated.[51] Meanwhile Godeheu had been named as special commissioner to negotiate on the spot in India.[52] Matters dragged on in London while he crossed the seas, met Saunders, the English governor at Madras, and, abandoning Dupleix's native allies, established a truce and provisional treaty in December, 1754. This might have been become the basis for further negotiations in London had not the Seven Years War broken out.

It should be noted that there was a twofold aspect to this diplomacy. Simultaneously the Company had its agents in London and in India; moreover, in both cases the French government was a participant. There does not seem to have been any clear cut division of work between the agents of the Company and the French diplomatic service. The government's interest in the Company is the point to be stressed. Mirepoix, the ambassador to the English court, was at the Company's service; Godeheu, against his own wishes, was named not by the Company but by De Machault, the Comptroller General, as special commissioner of the Company in India. The success or failure of the Company in the diplomatic field, especially the European end of it, must at the same time be regarded as success or failure on the part of the French government.[53]

Some idea of the cost of a diplomatic mission[54] is to be found in the records of the funds granted Duvelaer, agent in London for the Company, who was assisted by his brother. Between them they received 72,000 livres for their expenses and services rendered between April 1753 and February 1755, an average of 1,650 livres a month apiece. The younger brother continued his services in London after Duvelaer had returned to Paris, until after the news of Godeheu's settlement reached Europe in August, 1755. The total cost of the mission amounted to over 85,000 livres. Had

it been a success, this would have been a paltry sum to pay. Had he concluded a definite settlement, including the proposed neutrality agreement between the two Companies in the East, effective even when the two nations were at war, he would probably have saved the French many of the rights which they lost in the Seven Years War.

In the foregoing pages there are certain salient points to which attention may again be called. That there was cooperation on the part of the various companies is an idea frequently overlooked in the accounts of the past which have usually dwelt almost entirely on military matters. The Europeans might quarrel among themselves, and even seek native allies in their quarrels; but they could stand together on occassion—witness the arbitration treaties, the saltpetre combine, and the roupies affair. It is also interesting to note that the French regarded some of their rivals as legitimate, others as mere interlopers or intruders. The way in which European diplomatic policies are reflected in the activities of the companies is also worthy of note. That social relationships did exist between the employees of the rival companies is yet another point often disregarded. One is especially impressed by the way in which desire for more territory, and jealousy over the acquisition of lands by one's rivals influenced the actions of so-called commercial companies. Feudal lords never cast more jealous eyes on their neighbors' possessions. Was there not land enough and trade enough for all?

1. In the *Quarterly Review*, VIII, 131, there is reference to a Spanish Company of which no mention has been found in the eighteenth century documents.
2. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9145, fol. 65, Company to Dupleix, Jan. 12, 1752.
3. Foster, The East India Company, *Cambridge History of British Empire*, IV, 114-115; P. E. Roberts, *A Historical Geography of the British Dominions*, VII, *India*, pp. 64-67; Arch. Marine, B2, 275, fol. 16, Minister of Marine to Company, Jan. 3, 1726; fol. 118, Minister of Marine to Dodun, Feb. 18, 1726.
4. Arch. Col., C2, 23, fol. 130; Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 115, 116.
5. Arch. Col., C2, 23, fol. 129, Company to Cavalier, June 20, 1730; vol. 24, fol. 109; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9357, fol. 89, Council at Ft. William to Dupleix, Aug. 2, 1732; fols. 91-92, Company's orders *re.* Ostenders; A.F.F., 8979, fol. 70; Arch. Aff. Etr., Asie, II, 450-485.
6. Arch. Col., C2, 24, fol. 111, D'Espremenil to Company, Sept. 24, 1731.
7. India Office, Home Misc., 74, p. 233, Superior Council to Gov. Pitt, Sept. 30, 1733.

8. Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 220, 226; C.S.P.V., II, 379, 383, 385, 388-89.
9. C.S.C.C., III, xi,xii, and 416, 417; Foster, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
10. The French resisted Portugese intrusion in the Ganges region shortly after the Ostend trouble. Yet in 1744 they issued a passport to a Portugese vessel to facilitate its trade in this region. C.S.C.C., II, 328; Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 219.
11. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8930, fol. 175, Superior Council to viceroy of Goa, July 5, 1739; *Ibid.*, 9145, fol. 35, Company to Dupleix, Sept. 30, 1750; C.S.C.C., II, 385-86; C.S.P.V., II, 402.
12. Arch. Aff. Etr., Asie, VI, 278, 281; Martineau, *Dupleix*, III, 447-48.
13. Communication, P. Co., I, 205; IV, 46; C.S.P.V., I, 25; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9148, fol. 39; *Lettres et conventions des Gouverneurs de Pondichéry*, fol. 55. Deserters, Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8925, fol. 7.
14. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8933, fol. 360, Superior Council to the Company, Jan. 16, 1756; 9145, fol. 65, Company to Dupleix, Jan. 12, 1752; Martineau, *La politique de Dupleix*, p. 108.
15. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 12087, fol. 136; N.A.F. 8933, fol. 360; Foster, *op. cit.*, 114-115.
16. C.S.C.C., III, 339, 369.
17. P. Co., I, 56, 385; C.S.C.C., I, 87; II, 321, 359; Arch. Col., C2, 26, fol. 20, Deliberations of the Company, 1734; *Ibid.*, 37, fol. 143, Company to Council at Chandernagor, Dec. 4, 1751; Pillai's *Journal*, III, 280.
18. Arch. Col., C2, 29, fol. 202, Delib. of Co., 1741.
19. C.S.C.C., III, 390, French troops were carried in an English vessel to Bengal, 1737; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8980, fol. 11, Dupleix to Gov. Martin, June 26, 1737.
20. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8979, fols. 60-61, Dupleix to Stackhouse, Oct. 20, 1732; vol. 12090, fol. 25; Arch. Marine, 230, *passim;* Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 210, 211; Arch. Col., C2, 37, fol. 47, Memoir of 1751; India Office, French in India, I, letter 19, Fromaget and Cavalier to the English Company, March 9, 1734.
21. Arch. Aff. Etr., Asie, I, 182, Darrac memoir; C.S.C.C., III, 262, 263, 342, 343. India Office, Dutch Records, VII, sec. 69; Arch. Col., C2, 36, fol. 189, Company to de Leyrit, Nov. 21, 1750.
22. Martineau, *Origines de Mahé*, pp. 203-204, 302-303; Bib. Nat., N.A. F., 9062, fol. 2, Mahé-Talichery treaty, 1742; C.S.C.C., III, 235.
23. C.S.C.C., III, 183, 203, 215, 429. Even when the French were cooperating with the English to safeguard the circulation of roupies of Arcate in Bengal, the Superior Council in writing to the Council at Chandernagor stated that the English were doing their best to destroy French commerce in India.
24. P. Co., I, 311; C.S.C.C., I, 25; III, 400; Bib. Nat., A.F.F. 8979, fol. 47, Dupleix to Stackhouse, Aug. 28, 1732; *Ibid.*, N.A.F. 9062, fol. 14, Mahé-Talichery treaty, 1736; *Madras Rec. Cal.* 1740-44, p. 72; India Office, Fort St. David Factory Records, V, fol. 75, Aug. 1740.
25. Arch. Col., C2, 34, fol. 149; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8933, fol. 31-32.
26. India Office, French in India, I, letter of July 28, 1731.
27. Arch. Col., C2, 29, fol. 59; 83, fol. 99; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9062, fol. 2.
28. C.S.C.C., III, 440; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9062, fol. 2.
29. Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 210, 213; II, 417, 418; Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8981, fol. 45, Dupleix to Rev. Father Thomas, Oct. 21, 1738.
30. Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 61, 214-217; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9346, fol. 14, "Come eat of my soup and give me the pleasure of seeing you" wrote

Dupleix to Vernon on complimenting him on his appointment to the post of Governor of Negapatam. Arch. S. et O., E, 3756, fol. 9.

31. *Madras Record Cal.*, 1740-44, p. 501.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 152, 169, 183, 483, 501.
33. C.S.P.V., II, 364.
34. Bib. Arsenal, 4743, fol. 45, Dupleix to the Company, Dec. 19, 1735; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9144, fol. 196, Company to Dupleix, July 5, 1748.
35. Bib. Nat., A.F.F. 8981 fol. 56; Dupleix to Comptroller General, Jan. 5, 1739; 12087, fol. 37.
36. *Madras Dutch Records*, XIII; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8925, fol. 19, Director at Karikal to Dupleix, Sept. 30, 1751.
37. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8925, fol. 8, 24, 76.
38. Arch. Col., C2, 29, fol., 59, Superior Council to Dutch director at Cochin, Jan. 26, 1740.
39. *Madras Rec. Cal.*, 1740-44, pp. 142, 283, 307.
40. India Office, Records of Fort St. George, Diary and Consultation Book, 1752, fol. 3.
41. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9145, fol. 159, Company to Dupleix, Dec. 26, 1752.
42. India Office, French in India, II, letter by the President and Council of Fort St. George, Mar. 9, 1754.
43. Arch. Col., C2, 38, fols. 114, 115; Arch. Aff. Etr. Ang., 434, fol. 227, Mirepoix to the Sec. of State, March 29, 1752.
44. Ostend Co. see Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 112-16; India Office, French in India, I, Memoir from the *Compagnie des Indes* to Waldegrave and Memoir by the *Garde des Sceaux* to Waldegrave, Aug. 28, 1732; *Ibid., Home Misc.*, 74, pp. 172-3, 595. Arch. Col., C2, 23, fol. 129, Company to Cavalier, June 20, 1730; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8933, fol. 44, Company to Council at Chandernagor, July 22, 1731; *Ibid.*, N.A.F., 9357, fol. 85, Council at Fort William to Dupleix, Sept. 13, 1732; fol. 89, Council at Fort William to Dupleix, Aug. 21, 1732; fols. 91-92, Company's orders *re.* Ostenders, *circa* 1732; fols. 95-96, correspondence of the Council at Chandernagor with Chinchurat, 1733. The French in their correspondence with the Dutch referred to "un homme vêtu d'une robe de chambre, habillemen peu convenable à la commission dont il été chargé." Arch Aff. Etr., Asie, II, fol. 485, doc. 123, doc. 126. C.S.C.C., III, 382, 383.
45. P. Co., IV, 348.
46. Arch. Col., C2, 32, fol. 31; Andre et Bourgeois, *Recueil des instructions aux ambassadeurs;* Holland, III, 188; Arch. Col., C2, 36, fol. 256.
47. *Madras Rec. Cal.*, 1740-44, pp. 303, 304, 292; C.S.P.V., II, 365.
48. India Office, Records of Fort St. George, 1752, fol. 46; Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 8929, fol. 295, Company to Superior Council, Dec. 28, 1726; 8931, fol. 27, Superior Council to Floyer, Oct. 30, 1749; 9150, fol. 153; *Ibid.*, A.F.F., 12087, fol. 133; Arch. Aff. Etr. Ang. 436, fol. 262, Lambertye to Sec. of State, London, May 11, 1752, *re.* recognition of Dupleix as Nabab. Voltaire maintains that even if Dupleix did use forged documents he was merely following the custom common to the Nababs. *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 26, *Fragmens sur l'Inde*, p. 359, edition of 1784.
49. *Madras. Rec. Cal.*, 1740-44, *passim;* Arch. Col., C2, 31, fol. 216, Syndics of the Company to de Fulvy, Oct. 20, 1745; C.S.C.C., III, 348-57.
50. C.S.C.C., III, 333, 350.
51. Martineau, *Dupleix*, IV, 228; 371; Arch. Aff. Etr., Asie, XII, 327;

Ibid., Ang. 435, letter by Mirepoix, Feb. 10, 1753; *Ibid.*, St. Contest to Mirepoix, Feb. 23, 1753.

52. India Office, Orme Mss., 17, pp. 151-232.
53. India Office, Fr. in India, IV, *passim.*
54. Arch. Col., C2, 41, fols. 129, 241, 250, 295. In addition to the expense allowance of the two negotiators, there is an item, 1200 livres "to be paid for reasons known to the committee." India Office, Fr. in India, IV, dratt of Duvelaer's treaty under entry of 23 May, 1753.

CHAPTER XIV.

Conclusion.

A study of this nature does not lead to momentous conclusions, nor have the sources investigated led the author to develop any revolutionary theories about the subject. My purpose has been to show how the Company conducted its affairs and what the means to this end were. This, I trust, has been possible, although the materials have at times been fragmentary. However there is a question which might naturally arise in the mind of the reader. Was the organization of the Company a satisfactory one; did it enable the Company to fulfill the purpose of its creators? The question is one which cannot be answered in a word, for there are various factors which have to be taken into consideration.

First, what were the purposes in the minds of the creators? The preamble of the Decree of 1719 reads, "We have considered it proper for the welfare of our Kingdom to reestablish and increase the commerce of the French with India, and preserve the honor of the nation by paying to those people the debts contracted by the Company."[1] The people referred to are Indians, especially persons of Surat to whom the old Company was indebted, and to whom no payments had been made for over a decade. Nor were these debts ever paid in full. The disposable capital of the Company seldom sufficed for the needs of commerce, let alone paying off the burden of debt left by its predecessor.[2] In the matter of reestablishing and increasing the French trade with India, the Company met with greater success, for to accomplish this end all that it had to do was introduce even the smallest of cargoes, as its predecessor had been virtually defunct in all but name for a decade.

One must also consider that the Company had a monopoly of Oriental trade. Did it satisfactorily supply France with the commodities which that country needed? Weber, after a careful study and analysis of the situation, arrives at the conclusion that it ordinarily furnished as many goods as there was market for, and at a price comparing favorably with that which private traders would have had to charge.[3] The Company then can be said to have fulfilled the primary purpose for which it was created. That it did

not pay the debts of its predecessors and thus safeguard French honor in the East can have mattered little to a government which itself was burdened with a debt of over two billion livres, the nonpayment of which seemed to weigh but lightly on its Bourbon conscience.

In answer to the other part of the question as to the satisfactory organization, one can categorically say "no." And the explanation is as brief—"graft." But this is an intriguing word. What does it signify in this connection? Fraud and mismanagement were rampant in the Company, whether one turns his attention to Paris, Lorient, the high seas or India. No attempt is made here to list all the cases of fraud and graft met with in this study; I wish to show only that it was fairly prevalent and characteristic of the whole administration.

At Paris the greatest abuse was probably in regard to the number and character of the directors. They were certainly well paid, to say the least. Why indeed should eight or ten men draw salaries of over 10,000 livres per annum there, while the employees in India, with one exception, were paid less than half that sum? One might object that in India they could carry on local trade to supplement their meagre salaries. True; but then might they not neglect the Company's interest at times when private interests required attention? And moreover what were the responsibilities which lay on the shoulders of the directors that they should have been so well paid? What matters of policy did they have to decide? Did not the King's Commissioners really direct the Company for them? So it would seem from the accounts preserved. The Paris directors then are to be considered not only as overpaid, but also as underworked. Time after time one reads of the need for reform in the Paris administration. The directors certainly appreciated the value of economy to the Company, but that this should ever affect their own purses was a thought that they carefully kept out of mind.[4]

At Lorient, to recall an instance cited elsewhere, there was graft to be found in the purchasing end of the business. Many a bale of forbidden goods was surreptitiously disembarked there. There was even a manufacturer of false seals[5] resembling those employed

by the Company to be attached to its goods, in whose establishment, we are told, there was no unemployment problem. Nor can the town of Nantes stand forth clear of inditement, for there was negligence too when sales were held on the banks of the Loire.

On the high seas, incapacity took its place side by side with graft. Many a captain—the records fortunately do not permit one to say all—was guilty of taking for his own table supplies which had been embarked for the crew, none too well fed at best. And who can work on an empty stomach, especially if one's last meal was salt beef, and the next one likely to be salt pork? As if it were not enough to have some dishonest captains, the Company in the early days got hold of some inefficient ones as well, and apparently was not much more successful when it was training its own officers. In a memoir[6] addressed to Duverney in 1726 one reads of the command of a vessel being given to a favorite who had been to sea but twice, and that at the tender age of thirteen. The individual in question had never served as an officer, nor did he appear to have much of a sense of honor, for he carried 112,000 livres worth of goods for his personal account without the Company's consent. Nor does the record of vessels which had sailed from Europe and failed to make the return trip because one of the councils in the East had to condemn them speak well for those entrusted with their outfitting and repair.

In India the same story has to be retold. Scheming employees were there too, anxious to promote their own ends regardless of what the fate of the Company might be. Godeheu[7] tells of a native agent who had, through the negligence of the European employees, been able to defraud the Company with padded records of his expenditures. La Bourdonnais, too, found much fraud. The clerks, he claimed, could change the records with too much facility, thus encouraging crooked work on their own part and on that of the other employees. He maintained that fidelity and intelligence seldom went hand in hand; nevertheless, considering the guile of the natives, he goes on to say that he felt preference should be given to intelligence rather than integrity![8]

Attention must here be called to the interests of the employees foreign to commerce. The outstanding instance of what appears

to us to be nothing short of time wasting, but what to the Council was a vital issue, was a long drawn out religious quarrel. Should they employ Jesuits or Capucins; should the almoners live in the Company's enclosure or where they saw fit; and should they have vesper services in the fort? Volumes were written on the subject, not all by councillors in the Company's time, 'tis true, but even so the Council as a whole deliberated on the subject most verbosely. What else could we expect, however, when a councillor would go so far as to regulate the color of his clothes by the ornaments of the church?[9]

The fraudulent introduction of goods into Europe and India seems to figure most prominently among the sins of commission charged against the employees. Ships' officers were most favorably placed for such activities, but they were not alone guilty. Dupleix might write that the Indian councillors had no part in illicit embarkations because of the lack of confidence they had in the officers—a feeling which was entirely mutual—but the records do not bear him out. There is good ground for believing that Dupleix himself while at Chandernagor sent some 200,000 livres worth of merchandise home, where it was sold for him by friends in the very court of France itself.[10] The harm done by those who carried on this contraband trade was not simply that it deprived the Company of some cargo space and forced it to face a certain amount of competition in sales, but in addition its posts might suffer. Dupleix, for example, had occassion to write the directors[11] that "it is certain that your vessels are encumbered with beverages, with the result that the goods which we demand and which the posts need remain in the warehouses at Lorient, and never reach us. All your posts lack lead, iron and sail cloth." Not so frequent an occurrence, but surely to be classed as a greater crime was the sale of the Company's goods for one's own credit. Equally detrimental to the Company's intrest was the activity of the employees who gave away goods from the Company's stores, although perhaps the soul of the guilty party was one shade whiter than if he had burdened himself with filthy lucre as well.[12]

Dishonesty on the part of the employees is hardly indicative of high character, but it does indicate a certain degree of ability,

if they were able to carry their schemes to fruition despite the various visits, inspections and audits which were a part of the Company's system. Nevertheless many of the employees were incapable. This is to be explained by two facts, first the inadequate salaries, and second, favoritism. Because of the first, qualified individuals would not seek service in the lower ranks of the commercial employees, except it be that they had some resources of their own to tide them over to a period when they would reach the more lucrative post of councillor. Favoritism was to be found in all parts of the service. Powerful influence was necessary to get an appointment as director; ability counted for little; and one sometimes had to stoop low to keep a post once obtained. De Fulvy,[13] commissioner of the King was reputed to be a pensioner of several of the Company's principal employees. Dumas[14] is said to have obtained his appointment as Governor by a 30,000 livre gift to a *valet de chambre* of Cardinal Fleury. La Bourdonnais owed his advancement to similar tactics, and eventually profiting by their example, Dupleix too made his little donation to the courtiers at Versailles. After his appointment as governor, he continued to send gifts to France. But Dupleix was economical; there was nothing to be gained by bribing someone who had lost favor at court, so he sent presents at times to his personal friends for distribution where they would do the most good. Favoritism would not necessarily result in the Company securing unsatisfactory employees. Many of those appointed rested at least in part on bribery rendered valuable service. Dumas is an example, and Dupleix also, although the Company showed him but scant appreciation at any time for the services he rendered it. But many other employees were of little merit.

The Company was indeed a hot bed of corruption. A queen, a cardinal, many a duke and minister, to say nothing of an all powerful mistress, could not all have their favorites in office and still leave the Company with an entirely praiseworthy personnel. Even if one were to admit the form of organization and administration of the Company to be entirely satisfactory, which was not the case, one must still recognize the fact that graft, fraud and incapacity were all too prevalent.

1. Malleson, *History of the French in India,* p. 47 gives an English translation of the preamble of the decree of 1719.
2. Martineau, *Dupleix,* II, 144-45.
3. Weber, *La Compagnie des Indes,* pp. 510-11.
4. Dupleix's correspondence is full of criticism of the directors. Cf. especially Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9147, fol. 280; 9150, fol. 210; 9151, fol. 24.
5. Weber, *op. cit.,* p. 509.
6. Arch. Nat., F50, vol. 51.
7. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8993, fol. 159, Godeheu to De Leyrit, February 12, 1755.
8. Arch. Col., C2, 25, fol. 158, La Bourdonnais' *Memoir* 1733.
9. *Ibid.,* fol. 182; Arch. Col., F5A *passim.*
10. Bib. Nat., A.F.F., 8981, Dupleix to the Comptroller General, January 5, 1739; Weber, *op. cit.,* p. 509.
11. Bib. Nat., N.A.F., 9146, fol. 71, Dupleix to the Company, February 15, 1753.
12. Arch. Col., C2, 73, fol. 15-16.
13. D'Argenson's *Mémoires,* III, fol. 51.
14. Martineau, Benoist Dumas, in *Revue de l'histoire des colonies,* VIII, 145-162.

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The materials used in the preparation of this work consist primarily of manuscript sources and the recent publications of the *Société de l'Histoire de l'Inde française.* The numerous monographs on the *Compagnie des Indes* have been of some value, but that of Weber, *La Compagnie des Indes,* alone deserves special mention. Two works on Dupleix also are to be particularly noted; Cultru, *Dupleix, Ses plans politiques et sa disgrâce,* and Martineau's four volume treatise on *Dupleix et l'Inde française.* The former is of considerable value for a study of the Paris end of the Company's administration; the latter for the Indian phase of it. M. Martineau alone of the authors consulted appears to have made use of the Pondicherry Archives; on that account and because he quotes considerably from the materials to be found there, his work is practically indispensable. The great majority of the secondary works deal almost exclusively with military affairs, so that while they occassionally shed a little light on the organization or the administration of the Company, they have hardly repaid the time spent in consulting them in the preparation of this particular work.

The manuscript collections of greatest value have been those of the Colonial Archives and the National Library at Paris, and of the Arsenal of the Marine at Lorient. No general body of manuscripts belonging to the Company and relating to the period studied, have been preserved. Much was destroyed during the course of the French Revolution, and in the fires which accompanied the uprisings of 1871. What remains today is of very fragmentary nature. However, there has been an important collection of sources published at Pondicherry during the past twenty years. This series, sometimes designated as the *Archives de l'Inde*, consists of the more important sources preserved at the old Indian headquarters of the Company. It has been of primary importance for our work.

Bibliographical Guides and Calendars of Manuscripts.

There is no guide especially devoted to the sources and secondary works relating to the history of the French East India Company, nor to the history of the French in India. Various modern authors have been of some value, in the bibliographical notes in their treatises, in locating material; Cultru, Martineau, and Weber are the chief of these.

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I. Documents

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II. Memoirs

One group of memoirs is largely the outgrowth of Dupleix's career as an imperialist in his last six years in India. After his return, in 1754, he spent the rest of his life attempting to justify his actions as governor. Included in this same group might be the memoirs of La Bourdonnais, Lally Tollendal, and Law. Then there are the memoirs of 1769, a series of polemical discources on the situation of the Company at that date and of its value to the Kingdom. Both of these groups of memoirs have their value to one who would make a detailed study of the history of the Company. They however cast but little light on its administration and organization. In order of their appearance, as nearly as can be determined, they are:

1. *Lettre écrit le 15 Janvier 1741, à son Eminence Monseigneur le Cardinal de Fleury; par Mahé de La Bourdonnais, gouverneur général des Iles de France et de Bourbon.*
2. *Mémoire de la dame de La Bourdonnais pour le sieur de La Bourdonnais.* Paris, 1748. Supplement, 1749.
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11. *Lettre de M. Godeheu à M. Dupleix.* Paris, 1760.
12. *Précis du sieur Dupleix servant de réponse préparatoire au mémoire de la Compagnie des Indes.* 1763.
13. *Mémoire pour la Compagnie des Indes contre le sieur Dupleix avec les pièces justificatives.* Paris, 1763.
14. *Précis du sieur Dupleix en réponse au mémoire pour la Compagnie des Indes.* Paris, 1763.
15. *Réponse du sieur Dupleix à la lettre du sieur Godeheu.* Paris, 1763.
16. *Plainte du chevalier Law contre le sieur Dupleix; motifs qui ont occassionné cette plainte, et pièces sommaire, de l'expedition de Trichinopoly.* Paris, 1763.
17. *Réfutation des faits imputés au sieur Godeheu par le sieur Dupleix.* Paris, 1764.
18. *Lettre en forme de rétraction addressée au chevalier Law et présentée au public au mois d'avril 1764 par la veuve de Dupleix.*
19. *Mémoire pour le comte de Lally, lieutenant général des armées du roi, commandant en chef dans l'Inde.* Paris, 1766.
20. Morellet, *Mémoire sur la situation actuelle de la Compagnie des Indes.* Paris, 1769.
21. Necker, *Réponse au mémoire de M. l'abbé Morellet sur la Compagnie des Indes.* Paris, 1769.
22. Ct. de Lauraguais, *Mémoire sur la Compagnie des Indes, précedé d'un discours sur le commerce.* Paris, 1769.
23. Dupont de Nemours, *Du commerce et de la Compagnie des Indes.* Paris, 1769.

III. Contemporary Accounts

Contemporary accounts prepared in the course of the eighteenth century by Abbé Guyon, Abbé Raynald, and Voltaire are, like the memoirs, of general interest and have but little to say about the administration of the Company. Guyon's work, if we are to believe the word of Pilavoin, one time councillor at Pondicherry, was paid for by Dumas! Raynald's work is of value for the statistics he gives. Voltaire's work is rightly named—Fragments on India.

Guyon, M. l'Abbé—*Histoire des Indes Orientales, anciennes et modernes.* Paris, 1744.

Raynald, Abbé Guillaume—*L'Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes.* Amsterdam, 1770.

Voltaire—*Fragmens sur l'Inde,* in vol. 26 of *Oeuvres complètes.* 1784.

IV. Recent Publications

A considerable body of source material has been printed since the dissolution of Law's Company. A small portion of this appeared in the nineteenth century, but the more important items are of recent date, 1911 and later. It consists primarily of materials drawn from the archives of Pondicherry, and edited by Mss. Gaudart and Martineau. The Madras government too has been active in the publishing field, and several works of value for study of the French in India have appeared from its press.

1. Publications of the *Société de l'Histoire de l'Inde française,* sometimes called *Archives de l'Inde française.* All have been published at Pondicherry.

Gaudart, E.—*Procès verbaux des délibérations du Conseil souverain de la Compagnie des Indes.* 1912-1913.

Volume II, 1913-14, and volume III, 1914, bear a slightly different title, *Procès verbeaux des délibérations du Conseil superieur de Pondichéry.* These three volumes cover the period 1701-1739.

Gaudart, E. et Martineau, A.—*Correspondance du Conseil superieur de Pondichéry avec le Conseil de Chandernagor, du 30 Septembre 1728 au 2 février 1747.* 2 vol. 1915-1916.

Volume III is issued in two parts, both edited by Martineau, 1918-1919. The first part, covering the period 1747-57, bears the same title as volumes I and II. The second part is entitled *Correspondance du Conseil de Chandernagor avec divers,* 1745-1757.

Martineau, A.—*Correspondance du Conseil superieur de Pondichéry et de la Compagnie.* Tome I—1726-1730; tome II—1736-1738; tome III—1739-1742; tome IV—1744-1749; tome V—1755-1739. Pondicherry 1920-1928.

,—*Lettres et Conventions des Gouverneurs de Pondichéry avec les divers princes indiens de* 1666 *à* 1793. 1911-1914.

—*La politique de Dupleix d'après sa lettre à Saunders et son mémoire du 16 October 1753.* 1927.

This work derives its title from a sixteen page introduction by the editor, but contains one hundred and thirty five pages of source material.

—*Résumé des Actes de l'Etat civil de Pondichéry de 1676 à 1735.* 1917. Volume II, 1736-1760. 1919.

The *Revue historique de l'Inde française* volumes I to V also contains a few source selections.

2. Publications issued from the press of the Madras Government.

The Records of Fort St. George; French Correspondence 1750-1752. 3 vols. 1914-1916.

Price, Sir J. F.—*The Private Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai, Dubash to Joseph François Dupleix, Knight of the Order of St. Michael, and Governor of Pondicherry. A Record of Matters Political, Historical, and Personal, from 1736 to 1761.* 12 vols. 1904-1928.

3. Other sources printed in the 19th and 20th centuries include;

Journal et mémoires du Marquis d'Argenson. Paris, 1859.

Mémoire du Chevalier de la Farelle sur la prise de Mahé. 1725 Paris, 1889.

Jean Law de Lauriston, *Mémoire sur quelques affaires de l'empire Mogol 1756-1761* Paris, 1913.

Manuscript Sources

Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris; *Salle de Manuscrits.*

Fonds Fraçais—(referred to in the footnotes as A.F.F. or *Ancien fonds français,* to distinguish them from the *Nouvelles acquisitions françaisès,* or N.A.F.)—contain several important volumes of the correspondence of Dupleix and numerous scattered references to the *Compagnie des Indes.* The volumes of especial value are:

6231—*Mémoire sur les Compagnies des Indes Orientales* 1642-1720.

7799—*Règlement touchant la marine de la Compagnie des Indes arresté en l'assemblée d'administration du* 16 *September* 1733; fols. 228-88.

8036—Dernis; *Historie des compagnies de commerce.*

8979—A register of Dupleix's correspondence with diverse individuals Sept. 1731-Jan. 1733.

8980—*Ibid.,* April 1737-July 1738.

8981—*Ibid.,* October 1737-January 1739.

8982—*Ibid.,* January 1739-March 1740.

8993—Godeheu's *Journal* 1753-1754.

9090—*Journal du voyage de Chevalier d'Albert dans les Indes Orientales, 1722-1726.*

11332—*Règlemens de Marine* 1730; Regulations relating to commerce and colonies which had not been printed.

12087—Contains an account of La Bourdonnais' visit to Coleche, a memoir by Verrier, relative to Surat, and various pieces relative to the wars in India of this period.

12088—Contains washed map of Pondicherry 1761.

Professor Gipson of Lehigh University kindly loaned me photostat copies of volumes 8971 and 12087.

Nouvelles Acquisitions Françaises.

Two important private collections are in this series, those of Ariel and Margry, volumes 8883 to 8941, and 9256 to 9510 respectively. The Margry collection is a great *mélange* of miscellaneous documents, copies for the greater part, relating to many phases of French colonial history.

The Ariel collection, likewise mostly copies, relates primarily to the French in India. It contains among other things extracts from the correspondence of the Superior Council which Ariel secured while in India. Of considerable value is the collection of Dupleix's correspondence and papers, volumes 9144 to 9170. This includes the letters received by him while in India, particulary from the Company, and from army officers under his command, and letters from those representing his interests in India after his return to France. Other volumes of some slight value are 9225, 9226, and 9227 of the St. Priest collection, containing a few printed pages relating to sales at Lorient, and some copies, usually extracts only, of letters and memoirs of the period before 1760.

Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal; manuscripts.

4743-4744—Minutes of Dupleix's correspondence January 27, 1735 to July 20, 1736; and July 23, 1736 to April 10, 1737.

5148—*Recueil de differents plans des villes et ports situées dans les Grandes Indes.*

Bibliothèque de la Marine; manuscripts. (Rue de l'Université, Paris)

MSS. vol. 230—*Tableau général de la navigation des vaisseaux de la Compagnie des Indes.*

Archives de la Marine; (deposited at the *Archives Nationales*)

Series B2—*Registre des ordres du Roy et dépêches concernant la Marine.*

Series B3—*Lettres reçues.*

These two series are of especial value in showing the close check which the Minister of Marine kept on the naval activities of the Company. However, the material relative to the Company does not comprise more than perhaps one per cent of the whole series.

Archives de la Marine; Arsenal, Lorient.

Here are to be found the few remaining papers which belonged to Law's Company, which have survived the revolutionary movements in France. In the series IP and P2 are several hundred volumes of papers of a rather diverse nature, most of them of little value.

IP—The series IP is divided into five parts;

Vols. 1 to 117 cover the period 1718 to 1756, and relate to financial matters.

Vols. 118 to 163—1718 to 1771, relate to campaigns of the various vessels.

Vols. 164 to 239—1719 to 1771, records of crews, costs of arming vessels, and accounts of condition of vessels on their return to Lorient.

Vols. 240 to 277—1719 to 1771, administration, including *levees* of soldiers, sales, construction, fortification, relations with colonies, etc.

Vols. 278 to 296—Correspondence, 1719 to 1783.

IP2—This series of 97 volumes was long in the hands of the cataloguer, and was only made available to the scholars in 1926. For the greater part it adds nothing to our knowledge of principles, but three volumes are of especial interest. Volume 68 contains a list of voyages made by the Company's ships totaling 1005 in the period 1718 to 1769. Volumes 69 and 70 contain valuable extracts of the deliberations of the Paris directors. Naturally, having been sent to Lorient, they relate primarily to naval affairs.

Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.

Materials were found in three series, *Asie, Angleterre,* and *France. Asie;*

Volumes 1 to 17 contain a considerable number of memoirs on the Company, the most valuable being that of Darrac, written early in the 19th century, and giving an outline of the Company's history. Copies of many documents relating to the treaty negotiations with the English in the 1750s are also to be found here.

France;

1252; 1256; 1260; 1341; 1365; 1598; 1991; 2007; 2010; 2018; In these volumes are to be found memoirs containing suggestions for the reform of the government of the Company, and relating to its value to the state. There are also some edicts.

Angleterre;

422; 425; 426; 429; 434; 435; these volumes contain documents showing the place of the French Company in the country's diplomatic relations of the 1740s and 1750s.

Archives Nationales

ADix—384 to 386, Official decrees concerning the Company.

ADxi—41, Official decree concerning trade with India.

E—Register of action taken by the King's councils, with very few references to the Company.

F 12, volumes 51 to 105—Register of deliberations of the Council of Commerce 1700 to 1766. Of some slight value in showing the nature of the relations between the Company and various merchants in France.

F 50, *Marine et Colonies;* Volumes 1 to 12, Memoirs concerning the Company; Correspondence of persons connected with the Company.

G 7, 1705—Letters of nobility for directors of the Company.

M, 200; 203; 204; 240; these volumes contain documents relating to the activities of missionaries in the East in the 18th century.

P, Letters patent issued by the King; volumes 2380; 2441; 2454; and 2467.

Archives du Ministère des Colonies. (Rue Oudinot, Paris)

Series C 2—Documents relating to India. The series is divided into three parts. The volumes relating to our period are;

22 to 42—Administration in France. Volume 35 is missing.

65 to 84—general correspondence, originals and copies of correspondence between various posts and the Company, and between individuals associated with the Company.

116 and 117—these two volumes form a section entitled *Mémoires*, but scattered throughout practically all the volumes in the other sections are other memoirs.

This series is by all means the most important for a study of the administration of the Company.

G I, 481—*Census of Chandernagor*, 1751-1756.

Inde 2, volumes 4 to 11 are supplementary to series C 2.

Inde, 457—A collection of paravanas, firmans, and treaties of the 18th century, partially translated.

Archives du Ministère des Colonies—Deposited at the *Archives Nationales.*

D 2—Colonial troops; contains also a few references to the civil personnel in India.

F 3—volume 46, *Collection Moreau de St. Mery*, relative to India. Volume 238, Collection of laws, incomplete, in force in India 1604 to 1759, entitled *Code de l'Inde.*

F 5 A—*Missions;* volumes 16, 17, and 19 relate to Ursulines and Jesuits in India.

Archives Départementales.

Seine et Oise—(Versailles)

Series E, 3746 to 3756, Minutes of letters written by Dupleix 1750 to 1754. Vol. 3756 bis—Account book 1754.

Morbihan

Series E, vol. 238—copy of letters and memoirs of the City of Lorient 1736 to 1742.

Archives Communales.

Nantes

Series H H, vols. 199 to 236. These contain numerous documents relative to the activities of the Company at Nantes, to 1732. They are of great value for a study of the sales.

India Office (London)

The voluminous records of the India Office contain many a scattered reference to the French. To understand the nature of the relations between the two Companies, it is not necessary to know the details of all their dealings with one another. The volumes consulted, and found to be of any value for my purpose were:

French in India Series, volumes 1 to 4; These relate principally to military affairs 1740 to 1760.

Fort St. David Factory Records, Consultation and Diary Book, volumes 5 and 6.

Home Series, Miscellaneous, vol. 74.

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